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| Muslim India MONTHLY JOURNAL OF REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION VOL. XXVI NO. 304 CONTENTS OCTOBER, 2009 FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK: Call to the Community to oppose Centaral Madrasa Board and Save Madrasas ASSEMBLY ELECTION 2009: Syed Shahabuddin on Analysis of Maharashtra Assembly Election, 2009 BOOK REVIEW: Sadia Dehlavi’s Sufism-The Heart of Islam Reviewed by Rakhshanda Jalil BABARI MASJID: Iqbal A. Ansari on Role of the Congress in the Demolition CONSTITUTION: Quest for Freedom and Justice-Third Tarkunde Memorial Lecture by Kamal Hossain, ex F.M. of Bngladesh, 12 July, 2009 DEMOCRACY: Neelabh Mishra on Party System in Shambles DALIT POLITICS: Vikas Pathak on Tragedy of National Commission for SC and ST EDUCATION: C.P. Bhambhri on Abolition of Secondary Education GUJARAT GENOCIDE: J.S. Bandukwala on how to Defuse a Train of Gunpowder : Harsh Mander on Frozen Compassion & Absence of Remorse HINDUTVA: D.N. Jha’s Rethinking Hindu Identity Reviewed by Aditya Mukherjee : Mohan Bhagwat on Hindutva as Common Identity of all Indians HINDU TERRORISM: Parivar Claims Baba Budan Dargah, Chikmaglur-Second Ayodhya as making in the South : Abhishek Raman on Shiv Sena’s Call to Form Hindu Terrorist Squads HERITAGE: Khuda Bakhsh O. P. Library, Patna Annual Report, 2007-08 (Extracts) KASHMIR QUESTION: Sheikh Showkat Hussain on Unlawful & Unconstitutional Land Grab in Kashmir by Army & Other Authorities LAW: Joint Statement of Muslim Leaders on Legalisation of Homosexuality : Editorial The Times of India, 30 June 2009 MONUMENT: Editorial, The Hindu on Missing Monuments MINORITY QUESTION: Sarabjit Kaur on Religious Minorities in India MUSLIM WORLD: Uri Avnery on Revival of Myth of Propagation of Islam by Sword by Pope Benedict XVI to Support President Bush’s New Crusade : Debarshi Dasgupta on Cultivation of Israel Muslim Indians by Israel : Hasan Suroor on New Wave of Islamophobia in Europe? : Adrian Michaels on Muslim Europe: A Demographic Time Bomb : George Friedman on Afghan War: A New Strategy : Sam Sagher on Internally Dispaced Kurds in Iraq : Dr. Syed Habeeb Ashruf’s Message: From a Concerned Muslim American to Muslim Indians NATIONAL POLITICS-BJP: S. Prasannarajan on Advani’s Inglorious Finale NATIONALISM: Sunil Khilnani on The Ideals of India PARTITION: Ashis Nandy on Partition as a Humiliation & Loss of Real Estate for many Hindus : M J Akbar on Nehru & Patel: Divided India to Save It for Civil War : Balraj Puri: Was Jinnah Secular and Solely Responsible? : Maulana Azad on Partition RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION: Subhash Gatade on Cancellation of Allotment of Land for Masjid in Delhi by DDA SOCIAL JUSTICE: Amartya Sen on Rapid Growth with Widening Inequities in India : Mani Shankar Aiyar on Poverty of Politics and Politics of Poverty WAKF: Saba Naqvi on Wakf Scam: Allah’s Properties are Free for All! FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK Call to the Community to Oppose Central Madrasa Board and Save Madrasas The Madrasa as an institution has always been an eye-sore for the Sangh Parivar. They see it as the defence line for Muslim identity and an obstacle to eventual assimilation of Muslims in the Hindu fold. Under the NDA government the madrasas particularly in border areas were looked upon as cradle for terrorists and shelter for militants. As a result many madrasas including Nadwatul Ulama were subjected to search. Following 9/11 the US authorities added a new word to their lexicon-‘Deobandi’ because they were told that the Taliban had been trained in ‘Deobandi Madrasas’ in Pakistan. These madrasas had been established by the old boys of the Darul Uloom and had no connection whatsoever with Deoband. But, all embassies and intelligence agencies put the Darul Uloom and other Madrasas on their radar. Though, Home Minister Advani admitted that no madrasa manager or teacher anywhere in the country had been prosecuted for any subversive activity, the local police continued to harass them. Harassment has stopped but suspicion lingered about their purpose and their funding. At one stage, government tried to place its own teachers in the madrasas in the name of ‘modernization’. Very few madrasa responded to the bait. This may well be the conceptual origin of the proposed Central Madrasa Board. History The National Policy on Education, 1986, updated in 1992, two centrally sponsored schemes for Area Intensive Programme for Educationally Backward Minorities and for Financial Assistance for Modernization of Madrasa Education were launched during 1993-94. Under the 10th Plan these two schemes were merged to form the Area Intensive and Madrasa Modernisation Programme. These schemes are now sought to be replaced by a Central Madrasa Board which seeks to coordinate, regulate and control all madrasa education in the country. The State Madrasa Boards, functioning in some states have disappointed the Muslim community.The Central government has never conducted review of the impact of its Madrasa Modernization Programme whose basic approach was to provide teachers to Madrasas for modern subjects like English, Mathematics, Science and Social Studies. But the present Bill goes far beyond. The Central Madrasa Board Bill, drafted during the first UPA Government (2004-09) was ready for introduction but it was not introduced, whatever, the official reason, because nearly all well known Jamias, Darul Ulooms and Madrasas in the country, including the Jamia Nadwatul Ulama, Lucknow and the Darul Uloom, Deoband, were totally opposed to the very concept of a Central Board funding Madrasa education, laying down a uniform curriculum and syllabus(even for non-theological subjects), and conducting common examinations. So, this was a tactical move because of the fear of a negative impact on Muslim support for the UPA in the 2009 General Election. Now, that the second UPA government has completed 100 days in office, the Bill brought out of the closet, has been circulated to the Muslim MPs for their views. The Bill is not yet quite in the public domain because the heads of nationally eminent Muslim organizations like the JUH, the AIMMM, the JIH, the AIMPLB, the MJAH, and the All India Shia Conference have not been taken into confidence. Nor have the views of Muslim educationists and opinion-makers been sought. The idea is first to placate the Muslim MPs, because they alone can raise a rumpus in the Parliament. Controversial Aspects The community, as a whole, is not convinced about the need or urgency of the move. The first question they raise is why the government is so anxious to bring all madrasas under a centralized administration even to the best of its knowledge, no such central board exists for the Sanskrit Paathshalas whose number far exceeds that of the madrasas. If the idea is to upgrade the standard of education in religious institutions and to make their products more employable than they have conventionally been, the same consideration applies to Paathshalas. The State Madrasa Boards have not distinguished themselves by producing any religious scholars of national repute since their inception or at least since independence. They have been working as attached and subordinate offices of government steeped in corruption, graft and nepotism like the paathshala. In some states, for example, in Bihar, official intervention in Madrasas was politically motivated so that the Government of the day or the party in power may secure the free services of a set of drum beaters in every basti or mohalla! But the standard of these Sarkari madrasas and the employment prospects of their output were so low that they did not acquire any credence or credibility in the community. Largely, it was the products of the Azad (unaffiliated) madrasas which refused aid, retained their autonomy and produced the Ulema and religious functionaries. But the Muslim community did realize that religious scholars who perform conventional functions should also have minimum knowledge about the country and the world at large and have some idea of the direction in which the world and the country are moving. Therefore, apart from receiving classical instruction in theology, they should acquire basic knowledge of non-theological subjects and current affairs. This idea has been recognized by nearly all the leading madrasas and has flowered over the last 2 or 3 decades and many darul ulooms have taken pains to revise and prune their classical syllabus in order to teach non-theological subjects, essential in the modern context and pursue ‘contemporary education’. However, they have drawn a line between the two branches of knowledge and always focused on the essential purpose of the madrasas, which is not to produce administrators or engineers or doctor but religious scholars, and devoted only 25% of the academic time to contemporary subjects. At the other extreme, in West Bengal the affiliated madrasas have all been converted into high and secondary schools under the state madrasa board and allotted less than 10% of the academic time to what it calls ‘Introduction of Islam’, which covers all branches of theology-Tafsir, Hadith, Seerat and Fiqh. One can easily realise that this deformed and distorted education cannot produce any Islamic scholars worth the name, West Bengal has thus killed Madrasa Education. Unaffiliated Madrasas in UP and Kerala, for different reasons, have followed a common strategy to achieve the objective. Since primary instruction is prohibited in UP through the medium of Urdu which is the mother tongue of nearly 100 % of Muslim students. Muslim students are normally enrolled in local madrasas where they study up to the primary level. Then most of them take primary examination as private candidates and enter normal schools. In Kerala, school enrollment is nearly universal and all Muslim boys and girls have double enrollment during the first five years spending morning hours in the local madrasas and the rest of the day in schools. At the end of 5 years, those who aspire to become Aalim, stay with the madrasa system while a large majority moves on to the general school. These examples show that neither the Muslim community nor the managers of the madrasas are blind to the changing circumstances and the aspirations of the young Muslims and are trying to adjust as best as they can, without giving up theological instruction to every child at the impressional age of 5-10, to lay the foundation of his or her Islamic identity. During the last two decades there has been a very fortunate development. The senior products of the madrasas, comparable to graduates are accepted by several well known universities like the AMU, the JMI, the JNU and the Jamia Hamdard for the master course in several subjects, or a course in Tibb. Some universities require them to take a one year bridge-course in order to familiarize themselves with the new subjects of study as well as improve English which is often the medium of education. Such products have found their way into government service, including the central civil services, mass communication system, government media and as translators in the foreign service. This development has opened a new horizon for the madrasa products without affecting the autonomy of the institution or diluting its basic purpose. Why emphasis on Madrasas? Another important question that arises in the Muslim mind relates to the fact that only 4% of the Muslim students at the secondary level are enrolled in madrasas while 96% study in schools and colleges and receive certificates and degrees. What the community fails to comprehend is the selective approach. Most of the Muslim youth armed with university degrees are unemployed or they take jobs far below their entitlement. Why is it that the government is so anxious about improving the prospects of the madrasa products, while totally ignoring the wide spread unemployment among educated Muslim youth? Why no Schools in Muslim Areas? The Government launched Sarava Shiksha Abhiyan and is now implementing the Right to Education Act. But even at the lowest level, the benefits of universalisation are yet to reach the