The All India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat had, before the election, placed two clear political objectives before the Muslims: to defeat the BJP which aspired to regain control of the state and to raise Muslim representation in the Assembly. Both objectives stand fulfilled. With 57 MLA, still short of 75 which is their due, the Muslims are better represented in the Assembly than ever before with a jump of 20% over the previous Assembly. The number could have surpassed 75 with a little more vigilance and effort. The Muslim MLAs constitute roughly 14% of the strength of the Assembly, about 16% the ruling party against 18% in the population. Again a record, but to achieve due representation, the Muslims have a long way to go.
Out of 403 seats there are about 100 seats with high Muslim concentration. Even in this election, apart from 61 winners there are 37 Muslim runners-up. They were defeated mainly because the secular votes were divided, but also because Muslim votes in a given constituency were also divided. Politically speaking, non-Muslim candidates of SP or BSP or INC defeated a Muslim candidate of one of the other two. In some cases, the BJP ran away with the cake, even in some high Muslim concentration seats.
It is interesting to note that out of 12 Muslim mini-parties, only one opened its account with one seat. All others had security deposits of all their candidates forfeited. This shows that the Muslims have not fallen into the religious trap or followed the advice of power brokers with religious face.
They have also learnt to avoid the baradari or the denominational trap, Wahabi-Deobandi or Shia-Sunni. They have thus refined their technique of tactical voting i.e.; voting for the most winnable secular candidate capable of defeating the BJP in the constituency and voting preferentially for a Muslim candidate of a secular party in Muslim concentration constituencies. They largely voted unitedly. Where they failed was quantum of voting. Whatever the reason, the turn-out in U.P.was only 46% and there is no indication that the Muslim turn-out was significantly higher, as it normally is and should be.
The Mushawarat had also worked out a list of 98 Muslim concentration seats and endorsed winnable candidates in 92 constituencies. If no suitable Muslim candidate was in the field in a constituency, the Mushawarat had endorsed a non-Muslim candidate of a secular party who was likely to win. Of these, 31 Muslims and 9 non-Muslims hit the bull’s eye.
In the State Council of Ministers, Chief Minister Mayawati has included one Muslim as a Cabinet Minister, two as Ministers of State (independent charge) and two as Ministers of State, more or less in proportion to the Muslim strength in the ruling party. It is noteworthy that the Muslim Ministers have been allotted important portfolios. Particularly, the Cabinet Minister Naseemuddin Siddiqui, who represents the Muslim face of the BSP, has a huge portfolio. He is third in the hierarchy, after the CM and her closest political advisor, a Brahmin.
Mayawati had issued no manifesto, made no lavish promises but she had ceaselessly traversed the State for the last two years to build up support among all sections, particularly the Hindu high castes, the Muslims and the MBCs, the weakest section of the OBCs, who had been cheated of their due under Mulayam Singh Yadav. She came up with a new slogan of Sarvajan Samaj which means all the people. She promised Social Justice for All and devised a new design for social engineering. She made special efforts to woo the Brahmin who voted for the BSP because they saw no hope of the BJP coming back to power and no chance of the Congress regaining its predominance. She galvanised the people against Mulayam Singh Yadav’s misrule. She ignored inspired charges and acquired support among the Muslims, about 25% voters, though the SP constantly played the Muslim-Yadav formula. She gave tickets to 61 Muslims not only in constituencies of Muslim concentration but in some other constituencies where her own community, the Chamaars, or the MBCs & the Muslims together accounted for a sizable proportion of the electorate . She highlighted the common grievances on law and order, criminalisation of governance and corruption. Her tactics paid dividends and her social constituency, in theory, was expanded from 20% SC to 70% of the population. She gave the high castes who constitute about 20% of population even more seats because they have traditionally held or controlled many constituencies . They won 51 out of 137 contested. Out of 61 30 Muslims, 50%, won. She gave 110 tickets to the Dalits of whom 62 won. To the others the OBCs and MBCs she gave 93 tickets of whom 63 won.
The main problems she faces are to keep the Brahmins and other high castes satisfied, and the bureaucracy, dominated by them in line. It has served as the instrument of corruption in all previous regimes. Also she has some MLAs with criminal record in her own ranks.
