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| Muslim India MONTHLY JOURNAL OF REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION VOL. XXVI NO. 305 CONTENTS NOVEMBER, 2009 FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK: Universal Code for Treatment of Minorities CONVERSION: RAJEEV DHAVAN’s Judicial Analysis of India’s Anti-Conversion Laws COMMUNAL VIOLENCE: Late A. M. Rosenthal on Bombay’s Mass Murder in Jan-March 1993 ‘DESI’ TERRORISM: I. G MUSHRIF’S Alternative Theory of IB Conspiracy Behind Mumbai-CST Terror Attack GOVERNMENT: Chitrangada Chaoudhury on Limits to Right to Information : Ghanshyam Shah on Civil Society as check on’ HINDUTVA TERRORISM: Mushrif Exposes Hindutva Terror Network Stretching to Israel & Nepal, And Smashes India’s myth of "Islamic Terrorism" HUMAN RIGHTS: COL R HARIHARAN on Politician-Bureaucracy-Criminal Nexus Behind in Encounters’ Killings 26HISTORY: Renowned Indologist A.S. Altekar Destruction of Nalanda Exonerates Bakhtiar Khilji : Ram Puniyani on Communalizing History: Shivaji And Afzal Khan INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE: Dr. Ezzddin Ibrahim on Risks & Pitfalls on Islamic- Christian Dialogue KASHMIR SITUATION: PREM SHANKAR JHA on persistence of Kashmiri Militancy : Amitabh Mattoo on Four D’s For A New Kashmir MINORITY WELFARE: Kashif-ul-Huda on How not to do Minority Welfare MADRASA EDUCATION: Sachar Report on Madrasa Education (Extracts) 30 : Madrasa Challenge-Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan’Review by Yoginder Sikand MONUMENTS: Tourism Potential of Monuments of Asset & Heritage Site Editorial, Times of India, 13 October, 2009 MUSLIM MINOTITIES: Al Alwani’sTowards a Fiqh for Muslim Minorities Reviewed by Yoginder Sikand 44MUSLIM MINORITIES-CHINA: Chandra Muzaffar on Uighur Discontent NATIONAL POLITICS: Hindustan Times on Growing Dynastic Politics : Swapan Dasgupta on BJP’s Persistent Political Decline to arrest Congress Creed Turning into Commonsense : Maharashtra Assembly Election Result, 2009 & Shahabuddin’s Statement, 23 Oct. 2009 NATIONAL POLITICS-UN HC for HR: Navi Pillay on Casteism: as Another kind of Racism. : Aakar Patel on Caste Control on Industry, Politics & Media? OBITUARY: Eminent Academician IQBAL AHMAD ANSARI (1935-2009) : Renowned Theologian Ikhlaq Hussain Qasmi (1920-2009) Eloquent Speaker and of Inimitable Writer : Theater personality Habib Tanvir, 1923 –2009 OTHER MINORITIES: Tom Deegan on Sikh Separatism: Raising its Head Again PARLIAMENT: National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Bill, 2009 PARTITION: A.G. NOORANI on Congress-League Breakdown in 1937 on UP as - Real Forerunner of Pakistan : Making Sense of Jinnah Today Editorial, Economic & Political Weekly : M J Akbar on Gandhi and Jinnah In Present Context RSS: A.G. NOORANI Exposes Advani Lieon on Nehru Pressing Patel to Ban RSS M Zeyaul Haque is comment of Mushrif’s ‘Who Killed Karkare?’, SECULARISM: Omar Khalidi’s on Hinduising India: Secularism in Practice STATE-TERRORISM: Amnesty International’s Repot on Extra judicial Killings by the PAC in Hashimpura, 22-23 May, 1987 URDU: Non- Findings of Sardar Ali Jafri Committee on Implementation of Gujral Committeee Report on Urdu FROM THE EDITOR’S DESK Universal Code for Treatment of Minorities Among nearly 200 member-states of the UN, there is hardly one which has a homogenous population in terms of religion or language or race or culture. This implies that all of them have minority groups in relation to the majority group. In some cases, a state may have no groups with a clear majority but more than one minority groups with each of them constituting less than 50% share of the population. Generally every state need at least 10% of its population identified by a recognized marker like religion or race or language or culture different from that of the majority. The state has to evolve a humane and civilised modus operandi to deal with the minorities. The problem is even more complicated in countries of continental dimensions like China, India, Russia, USA, Brazil or Nigeria in which groups which form minorities in relation to the predominant majority collectively number in millions, though they may be scattered throughout the national territory. Such groups cannot be overlooked, ignored or bypassed in politics or administration or in development planning or even in external relations. The problem becomes very knotty in a centrist set up as the decision-making process is often remote and insensitive to the problems and grievances of minority groups, which have little access to policy making or its execution. In this sense, the task is much easier in a federation or even in a quasi-federation as in India. A federal set up may have an added advantage that the social group which forms a majority in the nation-state, may constitute a minority at some lower levels, namely, constituent states, districts, sub-districts, municipalities or villages. Conversely, even a group which forms a minority at the national level may constitutes a majority in some units at lower levels in some parts of the country. To take the obvious example, while Muslims, Sikhs and Christians are the three important religious minorities in India, they all form a majority respectively in states like Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and