community in their villages and mohallas. Why the government does not care to establish adequate number of schools according to national norms. If they exist they are generally treated step-children. Muslim parents are eager to send their children to schools of minimum quality in the neighbourhood, even braving other linguistic and social obstacles. A legitimate question is addressed to the government why it does not provide minimum educational facility and at least primary education of minimum acceptable quality to Muslim children in most cases have no option but to attend maktabs in local masjids. Outline of the Bill Let us now have a glance through the Bill. Though the Long Title only mentions coordination and standardization of non-theological education, the Act goes far beyond clearly shows under the Bill that the Board will be established by the Government will not enjoy academic or administrative autonomy. There is no compulsion, no doubt, and the Board shall affiliate why the madrasas which volunteer for the ‘honour ‘ to receive the ‘benefits’. But once affiliated, the Board can disaffiliate them or take disciplinary measures for not following its instructions. However, affiliation entitles the madrasas to receive grant-in-aid from the Central or the state governments. Among the list of subjects to be taught, theology does not have any priority. Instead of fiq‘h, philosophy is mentioned. The senior products are not guaranteed admission to colleges or universities or government institutions, far less employment. The Act does not lay down any qualification for the selection of the Chairperson of the Board or the method of selection or appointment (Section 4). Theoretically, it can be a non-Muslim. In any case, he shall be a person who enjoys the confidence of the government in power. Read with the provision for the appointment of Registrar (Section 14) who is to be nominated by the government in consultation with the Chairperson, it is clear that the decisions of the Board shall be taken, whatever the procedure laid down, by the Chairperson and the Registrar both of whom shall toe the line of the government. The Board shall have 11 additional members (Section 4 (1)), all of them nominated. 7 of them shall be ‘renowned’ Muslim religious scholars belonging to various sects and denominations. The draft mentions a ‘Deobandi’ and a ‘Barelvi’ while there are no such sects as they are both Hanafis. It shall have Ahle Hadith, Shafeis as well as two Shia scholars, one belonging to the Bohra community. Thus the Bill lacks a sense of proportion and seeks to divide the community. In addition, the Board shall include three Muslim educationists including a woman as well as a Muslim philanthropist (why?). No member will have any representative status, as the head of a Muslim organization, Jamaat or institution. The members will serve at the sweet will of the government and may be removed by the government before completing their term of three years. The Board shall have several Committees. The most important is the Curriculum Committee with 5 including the Chairperson of the Board as its head and the Registrar as Secretary (Section 35). The government shall nominate or appoint all other officers or employee. The Rules and Regulations of the Board shall be formulated by the Government. The Board shall hold an Annual Meetings, prepare an Annual Report as well as an Annual Statement of Accounts, duly audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, to be submitted for presentation to the Parliament. Section 18 (1) lays down the general duty of the Board as the standardization of the non-theological aspects of Madrasa system for its ‘comprehensive, systematic and integrated development’. But this is no more than a mask. Nowhere does the Act lay down the proportion of academic time and energy to be devoted to non-theological instruction. It is presumed that standardization by the Board will universally apply to all affiliated madrasas of the country. One wonders if it is possible and practicable. The Act goes further to empower the board to ‘emphasise the liberal, universalist and contextually pro-active genius of Islam’. It does not even clarify whether the general education in the Madrasas shall be compatible with basic Islamic doctrines. Sub-section 18(1)(w) speaks of ‘programmes for the consolidation of the inclusive society marked by religious and cultural diversity through proper interfaith understanding’. This is as political an objective as could be and can possibly clash with the basic tenets of madrasa education. Finally, it provides under sub-clause (ee) for ‘adoption of a non-polemelical approach to other religions and non-sectarian institutions in a state of fidelity to the Islamic spiritual tradition’. One does not understood what this means. But, it is obvious that any instruction for da`wa shall come under a ban. The Board shall recommend not only textbooks in non-theological subjects but also the prescribed reading material. Chapter V relating to finance, accounts and audit does not lay down that the affiliated madrasa shall be wholly funded by the government or the Board; it speaks of donations, gifts, etc., which are normally available to the madrasas. The funds of the Board shall be allocated as grants to affiliated madrasas for their maintenance and development and for such other purpose as may be prescribed including remuneration and honorarium. Again, nowhere does the Bill say that the remuneration and honorarium to the teaching and non teaching staff of the affiliated madrasas shall match those admissible to those of government schools and colleges. The Budget of the Madrasa shall be subject to approval by the Board. The financial procedure as well as the audit procedure is the same as generally applicable to government institutions but it will be beyond the capacity of an average madrasa to fulfill the formalities. In addition, the madrasas shall submit periodical reports and returns to the Board, for compilation and submission to the central government. It is said that the country has more than 100,000 madrasas but the figures may be misleading. The government has not done its home work to quantify the number of Maktabs and what the Bill calls primary, upper primary, secondary and higher secondary madrasas. If the past experience of the number of institutions which volunteered to receive government grant under ‘Modernisations Programmes’ is a guide, the total number of madrasas affiliated to the Board may not exceed a few thousands. But this is also raises a question on the double affiliation of the Madrasas which are already affiliated to some state boards. The Bill is also silent about the organic relationship between the Central and State Madrasa Boards. Conclusion The Modernisation Programme having failed, the Government now wishes to take over the entire madrasa system. No doubt, the teachers who are ill-paid may be better paid. But for hudnreds of years the community has supported the madrasa system and will not easily succumb to the lure of money or official status. The community knows that affiliation to a Government Board is an embrace of death which will not merely distort and devalue the system. Ultimately it will kill it. The Community realizes that the AMU and the JMI have lost their status as minority institutions. It also knows that despite Article 30, it is not easy to set up minority schools and colleges because of deliberate obstructions, which even the NCMEI has not been able to tackle with any success. Essentially, the madrasas are minority institutions. Nearly, all of them are also wakfs in law. The Bill totally ignores both these crucial aspects. Even the Right to Education Act does not recognize the functioning madrasas as equivalent to schools for the purpose of universalisation of education. Virtual takeover of the madrasas by the government will amount to gross interference in the religious affairs of the community and a violation of the Constitution. The madrasas are all modernizing themselves and introducing non-theological subjects, at their own pace and in response to the felt needs of the community. They cannot be rushed into divesting themselves of their autonomy and their real purpose for the production of Ulema and religious functionaries. Muslim organizations as well as leading Ulema and eminent Madrasas have already taken a position against the official move. There may be an odd voice here and there, enticed by monetary prospects, but just as the move to take over and regulate madrasas in Pakistan, at the instance of the USA after 9/11, under President Musharraf failed, so will this move. Insha Allah! Muslim India requests the government not to interfere in the madrasa system but as well-wishers simply create a Madrasa Development Fund which may be drawn upon by some madrasas at their option for their development. And no more. New Delhi 1 October, 2009 (Syed Shahabuddin) CONSTITUTION Constitutions and the Challenge of Social and Economic Change Quest for Freedom and Justice Third Tarkunde Memorial Lecture by Dr. Kamal Hossain, Former Foreign Minister of Bngladesh, 12 July, ‘09 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, was truly an act of faith, of a shared commitment to constitutionalism, based on human rights as "the foundation of freedom and justice and peace in the world". The Declaration was, thus, a bold expression of humanity’s resolve to change the existing reality. It proclaimed in the opening words of its operative part that the Declaration would serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. It was in effect a pledge to strive, at the national and international level to challenge colonialism, apartheid and authoritarian rule the world over and thus to universalize ‘constitutionalism’ and commit us all to concert our efforts to bring about social and economic change. The Universal Declaration clearly reflected the aspirations and objectives of those across the world, who were actively engaged in movements for political freedom and for economic and social justice. The emergence into independence meant for all of us the beginning of a quest for a free and just society, in which many and diverse expectations and competing interests would seek fulfillment. It fell to those placed in leadership roles to articulate those aspirations and to devise constitutional instruments and institutions to realize them. One is struck by the similarity of the language in which those aspirations were expressed. They asserted our right to self-government, to representative institutions to be established through free and fair elections, to the rule of law, to an independent judiciary, and through these institutions to strive for social and economic transformation of our societies, in which there existed unacceptable levels of social and economic inequality. The Objectives Resolution adopted on 22 January, 1947 by the Constituent Assembly of India solemnly pledged to secure to all the people of India justice, social, economic and political, and to safeguard fundamental human rights of all, including minorities. It drew upon popular consensus as expressed in documents which went back to the end of the nineteenth century. These included: the Constitution of India Bill, prepared in 1895 by some eminent Indians, the proposal adopted by the Indian National Congress, at the special session in Bombay in August 1918 for the new Government of India Act to contain a followed by resolutions adopted at the Madras Session in 1926 (and the Karachi Session in 1932) that the future Constitution must include a declaration of fundamental rights. The Commonwealth of India Bill, finalized by the National Convention in 1926, embodied rights in terms practically identical with the relevant provisions of the Irish Constitution. The Sapru Committee (1944-48) in its report urged the incorporation of fundamental rights in the Constitution while recommending their further division into justiciable and nonjusticiable rights. The coming decades would see progress towards an integrated approach recognizing all human rights (political and civil and social, economic and cultural) to be universal, indivisible, inter-dependent