Her advantage lies in the size of her legislature party, which makes organized defection or split practically impossible to achieve. She has thus a fair chance of giving U.P. a strong and stable Government for her full term of five years. If she runs U.P. well and repeats her performance in the Lok Sabha Election in 2009, her road to Delhi is clear and she may emerge as a major and even decisive force within the UPA, which she has decided to support.
There is always a possibility that in order to maintain herself in power, she may succumb to the pressure of the high castes and pay a high price for their support but it is doubtful she will permit herself to become a puppet in their hands. Her record shows that she is inclined to share power more or less equitably among all identified social groups while taking care of her core supporters, the Dalits(SC’s & MBC’s). On the other hand, she may discard any section which asks for too much,as she builds up a wider population base by giving the people what they most desire; good governance and development.
The Muslim community in U.P. which has today hitched its wagon to Mayawati’s rising star comprises 18.5% of the state population and roughly 25% of the national Muslim population. It is at the same time one of the most backward Muslim communities of any state in the country, next only to West Bengal. What they get, will depend on how the Muslim MLA’s perform.
Since 1947, Muslims in U.P. have always supported a secular party but so far they have never graduated to equitable partnership, to having a say in governance and sharing power won by the party they supported. This was as true of the Mulayam Singh Yadav’s regime as the preceding decades of the Congress rule. In a way they have always been exploited and at the end they felt frustrated and alienated, switching support, dividing their votes, trying mini-parties floated by Muslim political adventurers. For the first time, the Muslims have come to realize the value of solidarity.
The Muslims in U.P. have been asking why they have never shared power as in Kerala or become a strong political force as in Assam. They should understand that U.P. is a large State and the Muslims are too widely dispersed. They should also remember that U.P in the pre-independence days was the major base of the Pakistan Movement, and the main arena of struggle between Hindu & Muslim Communalism. Over the years, despite the surge of Hindu communalism particularly through the Ramjanambhoomi Movement, the ideas of Secularism and Social Justice have penetrated the mind of the common man to deal on equal terms with caste-based parties in the arena. Any overreach by the Muslim or any aggressive demonstration of religious identity will only serve the purposes of Hindu Communalism. Steadily the national parties like the Congress or BJP have receded in the background and cast-based regional parties have come to occupy the front row. The modus operandi of these parties is to consolidate their own caste vote and then seek support from other castes and communities which more readily comes forth once it has reached a critical mass. That is how Jat-based Lok Dal or, the Yadav-based Samajwadi Party or the Dalit-based BSP sought and secured Muslim support and came to power. Muslim should realise that they missed the boat by not forming a Muslim-core party at that juncture or even a Muslim pressure group.
All political parties have their own social constituencies but, with the exception of the BJP, they are not hostile to or suspicious of the Muslims and are inclined to treat Muslims as yet another element in the electoral equation. They are not averse to the Muslim receiving a reasonable, if not due, return.
The Muslims have to participate in the struggle of the common man for a better life and not confine themselves to their own deprivations and grievances. In brief, their political strategy has to be inclusive, for full participation in the quest for justice for all deprived sections of the people.
The basic problem lies in that the UP Muslims have failed to throw up a leader of stature, capable of negotiating on equal terms with the leaders of other secular parties. Leaders do not drop from heavens, but emerge from the people through struggle and sacrifice, and through mutual trust and confidence. The Muslims have no political weight in UP because they have no leadership and they have no leadership because they can not unite under a leader. So, whether it is a Muslim-core party or a Muslim pressure group, to be effective, above all they need unity. Unity alone shall empower the leadership to negotiate with other groups and deliver on his commitments and secure the agreed quid pro quo.
Once the Muslims have overcome their social, sectarian and political divisions, they should line up, to the last man, behind a time tested, selfless, experienced and competent leader and build an effective pressure group or political party. Unity then they have no option but to extract maximum gains from tactical voting. But they have to learn to exert pressure on the government, through the MLA’s they helped to win, on the treasury benches and in the opposition, who should come forth to place their concerns before the government, the legislature and the people.
New Delhi
1 June, 2007 (Syed Shahabuddin)