and inter-related. This was proclaimed in the Vienna Declaration of the World Conference of Human Rights in 1993. The Rio Declaration (1992) had enumerated as its first principle that "human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development". This followed the words in the Stockholm Declaration (1972), The critical relevance of civil and political rights to the realization of economic and social rights has been underscored by the Nobel Laureate, Professor Amarty Sen, who as the author of the first chapter of the Human Development, 2000 spelt out the conceptual framework for it. National constitutions were to reflect this integrated approach. The Freedom Charter, a statement of political principles by South Africans opposed to apartheid, ratified at the Congress of the People in 1955, called for a social order in which: "Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children …. …. All people shall have the right to … be decently housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security … [N]o-one shall go hungry; [and] free medical care and hospitalization shall be provided for all, with special care for mothers and young children." The Indian Supreme Court has been giving substance to Directive Principles, holding in Kesavanda’s case, that: "The Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights mainly proceed on the basis of Human Rights. Representative democracies will have no meaning without economic and social justice to the common man. Freedom from foreign rule can be looked upon only as an opportunity to bring about economic and social advancement. After all freedom is nothing else but a chance to be better". The judgment went on to observe that the Objectives were "a precursor to the Preamble to the Constitution and have now been incorporated in the Preamble." Chief Justice Bhagawati explained the rationale for the expanding scope of judicial review and the judiciary’s pro-active role in promoting social and economic rights through public interest litigation. He emphasized that the constitutional promise of socio-economic transformation and an egalitarian social order called for a liberal judicial approach. Over the years the Supreme Court has contributed towards protection of socio-economic rights in (many) cases. It has also approved of reservations by way of affirmative action in favour of the less privileged. In Bangladesh the Supreme Court has played a pro-active role in entertaining public interest litigation petitions to protect the lives and livelihood of people from adverse environmental and ecological impacts of projects. It has also admitted petitions and granted protection to slum dwellers to factory workers, environmental hazards, corruption of inhuman custodial practices. The constitutional mandate to bring about social and economic transformation is a pledge to the people. There is a legitimate expectation that constitutional organs, each in their own sphere, will make their utmost efforts to achieve that goal. The increasing resort to public interest litigation and the proactive role progressively assumed by courts is in part the result of the deficits in discharging their role by other organs. In India, since 1970 to the present day, the Supreme Court role has been expanding its protective role through. By innovative interpretations of the right to life and other provisions, it has given protection to those being denied their socio-economic rights, including the right to housing, education and health. The criticism that such a pro-active role by the judiciary amounted to judicial overreaching into spheres reserved for other organs has, however, yielded to the view that such a role is justified as legitimate judicial realization of the Constitution’s transformative social values. In deed the constitutional mandate for social and economic change requires activism on the part of all the organs as well the citizens. Therefore, I favour judicial activism. Not only has Indian Supreme Court earned public respect and given hope to those segments of the poor and vulnerable who were marginalized and excluded, but has generated legal resources which others have drawn upon. The widely discussed recent judgment of the Delhi High Court obtained by the Naz Foundation demonstrates judicial courage and creativity to protect persons who have been victims of social taboos. Social transformation through enforcing of constitutionallyrecognized socio-economic rights is an on-going process and can be described as work-in-progress.Change can only be ensured by identifying the barriers, which are placed in the path of social and economic change by powerful interests, and the means of overcoming them through a strategy of empowerment and strengthened democracy. A former EU Commissioner on Development from Germany, Dieter Frisch, wrote as follows: "The rule of law cannot be replaced by market forces … (a new culture is emerging where) the pursuit of fast and easy money by any means makes people who work hard appear naïve and foolish…" When societies promoting economic liberalization have ignored the need for law and social policies efficiently to regulate the operations of the market, uncontrolled freedom has tended to degenerate into licence to maximize private profit by any means and resulted in burgeoning corruption, fraudulent financial transactions involving banks and stock exchanges, the emergence of powerful criminal syndicates and growing violence paralleled by ruthless and lawless law enforcement. Globalization and economic liberalization have significant implications for the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, and, in particular, the rights of the poor and the disadvantaged. The linkage between democracy, development and human rights is underscored by studies which have documented that "bad governance leads to incompetent - and often discriminatory - administration of social services and development projects, widening social gaps ...and constitutes a major obstacle to social development" and also "the impoverishing effects and basic inhumanity of gender discrimination - in terms of prescribed and limiting roles; lack of economic opportunity, health care geared to the needs of women and children, access to education, credit, land, income and property; and participation in institutions which enable popular participation" We had been forewarned of these dangers several decades ago by the Nobel Laureate, Kaviguru Rabindranath Tagore , thus: "We have for over a century been dragged by the prosperous West behind its chariot, choked by the dust, deafened by the noise, humbled by our own helplessness and overwhelmed by the speed. We agreed to acknowledge that this chariotdrive was progress, and the progress was civilization. If we ever ventured to ask ‘progress toward what, and progress for whom’, it was considered to be peculiarly and ridiculously oriental to entertain such ideas about the absoluteness of progress. Of late, a voice has come to us to take count not only of the scientific perfection of the chariot but of the depth of the ditches lying in its path." As early as 1964 Pandit Nehru, in response to Andre Malraux’s question: "What has been your greatest difficulty since independence?", had answered: "Creating a just society by just means.". Some five decades later those words have a strange contemporary ring as the quest for freedom and justice still continues in our societies. The State and Democracy in South Asia Report ( 2008) brings home to us how formidable is the challenge of social and economic change that still faces us:. Once seen as a contradiction in terms which required a country to choose either political freedom or economic equality, the challenge of simultaneously pursuing the two goals is present in some measure in all parts of the world, but nowhere is the challenge as imposing as it is in South Asia …. If one needed any evidence to believe that freedom from want is still a distant goal in this region that South Asians experience the most intense forms of poverty, deprivation and destitution, this Report lists it all. Restoring justice to development calls for strengthening democracy, which in turn calls for re-generation of healthy politics. Politics must be regenerated so that it is once again the means for engaging the hearts and minds of all our people. It is through mobilizing of empowered citizens and their shared efforts that a just society can be built. Human rights activism, popular mobilization and the strengthening of civil society in support of the core democratic values gives depth to democracy. Effective national human rights institutions, press freedom, including independent media, and judiciary are critically important for a truly functioning democratic political order through which economic and social justice can be achieved. In the words of Aung San Suu Kyi. ‘Saints are the sinners who go on trying’. "Let all of us sinners aspire to be saints. Let us go on trying." (Source: PUCL Bulletin, August, 2009 NATIONALISM The Ideals of India Sunil Khilnani, Eminent Academician A new self-belief and confidence in things Indian, and in the country, is felt especially among the young. Within the next decade, the average age of our population will be under 30, and a remarkable four-fifths of these young Indians, a CSDS survey found earlier this year, are optimistic about their future along with their children’s. Against expectations, the most aspirational and optimistic youth are to be found not in the big cities, but in the small towns and villages. By a large majority, India’s youth subscribe to democratic principles and freedom of expression. Among young Indians, there is a growing sense that India has to further its entry into the global domain-that self-isolation is not the way forward. Fear is often a spur to nationalism and such was the case with the Hindutva nationalism of the BJP and its Parivar. The nationalism of Hindutva was born out of an effort to appease and pander to the sentiments of a minority of Hindus, those troubled by the social and economic changes that began to agitate India in the 1990s. The BJP ideologues and leaders hoped that by playing upon such fears-those of Muslims and other minorities, fears of being left out of the economic race, fears that others were cornering social privileges-they could reap electoral benefits. To some extent, of course, they did, but in doing so, the limits of their running-scared nationalism were revealed. Hindutva nationalism was a zero-sum nationalism: its promised gains were always at the expense of others. The BJP somehow imagined that it could gull Indians into believing that this was a unifying nationalism. But over time it became clear that most Indians perceived the BJP’s nationalism as divisive, disruptive and undesirable. For all its faux aggressiveness, it continued to portray India and its Hindus as victims. The dissonance in the BJP’s message defeated its electoral prospects in 2004. But the party anticipated electoral dividends after last year’s long sequence of terrorist attacks last year, culminating in the assault on Mumbai. It could not realise these hopes in 2009. It had wrongly imagined a fearful, defensive electorate. India’s incumbent leadership, meanwhile, has done better by defining its political vision in terms of economic development and social justice. A steady focus on these issues over the past five years has allowed for a valuable break from the incendiary identity battles that have scarred the recent political landscape. But, in the years ahead, we are going to need a political vision more gripping than merely the economistic-one that manages to articulate the optimism and pride in Indianness. Paradoxically, the most important large-scale change has been the emergence of the states, both as the basic unit of political choice and of economic opportunity. Yet, electoral politics and market economics are working in different directions. The political dynamics are to a degree centripetal-pulling regional polities closer to Delhi by giving them a stake in the coalitional structure of power. The great economic disparity across the states, though, portends more centrifugal potentialities: rich and poor states will make different claims on the Centre and will, in turn, require asymmetric response, and inter-state rivalries over migration, environmental effects of development, and access to resources, both natural and fiscal, will rise. In this circumstance, the need for an overarching national story, one that can frame the particularities of policies and outcomes, that can explain them and endow them with some larger purpose, is clear and urgent. A nationalism that can speak and listen to the multiplying self-definitions being produced by India’s open society. We will also need a rejuvenated nationalism to steer ourselves. India needs to be able to project a defined and positive sense of what it stands for in the world-a self-definition not designed expressly to please any particular power. Such a nationalism would give the much-needed ballast to definitions of our national interest, at present too narrowly specified in conventional security terms. India is entering an era of difficult, high-stake negotiations and bargains, like climate change, the terms of international trade, the management of financial regulation, the uncertainties of Asian power alignments and mounting regional dangers. Nationalism cannot alone suffice as a way of addressing such problems, and very often, in the form of economic protectionism or cultural chauvinism, it is the main obstacle to tackling them. But, sadly, it is probably a necessary starting point, an opening gambit, in a world where the wealthy and the powerful are increasingly bent on pulling up the draw-bridges and protecting what they have already acquired. No doubt, we need to work towards establishing more inclusive structures of international governance and collaboration, but we have also to be prepared to survive in a world in which such structures may fail or prove ineffective. We need also to anticipate the possibility that it is nationalism that may come to define the character of relations with our powerful Asian cohabitants. In the face of such varied and complex challenges, the vapidity and ineffectualness of Hindutva nationalism is clear. A more adequate national vision will have to draw on our founding principles: on, above all, a commitment to the value of diversity, both as collective feature of society as a whole, as well as an internal trait of the individual, enabling plural identities at both social and individual levels. The evidence, whether concerning biological development, societies in history, or individual psychology, shows that diversity best allows successful adaptation; it provides structural resilience, and is self-immunising. Narendra Modi’s Gujarat is in India; but India is not his Gujarat. We shall need to elaborate a nationalism that proceeds by composition, not by imposition; that is inductive and additive, not deductive and subtractive; that abandons the elusive search for essentialist identitarian criteria (land, ethnicity, religion, blood) and instead reaffirms our foundational political principles. And this means a nationalism that is confident enough also to engage in fundamental debates about the Republic. Should we not be moving towards the goal of a common citizenship and a system civil law based on secular principles for all? Should we not be looking beyond reservations as the primary tool to handle the intricate problem of social justice?. (Source:India Today, 24 August, 2009) DEMOCRACY Party System in Shambles Parties not Based on Ideology, Not Sustained by Political Process or by Internal Democracy Neelabh Mishra, Eminent Columnist The post-YSR clamour for his son to take over as CM and the sorry spectacle the BJP made of itself in the last few weeks both go to show that our political parties are far from being evolved institutions with well-set norms and procedures. No party in the country is in ship-shape? Out of office for a term, the BJP, it’s said, invested so much hope in capturing power in the last general election that its crash threatens to tear the party apart. This, despite its relatively more committed cadre base and the ramrod ideological and organisational support it gets from the RSS. But imagine the opposite. Had the Congress lost a third consecutive parliamentary election in 2004, wouldn’t its leaders have been clawing at each other the way BJP luminaries are today? And with even Sonia Gandhi’s vote-gathering potential in grave doubt then, would they not have gunned for her eventually? Just see how Congress workers treated P.V. Narasimha Rao in the wake of the 1996 loss of power and his replacement Sitaram Kesri after the party’s second consecutive defeat in the 1998 elections. Dynasty is not sacrosanct for the Congress people, when the Congress split after the defeat of 1977, even the formidable Indira Gandhi was left with a rump party which she then single-handedly brought back to power in 1980. Dynasty is feted only if it gets votes and brings power. Since the grand old party structure of the Congress corroded and split in the late 1960s, all political parties gradually became vote- and power-grabbing mobs. Sometimes they built themselves around a charismatic individual or dynasty, as with the Congress or umpteen regional parties, and sometimes they built themselves around a cadre base, idealistic during the early years but starting to rot with acquisition of power, as with the BJP or the Communists. When four parties with separate ideological and organisational cores, evolved over a period of time, merged with each other and formed the Janata Party to defeat Indira Gandhi’s Emergency and replace her from power, they failed to create a single organisational structure for the new party in the years in power. All the subsequent splinters of this party formed around personalities, except for the BJP. Through the years, these splinters re-merged, re-formed and re-split around personalities like Charan Singh, Jagjivan Ram, Chandra Shekhar, V.P. Singh, Devi Lal, Ramakrishna Hegde, Biju Patnaik, Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Prasad Yadav, H.D. Deve Gowda and Nitish Kumar, but never evolving an institutionalised organisational structure with proper elections. The Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu and the socialist parties of the north have evolutionary pasts rooted in ideology and political movements, but they have degenerated to single-person or family outfits. Though the Hindutvawadis have had an ideological glue, the BJP, like its earlier incarnation, the Jan Sangh, has been hamstrung by an accountability, not to political and democratic processes, but to an extra-party controller and handler like the RSS, which has also been used by factions to settle scores with each other. The so-called collective or consensual decision-making in the BJP is forged through over-the-shoulder "help" from the RSS. Smaller Hindutva parties like the Shiv Sena and the Hindu Mahasabha have been personality-dependent mobs. The sad fact is that our parties except perhaps the Communists in a nominal sense are not exactly political institutions born of and sustained by political processes, as they should be. Moreover, democracy hardly touches intra-party processes. The Congress evolved through a long and testing history of debate and once boasted of an enviable pantheon of great leaders. This should have offered the least common denominator for our post-’47 politics. But it betrayed its past when it began to be plagued by bogus memberships and farcical organisational elections. Later Indira Gandhi completely overthrew its democratic pretensions. It still follows the organisational culture of nominations and decrees. In its last organisational "elections", the AICC members from the states supposedly "authorised" their state committee leaders to elect the party president, who was also "authorised" to nominate other office-bearers. In these conditions, Rahul Gandhi promises to hold Youth Congress elections under the supervision of former Election Commissioners J.M. Lyngdoh, T.S. Krishnamurthy and K.J. Rao. It will be watched with interest whether the exercise proves cosmetic or becomes a harbinger of change in the Congress and sets an example for others. (Source: Outlook, 21 September, 2009) SOCIAL JUSTICE India- Rapid Growth with Widening Inequities Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate India Tomorrow will not come about with just one magic bullet. The rapid economic growth of the past six years has been encouraging. While the economy was growing at the rate of about 5, 6, 7 or 8 per cent, the public revenue was growing at 7, 8, 9 or 10 per cent and sometimes even 11 or 12 per cent. This revenue could have been used for the removal of all social injustices. Even so, I don’t think a free market can be associated with happiness. Indeed, scepticism in the market is far more widespread among the public than professional economists. And the scepticism is stronger now. I’m not anti-growth; I’m against growth for the sake of growth. It’s crucial to focus on the central injustices that we’ve been witnessing: child undernourishment, lack of medical care, premature privatisation of health care, and lack of education. These are failures of the state. In Kerala, more than 50 per cent of the health care is provided privately, but that is on the secure basis of public health care being available for all. I have nothing against the private sector when it comes with the solid basis of public health care being available for all. But since in most of the country it is not, what you get is a kind of substitute private health care which leads to the exploitation of peasants who know little about their illnesses, but know the symptoms. They don’t know whether they are getting the right treatment and when they can’t get medical care from the state sector, they spend a lot of money obtaining relief from the private sector where they are often exploited. Once I complained about the combination of quackery and crookery, and I think something of that still exists. Similarly, in education too, if state schools were better financed, better run, if there were greater accountability, greater resources, there could be a much better use of the state sector and much less need for private education. I think the premature privatisation of the education and health sector has the effect of generating both inefficiency and inequality. Sometimes people spend the little income they have on medical care which they can scarcely afford. If we generate more public resources and use them with a better identification of the prevailing injustices in India, we could make a big change. I used to get frustrated with the Indian economy: it had the potential of a high growth rate but it never seemed to grow. And I never , for a second, thought this was a result of democracy because I think economic growth depends upon the friendliness of the economic climate and not on the fierceness of the prevailing political arrangement, which, to a great extent, we have achieved. But there are other things that we can do. It is very shocking that we have not done more on the right to food for everyone, including children. We have not done more to eliminate gender inequality, maternal undernourishment. These are essentially the real problems. We have such a widespread incidence of maternal undernourishment that in turn leads to foetal undernourishment and underweight babies, child undernourishment and their inability to grow into healthy boys and girls. There is deprivation after you are born too, but a lot of it goes back to the womb. And that goes back to gender inequality. So gender deprivation, gender inequality and child deprivation are very closely related. And now we have the medical argument that undernourished babies tend to develop more cardiovascular diseases. Undernourishment of mothers, undernourished babies and high incidence of cardiovascular diseases in India are interconnected where the neglect of women plays a central part. We ought to look at what the big failures are, and enter into a debate and ask the question: if you could eliminate one injustice, which one would it be? There’s nothing to prevent the elimination of one injustice being combined with the elimination of other injustices. So the big question is: what are the big injustices? We have paid little attention to the big constructive things we could have done to eliminate gender inequality, to eliminate undernourishment of children and also the class divisions. We have taken a reasonable number of initiatives on caste. The question is whether they have been adequately well-directed and well-thought-out to make them effective. In my book The Idea of Justice, I’ve tried to make a distinction again and again between neeti and nyaya. Neeti is about appropriate rules and institutions and nyaya is the realisation. I think that caste policy has been driven by neeti: certain reservation of this kind and reservation of that kind and so on. We need a more nyaya-based perspective in dealing with caste distinctions in India. The focus does relate to a deficiency in Indian political thinking on this matter, mainly over concentration on neeti compared to nyaya. What kind of neeti you need is still an open question. Perfect justice is very hard to come by and indeed very hard to agree on what it might be like. If we are not eliminating removable injustices, then we are living without justice in a more practical sense. This can be said about many countries, particularly India. There are two things to say here. One is that institutions don’t sell or guarantee justice since it also depends on our behavioural patterns and our interactions with each other. So we shouldn’t put the blame only on the institutional weakness. For example, there are many injustices that could be removed within the democratic system in India that have not been removed, such as elimination of caste divisions and institutionally we can still do further. But there are also human behavioural failures connected with the practice that have been very difficult to eliminate in India no matter how much our theories of the rationality of the caste system have been revised. Our biggest strength is in having a democratic system, having a basically tolerant people, having a population that likes arguments and doesn’t mind disagreement, that tolerates eccentric views, that is willing to engage in debates, and that finds free public media to be acceptable and very important in their lives. Newspapers may be shrinking in the rest of the world, but in India they have been growing. These are very positive factors. I think the weaknesses lie in the fact that the newspapers have to be more probing and have to go more into less immediately visible injustices. Injustice of talent is immediately visible and has been dealt with but not the injustice of continuing hunger. We need more vigorous practices, more public engagement on these issues and also, to some extent, we have to be less engaged with the past. In my judgement, I don’t want to be ostracising the Left-I am very much a part of the Left-but I’m disappointed that, to some extent, the Left intelligentsia has been imprisoned by the past, the Cold War. America may be a threat in many ways but I don’t see it as the biggest threat to India or to the rest of the world. One has to rethink that. My hero is public reasoning and I would like everyone-both on the Left and Right-to engage more with it. People have to read each other a bit more, argue with each other a bit more. And we have the tradition and liberty to do it. It’s a question of practising it with a greater determination. Since Montesquieu, it has been argued that the market will keep people away from harmful activities, that is, if you engage in the market, you will not go around blowing other people up. This was an idea discussed by Albert O. Hirschman in his book The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph. And it’s an argument that is still being used by authors like Thomas Freidman: because of the paucity of jobs in the economy, there is an easy recruitment of fundamentalists and violent extremists. Another argument is that it generates efficiency but not necessarily equity. And that was one of Adam Smith’s arguments in Wealth of Nations. He considered markets to be in need of support from other institutions. Many people would like to think that markets generate happiness, though I don’t think it is a part of the intellectual history of the market. Singapore attempted a multiracial society and it has been a success. No other society has been so successful in terms of multiracial, multi-ethnic, multicultural integration as Singapore has been without people merging into a melting pot. They really practice multiple identities. There are things to learn from Singapore even though it is not a democratic country in the Indian sense. As democracy is concerned, I think, moving to a dictatorial system is not going to help matters but practicing democracy more vigorously is important. (Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor, Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Economics at Harvard University. He won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998. His latest book is The Idea of Justice.) -This article is based on Amartya Sen’s conversation with S. Prasannarajan. (Source: India Today, 24 August, 2009) Poverty of Politics and Politics of Poverty Mani Shankar Aiyar, Former Minister Our politics of poverty is characterised by our poverty of politics. Although poverty is the overwhelming fact of our national life, it is hardly the theme of our politics. It is stunning rates of GDP growth that command the attention of Parliament and the media, hardly the accompanying deterioration the in the economy, disparities that in our case are widening so obscenely as to threaten the very continuance of our democracy. If we can repeat the performance of the last 30 years, the smallscale industries sector can generate an additional 36 million jobs by 2020. Ritually, in every session of Parliament, we debate drought, floods, unemployment and rural development. Unfailingly, the House empties as soon as these themes are taken up so dues the press gallery. Lucky is the MP who gets a line of what he says into the evening news or the papers next morning. A virtual blanking out from the minds of the dynamic, surging, media-guzzling middle class of the everyday lives of the vast majority of our people-the 836 million who live on less than Rs 20 a day, as identified by the Arjun Sengupta Committee. Once the Budget is behind us, we would discuss inclusive growth, poverty alleviation and labour laws. Tragically for our poor (but happily for our rich), the woes of the stock market, the recapitalisation of every failing enterprise, and the misery of being rich and famous in a time of economic downturn has crowded out any boring discussion of why two-thirds of our people are languishing in the most awful conditions as we soar towards our destiny as the coming economic superpower. The plaudits of Wall Street drown out the wailing of our widows. We deeply love the successful. This is emphatically not because our politicians or journalists are particularly venal. Karl Marx observed 150 years ago that the cultural, social and ethical superstructure of any society reflects the relationship between its classes and the means of production. What was true of Victorian England, Bismarckian Europe and the burgeoning United States of the 19th century is true of us too. In our superstructure, there are two classes of Indians: the consumer and the citizen. We can’t attain the 11th plan goal of ‘inclusive growth’ without ensuring ‘inclusive governance’. Our consumers number 200 million who are defined by their "effective demand", that is, the money in their pockets. The deeper the pocket, the more they matter to the market. Our citizens (a mere 800-900 million of them, and growing) are defined by their presence on the margin of the market (or, more often, right out of it) and a monetary inability to translate their "demand" for basic goods and services (food, fuel, drinking water and shelter) into "effective demand". Every one of India Today’s readers can recite parrot-like our 9 per cent growth record through most of the last five years, but few would know that after standing 134 on the first-ever UN Human Development Index (HDI) in 1994, the latest index places us at 132. We have slithered just two places up over the last 15 years despite a 15-fold increase in Central government budget spending on anti-poverty programmes, from around Rs 7,500 crore in 1993-94 to well over Rs 1,20,000 crore in the 2008-09 (in addition to another Rs 70,000 crore of farmers’ loan waivers). There is simply no correspondence between outlays and outcomes: outlays have soared; outcomes have remained derisory. The conventional wisdom is that higher growth leads to higher government revenues and thus opens the path to increased social sector spending. Anti-poverty spending rose from Rs 36,000 crore in the last year of the NDA (2003-04) to Rs 1,20,000 crore in the last year of the UPA. Yet, apart from increasing vastly the number of Indians whose income rose from Rs 8.99 per day to Rs 9.01, which is the Plimsoll Line that divides the BPL from the non-BPL, what real impact did this have on human development for the poor? Almost nothing says the UN HDI. Almost nothing adds every sectoral evaluation (primary education, primary health, etc) of the Planning Commission. Rajiv Gandhi told us 20 years ago that 85 paise in the rupee gets spent on administrative expenses, leaving but 15 paise to actually reach the intended beneficiaries. This is one Rajiv Gandhi quote that the practitioners of the politics of poverty, both in the media and Parliament, have repeated ad nauseam not because it is the key to understanding the persistence of poverty but because the statement has been portrayed as a confession to corruption in high places. Because of this deliberate or ill-informed misunderstanding, the key point has been consistently missed, that we just cannot attain the 11th Plan goal of "inclusive growth" without first ensuring "inclusive governance". In 2004, we inherited close to 300 Centrallysponsored schemes for alleviating poverty (since reduced to about 100). Each of these schemes has its own delivery silo, all designed to deliver basic goods and services to the same set of intended beneficiaries-the poor-but so carefully insulated from the other delivery silos that there is no possibility of converging the schemes or synergising their endeavours. Each delivery system has its own set of the privileged: district and sub-district officials; comprador NGOs bowing and scraping before their babu patrons; hangers-on and sycophants, all of them so richly recompensed that before they get down to any actual work, 85 paise is skimmed off every rupee on the average merely to install and keep in place the delivery mechanism. The schemes, in other words, exist for themselves, little bureaucratic empires so incestuously designed that the recipient has no participation in, and less knowledge over the very building blocks of his own life. The bureaucracy assumes, from the cabinet secretary down to the meanest patwari, that because they are better educated and more regularly paid than those they "serve", there is no need to involve the poor in planning or implementation. Moreover, the self-image of the bureaucracy is that they are not only more efficient but also more honest than politicians, especially low-level politicians. Notwithstanding constitutional arrangements that have been on our statute books for 15 years, there is virtually no discussion on the floor of our legislatures or in government or in the media of how to secure a manifold increase in outcomes without increasing even a paisa of the outlay. State legislators, in particular, block every attempt at genuine empowerment through the effective devolution of functions, finances and functionaries fearing a dilution in their powers of patronage. As long as we rely on an alien and transient bureaucracy to dispassionately "deliver" development to the poor, the delivery mechanism will swallow most of the resources on just putting itself comfortably in place. It is only if the money directly reaches the treasury accounts of the elected representatives at the grassroots that the institutions of grassroots governance will become directly and immediately responsible to the Gram Sabha, the constitutionally-mandated assembly of all eligible voters in every village panchayat. The Constitution has obliged our political system to constitute around 2,50,000 institutions of local self-government to which we have elected no less than 32 lakh representatives, of whom an astonishing 12 lakh are women, and an even more astonishing 80,000 are chairpersons, the greatest-ever experiment in democracy without precedent in history or parallel in the world. We have more elected women in office than the rest of the world put together. Yet, little is known to legislatures or the media about this amazing saga of political and social empowerment. The rising middle class has so monopolised media and political space as to crowd out almost altogether the politics of poverty. The lakhs of elected representatives, closer to their electorate than any bureaucracy will ever be and, therefore, necessarily responsible for delivering responsive administration to their electorate, are yet to be made part of the democratic discourse or the development process. For the most part, they are spurned or neglected by the higher echelons of our democracy. But this will eventually change because democracy is, at bottom, a game of numbers and all we need to do is mobilise 32 lakh local government representatives to pit themselves against 5,000 MPs and MLAs to secure, irreversibly and irremovably their constitutional right to be the masters of their fate and the captains of their souls. Hanging on my wall is a poster with Mahatma Gandhi’s response, on the eve of Independence, to a question about the "India of your dreams". "I shall work for an India in which the poorest shall feel that it is their country, in whose making they have an effective voice". It is only when that happens that the politics of poverty will really come into its own. (Source: India Today, 24 August, 2009) MINORITY QUESTION Religious Minorities in India Sarabjit Kaur The term ‘minority’ in general refers to a part of the population of a state that is marked off by race or language or religion or some other social characteristic which leads the people of the group to be looked on by the majority as somewhat different or ‘other’ and leads the minority to view the majority as as both different and dominant. In the context of India, the term ‘minority’ encompasses groups of every possible type racial, linguistic, religious, territorial and in addition groups unique to Indian society: minorities on the basis of inferior caste status. According to Indian official terminology, ‘minority’ has a more restrictive range and refers only to the religious minorities. India is a home to all major religions known to mankind. Pluralism is the hallmark of our society. This acceptance of diversity is not something new but can be traced back to leaders associated with the national movement and the drafting of the Constitution. While religious communities were acknow-ledged from a cultural point of view, they were not given official recognition in social and political terms. The reluctance on the part of the government towards any official protection of the religious minorities reflected a more general attitude; its emphasis was as much on national unity. (Varshney ed. 2004, p. 127) The emphasis on national unity was however not something which gained significance in the post-liberation era. It had a long history. In the 19th century, the moderates had emphasised the idea of unity. This emphasis on unity after the 1920s was advocated by Gandhi in whose eyes, the Indian nation was a collection of religious communities. The progressive intelligentsia represented by Nehru also rejected the notion of a nation based on ethnic feelings or with religious communities as propounded by Hindu nationalists or the Muslim League. In January 1947, G.B. Pant made a revealing speech before the Constituent Assembly, whereby he established a strong relationship between on the one hand, the need for the minorities, and especially the Muslims, to get integrated, to merge with the nation as individuals, and on the other hand, the precondition of this process, the dissolution of the religious communities. By recognising an undifferentiated individual as being the basis of the nation obviously implied pleading for a culturally uniform nation. (Varshney ed. p. 129) The same concern was also expressed by B.R. Ambedkar, the Law Minister in Nehru’s first Union Government and Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, in the following words: Our difficulty is how to make the heterogeneous mass that we have today a decision in common and march on the way which leads us to unity. (Varshney ed. 2004, p. 132) In the same perspective, S. Radhakrishnan, who later became the President of India in 1962, suggested that the following be included in the Preamble to the Constitution: … with a view to develop a homogeneous, secular democratic state, the devices hitherto employed to keep minorities as separate entities within the state be dropped and loyalty to a single national state developed … we must put an end to the disruptive elements in the state. What is our ideal?. It is our ideal to develop a homogeneous democratic state. (Varshney ed. 2004, p. 135) To concretise the idea of unity, the system of separate electorates, which was considered by a number of Congress members as responsible for the development of the ‘two-nation theory’ that finally led to the creation of Pakistan, was abolished. Sardar Patel, however, did not oppose to the idea of reservation of seats for the Muslims. This idea, however, was not acceptable to some members of the Minority Committee like H.C. Mookherjee, a Christian leader. The Indian Union which was born with the proclamation of the Constitution on January 26, 1950, maintained the neutrality of the state against the aspirations of the Hindu traditionalists for a ‘Hinduisation’ of the Republic. The debates on the issue of national symbols are very revealing in this perspective. Hindu traditionalists such as Seth Govind Das and H.V. Kamath wanted to call the national flag, Sudarshan. Seth Govind Das wanted India to be officially called Bharat and H.V. Kamath wanted Bande Mataram to be made the national anthem. The debates that ensued ended in compromises which were mostly unfavourable to the Hindu traditionalists. So far as the naming of India was concerned, after long discussions, it was finally decided to use the well-known formula of the first Article of the Constitution: India that is Bharat shall be a Union of States. Insofar as the national anthem was concerned, Bande Mataram was rejected in favour of Jana Gana Mana, which sings praises of India’s unity in spite of its regional diversity. The national flag and emblem also ended up avoiding overtly Hindu connotations. The Indian Republic drew on its Buddhist legacy, giving itself both Indian and yet neutral official symbol and thereby ensuring that no single religious community would be able to claim them. The Constitution of India therefore did provide a space for diversity. Two concerns that were reflected were a) not only every citizen but also all the communities must have a level playing field in every sphere, and b) those who have historically suffered social debility of any kind have been given a constitutional guarantee of protective discrimination. However, before we look at the guarantees provided to individuals and groups and institu-tional arrangements in the Constitution, let us briefly see how the management of diversity was articulated in the Preamble of the Constitution. The objectives of the Constitution, are laid down in the original Preamble. However, while the framers of the Constitution were content with unity, later politics brought back an emphasis on integrity too by including ‘unity and integrity of the nation’ through the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution in 1976. In Part III of the Constitution certain articles are included Articles 14-18 (Right to Equality), Articles 19-22 (Right to Freedom), Articles 23 and 24 (Right to Freedom of Religion) and Articles 29-30 (Cultural and Educational Rights), to accommodate the diverse groups existing in the country. The various measures therefore were undertaken to strengthen the idea of unity and also to inculcate a sense of belonging to the nation. But in spite of all the steps undertaken, the minorities have not been able to associate with the majority. The divide between the two continues and in fact with the passage of time it has widened. This provokes one to identify the reasons which have been responsible for widening the gulf between the majority and the minority. Some of the reasons are: Firstly, as far as the Constitution is concerned, there are certain flaws that prevail in it— The Indian Constitution and the Hindu Code Bill define Hindus in such a way as to include Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs, the three protestant religious groups. According to the Indian Constitution, all those who profess religions of Indian origin are Hindus. The constitutional expansion hence denies the identity of minority religions as being of Indian origin. Besides, the denial of identity of minority religions, the identity of even tribals is denied. From 1871 to 1931, the British Indian Census used terms such as ‘primitive, tribal or animist’ to describe the religions of the Scheduled Tribes and to a limited extent those of the Scheduled Castes. The first Census enumeration of indepen-dent India was done in 1951 and those tribals who were not converts to other world religions Christianity, Islam, Buddhists were automatically categorised as Hindus. Thus, through a mere definitional twist, the Census authorities of free India appeared to deny authentic religions identity of millions of Indians and thrust upon them an identity which they disown. If one focuses on Article 25 of the Constitution, it assures not only freedom of conscience but also the right to propogate one’s religion. Propagation of religion may lead to conversion. Therefore, if the spirit of the Constitution is adhered to, the state should not intervene when people convert from one religion to another. While the state in India has never prevented conversion as such, it has intervened in the process of conversion due to ‘popular pressure’ only with regard to conversion to Islam and Christianity because these religions are perceived and defined as products of conquest and colonisation. In contrast, one does not come across any popular protest or state intervention even when substantial numbers of persons convert from one religion of Indian origin to another. Therefore, it is clear that state intervention is selective. This erodes the meaning of secularism as defined in the Constitution. The genesis of such discrimination may be traced to the Constitutional order which declared ‘no person who professes a religion different from Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste’ denying non-Hindus the statutory benefits that are accorded to Scheduled Caste Hindus. In addition to all this, one can also see certain flaws in the functioning of the state. The state has intervened to change the personal laws for Hindus, Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs through the Hindu Code Bill and made them uniform. If the state has to act as a reformer, then it should play the role vis-a-vis all the religious collectivities. Besides this, one finds a weakness on the part of the state in dealing with communal Violence. It has been seen that either the state is a silent spectator or if it acts, it does not operate in a neutral way. The first way of functioning of the state can well be seen in the case of Orissa which experienced the communal outrage in the last week of August 2008. The Sangh Parivar was given a free hand to kill and terrorise the Christians minorities. The State Government therefore silently witnessed the death and terror which took 40 lives and made 10,000 homeless. The second way of functioning of the state is well seen in the February 28, 2002 communal Violence that took place in Gujarat. More than 1000 persons were killed About 700 hundred mosques and mausoleums were demolished; property worth Rs 10,000 crores was looted or burnt. Hundreds of Muslim families were totally uprooted. In these riots, the police and the bureaucracy operated in such a way that sopported the majority community, that is, the Hindus. What is worse the Chief Minister Narendra Modi justified these riots and described them as a reaction to Godhra fire. The honest officers who did not allow carnage in their areas were instantly transferred by the Gujarat Government. These are just two incidents. But if one studies India’s political history, then one finds that it is dotted by numerous riots. Thus, in spite of many years of independence, India has not been able to free itself of the curse of communal violence. If anything, it has been getting worse year after year. According to Asghar Ali Engineer, there has not been a single year in the post-independence period which has been free of communal violence though the numbers of incidents have varied. The inability to control communal violence leads to the weakening of the faith of the minority in the political system. They see it as dominated by the majority community. The middle class, especially the elite Hindu middle class, is complacent. The poor and lower-caste Hindu community is silent. This silent majority has no opinion primarily because it has no confidence that its opinion matters. Certain steps, therefore, are urgently needed to control the menace of communal violence. What is needed is that civil society groups, Left parties and secular forces should strengthen themselves. So that they can unitedly combat the growth of fundamentalist forces. Will instil not only a sense of security amongst the minority but but will also reflect the true secular character of the country. (Source: Mainstream, 17-23 July, 2009) NATIONAL POLITICS-BJP Advani- Towards an Inglorious Finale S. Prasannarajan, Consulting Editor, India Today The loneliest man of Indian politics dreads to step out of the walls that separate him from the horror that multiplies outside haunted fortress in Lutyens’ Delhi. Open the windows and he hears the whispers of the Undead who have swarmed the leafy lanes. They are waiting to claim him, and their voice has the unmistakable tone of vengeance and anger, hurt and humiliation. He dare not look. Oh, those creepy figures without shadows, and he knows who they are, where they come from, and what makes them hungry. They are all there, he is darn sure. That lanky fellow from Karachi, still exuding his impeccable Savile Row elegance and chomping on the damp half of a cigar, seems to have left the mausoleum back home for good and found a more rewarding haunt across the border. Alongside the founder of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the soldier in olive green who carries within him the harshness and endurance of the desert, and he is waving a hardback and crying "Honour". There are more of them, the wounded, the defeated, the marginalised, and even some bearded chaps from Godforsaken Kandahar. Their accusatory fingers are growing frighteningly longer, as if they might even pierce the concrete and touch his allegedly frozen conscience. Lal Krishna Advani can only shudder and retreat further into the shrinking shell of his political existence. This is not the place he thought he would end up after such a long journey. A place of isolation and rejection. And this is not what he imagined he would become. A superannuated leader who refuses to accept his own redundancy. Once upon a time, there was an Advani the mobiliser who travelled the entire length of the country as the spokesman of a vandalised nation. He retrieved the abandoned gods of the political Hindu from the archival sites of civilisation and placed them just outside the polling booths. He was the argumentative nationalist who provided the sharpest counterpoints to the official version of secularism. He made the BJP a party of governance, which marked a historic right turn in Indian politics. The best of Advani, whose political career is almost as old as independent India, embodied struggle against power. That Advani is long dead. What we have today is a grim old man who is desperately struggling to postpone his own political irrelevancy. Out there, as the banished and the sidelined ask questions about his leadership, his integrity and honesty, his lies and tricks, he has no words to defend himself. The iron cult is being blasted. Along with him, the party too is unravelling. Since the fall in 2004, which itself was precipitated by the blinding fallacy of a "shining" slogan, it has been a story of slow but steady disintegration. Once a party that was pretty certain of its ideological identity, the BJP today is a house of delusion, inhabited by leaders who are gifted with ambition but no ideas. Once the party that brought an end to the Congress century and challenged the dead certainties of left-liberal politics, it has wilfully vacated its rightful space in Indian politics. In retrospect, the-Right-in-power was the shortest romance in our political history; those who won the mandate proved not to be worthy of it. Today, after two devastating humiliations, the official custodians of the party are busy scavenging the wreckage of defeat for the last remains of power. It is the pathology of the discredited; and Advani, the BJP’s tallest leader after Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s retirement from active politics, is the cause number one. As Vajpayee soared above the party, Advani was the proverbial number two, and the long distance yatri of Indian politics never revealed his frustration. The more he travelled, the more elusive appeared the destination. When he did finally become number one, he saw it as a moment of liberation and possibility. He should have stopped there. Instead, the yatri accelerated his pace only to become the cause number one of the BJP’s nervous breakdown. He is the one who stands between decay and renewal. After the 2004 defeat, at the National Council meeting of the party, he said: "Ideology is what gives the BJP its distinctive identity. We are a party with a difference precisely because we are firmly wedded to a set of core beliefs. Our political priorities, strategies and tactics may be fashioned by the issues of the day but our ideology remains constant. The BJP is first and foremost a nation-first party. We are a party of nationalism. Our politics is determined by the litmus test of what is good and desirable for the nation." Those were inspiring-and reassuring-words from the original action hero of Hindutva, which he had defined as a nationalist, not religious, sentiment. And those words should have formed the first testament of the party’s new guide and philosopher. He should have gracefully made the way for a new leader. He had other ideas, and there was a job he badly wanted. He chose to be the highest guru of subterranean manipulations, and defying both biology as well as ideology, he repainted himself as the Future. He did not become another Vajpayee. He has become the sole repudiator of whatever the great reconciler of the Indian Right stands for. Not that it was too late for him to play the wise counsellor. Shimla-or in retrospect Jaswant Singh’s Siberia-was his last chance of redemption. Perhaps he alone could have averted Jaswant’s martyrdom. Advani, the first BJP leader to sing the secular virtues of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, quietly endorsed the banishment of the blasphemous Jaswant who did not say anything more outrageous than what the leader of the Opposition had written in the visitor’s book at Jinnah’s mausoleum in Karachi: "His (Jinnah’s) August 11, 1947, address is a forceful espousal of a secular state in which every citizen would be free to practice his own religion. My respectful homage to this great man." Well, Jaswant did a lot more than lazily paraphrasing the Quaid-e-Azam’s much quoted address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He did 10 years of research in history before retelling the story of Partition and the political life of Jinnah. When Jaswant was summarily sacked by the suddenly animated Rajnath Singh for writing a book, for going against the popular mythology of the good Nehru and Patel and the evil Jinnah, for asking questions. Ideally, Advani should have stood up for the sacredness arguments. Certainly he could not have been unaware of the uses of arguments and revaluation of the past in a confident democracy that was in no need of bogeymen. Advani too suffered for his arguments for a while; he felt abandoned, isolated and misunderstood, but he stood by his belief. He did not repent or recant. Mohan Rao Bhagwat seems to have enjoyed his status as the most sought after sound bite guru. he told India Today: "When I look back, I identify two landmark events in my entire political career: first, the Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya; second, the six-day trip to Pakistan. And I can tell you that… I had a feeling I was making history. The Rath Yatra yielded immediate dividends for the party. As for the Pakistan trip, a few years down the line there will be people who will think that what Advani did then had strengthened his cause, his party and raised his esteem in the people’s eyes." In his memoirs My Country My Life, he writes: "I continue to hold the view that I had expressed in the India Today interview…This debate (about Jinnah) is not about the past; it is about the future, in the light of the lessons from the past. For the issue that should be discussed is not so much Jinnah, but the future of Indo-Pak relations in the context of a new vision of peace, inter-religious harmony, and inter-state co-operation in all of South Asia." The conviction politician was very much on display. Jaswant took Advani’s argument further and gave it a book-length legitimacy of scholarship and research. At the now-infamous session of introspection, when the ayatollahs in saffron asked for the heretic’s head, Advani, the original deviant, felt no sense of solidarity with Jaswant; he did not bother to tell the neophytes in the party that BJP was not fragile enough to crumble under the weight of a book. He showed no conscience-or courage. When a wounded Jaswant proved to be a bigger threat than his book, Advani just retreated, perhaps knowing that no words could have redeemed him. When Jaswant took him on over Kandhahar and the cash-for-MPs scandal, Advani did not come out with his version of truth. Maybe he was silent because he hated to lie. The aura was anyway coming to an end. It began long ago. The halo of the Hindutva’s long marcher was not there as he stared down from the cardboard legend of "Determined Leader, Decisive Government" in the last General Elections. It was his first and last battle for power, and at 82, he was determined to realise his ambition, and quite decisive about the style of his campaign-very presidential. In yet another desperate makeover, he sold himself as a moderniser-and a strongman for the hard times who was pitted against the "weakest" prime minister. Independent of the traditional structures of the party, it was a campaign sustained by his fantasy and a select few non-political freelancers. Ideally, he should have been just the campaigner, not the candidate. Advani on the stump was not exactly the face of 21st century India-or of a 21st century Right-wing party. He turned the election into a referendum on himself and the answer was a resounding no. Still he refused to read the message that he has overstayed, that the time has come for a total generational shift. Defeat only intensified his hallucination about political immortality, and he took refuge in make-believe. He has become the patron saint of a cabal, each member a protégé of his. They are united in projecting him as the indispensable one because each of them doesn’t want the other as the next leader. So the BJP today has a president whose freedom is purely ceremonial. (Rajnath’s only show of authority was the sacking of Jaswant.) The real power is with an urban Brahminical elite. Advani himself declared that the BJP chief ministers will not be "disturbed". He has been distancing himself from ideologically driven grassroots leaders-be it Kalyan Singh or Uma Bharati-from the hinterlands since the late 1990s. He abandoned the constituency that made him and desperately sought the approval of the one that doesn’t vote for him anyway. He has now reached a stage where he has nowhere to turn for one last vote of conscience. In the wake of the post-Jaswant mutiny, he has only succeeded in bringing the RSS to the centre of the party affairs. Mohanrao Bhagwat, the media-savvy RSS boss with that camera-friendly walrus moustache, seems to have enjoyed his status as the most sought after soundbite guru. Still, the high profile role of the Sangh as the final arbiter of the BJP’s destiny may have restored peace in the House of Saffron, but it has also strengthened the stereotype: the party’s independence is conditional. It has further added to the image crisis of the BJP. It is perhaps the final revenge of Advani. On September 12, 1947, the 20-old swayamsevak left his hometown of Karachi for Delhi on a BOAC aircraft. He had to flee because many of his colleagues were arrested after a bomb blast in the city. Six momentous decades later, it is again farewell time. (Source: India Today, 14 September, 2009) ASSEMBLY ELECTION 2009 Maharashtra Assembly Election, 2009 Introduction to Maharashtra Politics & Guidelines for Muslim Minority Syed Shahabuddin Maharashtra ranks 4th among the states of the Union from the point of view of Muslim population. It comes immediately after UP, West Bengal and Bihar. With a population of 10.3 million Muslims, it has 7.43% of the National Muslim population and about 10.6% of the total State Population of 96.9 million (2001).2. Muslim are not spread uniformly throughout Maharashtra. In 14 districts their Proportion is more than the state average, but in remaining districts their proportion goes down to even less than 5%. 3. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly has 288 members. The average population per constituency is 3.35 lakhs. The due number of Muslim MLA’s in the state should be about 31. Muslim population exceeds 3.35 lakhs in 10 districts and can alone generate 16 seats proportionately. But the average number between 1952 & 1999 was only about 9.5.In 2004 the number of Muslim MLA’s rose to 11. However, additional 8 Muslims from various parties were runners-up, and 23 more Muslim contestants were placed as second runner-up, excluding the Muslim winners or first runners-up. Thus, a total of 11+8+23 i.e., 42 constituencies had voted significantly for Muslim candidates which shows that in ideal conditions, the Muslim community can reach the due level of representation. 4. Maharashtra is divided in 7 administrative Division. Each as subdivided in districts whose total number is 35. It is possible that within a division, some districts may have high Muslim population to generate at least one or more seats. But the other districts in the same Division but together may exceed the magic figure of 3.35 lakhs of Muslim population & generate a seat. A Secular party may field one additional Muslim candidate in a suitable constituency in one of the others districts. 5. The same is true of constituencies within a district. With a large Muslim population, some constituencies may be Muslim winnable with about 25% plus Muslim population. Other constituencies which are contiguous may generates one additional Muslim winnable seat, if their total Muslim population exceed 3, 35,000. STATE POLITICS 6. Maharashtra has a tradition of anti-Brahmin movements dating back to two centuries. In modern times it crystallised in the form of Republican Party which claims to represent the Dalit masses. Unfortunately, this party has over the years broken into several fragments and depending upon the caste of its leaders, each faction nurses a particular social constituency & uses it to make a deal with a major party. 7. Socially in Maharashtra the Marathas constitute the biggest social group or community whose undisputed leader is Sharad Pawar of the NCP.Brahmins and other high castes generally support the BJP and Shiv Shena, apart from urban middle classes. 8. The Muslims are often fragmented on baradari & sectarian basis and even by geographical origin. Since Metropolitan Mumbai has attracted people from all over the county in search of livelihood and, new-comers generally find shelter in the localities inhabitated by those who came earlier or belongs to the same caste or sect. Muslim Parties, during the Lok Sabha Election, 2009, tried to form a united Muslim front but it failed to take roots 9. With their pattern of dispersal, Muslims cannot win may Assembly seats under the present electoral system in their own, as there are no Muslim majority seats & very few with above 25 %Muslims. But they may win seats with a suitable social partner on give-and-take basis. The best choice could be the Dalits, if and only if Republican Party reinvents itself as a viable force. It has recently made a beginning by forming a Republican-Left Democratic Front(RLDI), under the leadership of the Republican leader Ramdas Athawale with the objective of providing a third alternative to the people of Maharashtra going beyond the INC-NCP alliance and the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance. The Front presently includes, apart from the RPI, the Peasant and Workers Party, the CPM, CPI, SP, JD(S) and LJP, not to mention some minor local parties. Prakash Ambedkar a prominent dalit leader has not joined the Front. One major national party, the BSP, with about 5 % of the voters remains out of this combination and has the ambition of contesting as many seats as possible, winning at least 25 seats and playing the king-maker, if no alliance or party emerges with a monority. Both the RLDF & the BSP are likely is cut into secular votes & weaken INC – NCP against SS-BSP. 10. So far, the Muslim votes have been shared by the INC-NCP, SP and BSP. By contesting against each other. They divide Muslim votes in almost every constituency. If Muslims support one major well-selected contestant unitedly and massively in 30 odd Muslim constituencies of higher Muslim concentration and if the candidate belongs to the biggest Muslim subgroup in the constituency, it is possible for the Muslims to attain higher representation in the Assembly, than in 2004. Secondly, Muslim should aim at such seats, in which no other social group or community has a higher proportion. 11. All secular parties are however anxious to use every election to expand their influence and their insist on contesting seats even with a low concentration of their social group. But except high concentration areas, experience shows that with social affinity alone, no secular party except NCD can win many seats. 12. On the basis of the election results of 1999 and 2004 the estimated Muslim population in various constituencies, a district wise chart (See Annexure ) has been tabulated to locate winnable Muslim constituencies, division-wise and district wise. But, the weakness lies in that no accurate count of Muslim voters or proportion of Muslim electorate is available. Only a local muslim organization is in a position to count & determine the proportion of Muslim voters, This must be done, particularly where it is likely to exceed 20%. NEED FOR MAHARASHTRA MUSLIM FORUM 13. What is needed is to form a Maharashtra Muslim Forum with participation of the MMM, the JIH,the JUH, the Ahl-e –Sunnat and the Ulema Council to negotiate with the leading political players in the field to persuade them to field Muslim candidates who command credibility in the eyes of the community and are also acceptable to the non-Muslim electorate. 14. General Guidelines (1) All eligible Muslim should be dully registered as voters, particularly those who have just crossed 18. (2) All Muslim voters should cast their vote. (3) The number of Muslim voters in every constituency should be counted, polling station-wise; only the constituency which has more than 20 % Muslim voters may be claimed as a Muslim winnable seat. (4) Muslim opinion-makers in every constituency should form a small Committee to select the best candidate from the Muslim point of view; This should be conveyed to apex Muslim Forum in the state for negotiation with major parties in the contest. (5) The Committee should also prepare the electoral history of the constituency to find out, how much times it has been won by a Muslim candidate and how many times a Muslim candidate has lost by a small margin. (6) As finally decided, all Muslim voters should vote for the common candidate. 15. The Forum should target all Muslim Winnable Seats which should be identified by the following criteria:- (1) Muslim voters constitute at least 20 %of the electrorate. (2) Muslim voters are more than those of any other identifiable social group. (3) Muslim community is not divided by baradaris & sects. (4) Muslim community is on good terms with other social groups, particularly, the Dalits. (5) Muslim community has one or more suitable potential candidates, active in public life and acceptable to all Muslims and some other social groups. (6) Muslim community has formed a local consultative committee to chose a muslim candidate and project him. The local committee should advise the apex Muslim Forum to place his name before the major contestants & negotiate their support. (7) The agreed candidate is in a position to raise some resources from his friends, sympathisers & well-wishers, apart from the party which nominates him as its candidate. (8) The candidate is in a position to set up his polling machinery to conduct an effective campaign and establish contact with all the voters. Chart of Winnable Muslim Constituencies | | | | Average Population—3,50,000 | | | | | Division | District | Due | Constituencies | Remark | | Muslim Population in | Name- Muslim Population | Seats | No. Name- % of Muslim | | | Lakh-No. of Seats Due | | | | | | 1. Amravati12.4 Lakh3-4 | Amravati (3.5 L) | 1 | 38. Amravati | RU 04 | | Akola (3.0L) | 1 | 31. Akola East 24% | | | Buldhana (2.8L) | 1 | 22. Buldhana 24% | | | Yavatmal-Washim (1.1L) | 1 | 78. Yavatmal - | | | | | 81. Pusad | | | | | 79. Digras 32% | | | | | 35. Karanja 22% | | | 2. Konkan34.5 Lakh- 10 | Mumbai City (7.4L) | 1-2 | 177, Bandra West | W04 | | | | 180, Wadala 22 % | | | | | 184, Byculla 25 % | W04 | | | | 186, Mumbaidevi 25 % | W04 | | Mumbai Suburban (14.9L) 4 | | 160, Kandivali East 20 % | | | | | 101, Charcop | | | | | 165, Mankhurd Shivajinagar | W04 | | | | 175. Kalina 20 % | | | Thane (8.8L) 2-3 | 2 or 3 | 136, Bhiwandi west 30 % | W04 | | | | 137, Bhiwandi East 30 % | | | | | 138, Kalyan | | | | | 145, Meera Bhayander 31 % | W04 | | | | 149, Mumbra-Kalana 30 % | | | Ratnagiri (1.8l) | | | | | Raigarh (1.7L) | | | | | Sindhdurg | 2 | 193. Shivardhan | RU 04 | | 3. Aurangabad11.3- L3 | Aurangabad (5.7 L) | 1 or 2 | 107. Aurangabad Central 25% | | | | | 108. Aurangabad West 25% | | | | | 104. Sillod 20% | | | | | 109. Aurangabad East 25% | | | Parbhani (2.4 L) 1 | | 96. Prabhani | | | Jalna (2.1 L) 1 | | 98. Pathri or 99 Partur | W04 | | Hingoli (NA) 1 | | 93. Kalamnuri 25% | | | 4. Nanded 10.8 L3 | Latur (2.9L) 1 | | 239.Ausa 25% | | | Nanded (3.9 L) 1 | | 86. Nanded North 30% | | | | | 97. Nanded South 30% | | | Osmanabad (1.5 L) 1 | | 242. Osmanabad 25% | | | Beed (.5 L) | | 230. Beed 25% | RU 04 | | 5. Nagpur (2) | Nagpur (3 L) 1 | | 55. Nagpur Central, or 30% | W04 | | 5 otherDists.(less than1 L) | | 58. Kampti 30% | W04 | | | | Best Muslim Constituency in the rest of Division | | 6. Nashik 13.9 L 4 | Dhule 1 | | 7. Dhule City 35% | | | Jalgaon (4.6 L) 1 | | 13.Jalgaon City 20% | | | Nashik (5.3L) | 1-2 | 114. Malegaon Central 25% | RU04 | | Ahmednagar (2.6L) 1 | | | | | Nandurbar 1 | | Best Muslim Constituency in the Dist. |
| 7. Pune | Pune (4.5L) 1 | | 214 Pune Cantt. 20% | | | | | 215 Kasbapet 20% | | | Solapur (3.8L) 1 | | 248. Solapur North or | | | | | 249. Solapur South | | | Kolhapur (2.4L) 1 | | 273. Kagal | W04 | | Sangli (1.3L) Satara (4.5L) 1 | | 281. Miraj | W04 | | Total | 31-35 | | |
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