some North-east states. Deeper analysis will bring out that barring micro groups, all other social groups have sub groups and some of them may constitute a majority in some districts or sub-districts or municipalities or villages. Another aspect of the problem is that a country which has an over-whelming majority of a particular group is bound to have an imprint of its religion, language or culture in all walks of life at all levels. In such a situation, the tendency towards assimilation or the pressure to have uniformity or homogeneity also increases. For example, in most Slavic states all non-Christians tend to take Slavic names or surnames. Historically minority groups often adopt a device to conceal their real identity. In India a person is immediately identifiable as a member of a religious or caste community by his name. People living in the same territory have to a large extent a common language or a common culture. But in the age of democracy, every social group, however small, wishes to keep its identity or even to project it. The minority groups, therefore, with some exceptions, reject, or at least resist assimilation. There are, however, situations in which a minority group finds it safer to fall in line and voluntarily assimilate itself with the majority group and in its own interest. It may find it practical and even beneficial to merge its identity with that of the majority group. All said and done, minorities are a fact of life and have to be recognized. The existence of the minorities is a question of fact, not of law, and should be accepted as a valuable contribution to national diversity and as a welcome variation to a dull monotony. At the end of the First World War, when several countries in Eastern Europe were liberated from the Russian or Turkish empires, the question of protection of rights of minorities became the subject not only of post-war negotiations but of international agreements with the formation of the League of Nations. At the end of the Second World War the United Nations Organisation, created by the international community paid particular attention to the rights and duties of the minority groups in the states of which they are citizens and reciprocally the rights and duties of the states towards their minorities. This is indeed a radical departure. In principle, all states accept that the minorities are equal citizens, entitled to equality before the law and fundamental freedoms and adequate share in the goods and services that the state offers, thus, creating a uniform environment of equality. The state cannot discriminate, under the UN Charter or under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, against any citizen on the basis of religion or race or culture or language. Most states which have emerged after the Second World War at the end of the colonial era have fundamental rights written in their Constitutions. But, in all human affairs there is a gap between precept and practice. This is the reason why the UN System or the international community has been steadily working on eliminating discrimination particularly on the basis of race or religion or language through International Covenants, Conventions, Declarations and Resolutions. Surprisingly, the international community could not formulate a precise definition for the term ‘minority’. That is why it decided to give a long title to its historic Declaration of 1992 on the rights of minorities, as UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and the subsequent Resolution of 1998 which lays down what states governments agencies and NGO’S should do for minorities. Now the international community has a comprehensive standard which covers all valuable elements gathered from provisions in the treaties between the first and the second World Wars, the UN Charter of 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. In the meantime, the UN also adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965 and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief in 1981; Finally, in 1993, the Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna set a seal on Minority Rights as an integral element of international law on Human Rights. Many NGO’s and experts have participated in workshops, seminars and symposia, sponsored by the UN to refine the concepts and implications of minority rights at the national, regional and international levels and have tried to draw attention to indigenous peoples and aboriginals, marginalized in several countries. The international community is still debating whether Zionism in Israel constitutes racial discrimination and a violation of human rights & in the Indian context whether the phenomena of caste or the treatment of Adivasis generates questions of minority rights. Since the situation varies from state to state, even among those, which have a sizable proportion of minorities in their population, it has not so far been possible for the international community to lay down a justiciable code for the protection of the rights of the minorities and for the promotion of their legitimate interests and aspirations. However, nearly every state has, apart from the provisions in its constitution, enacted laws and issued executive instructions for dealing with specific situations and problems that arise. And all of them have been subjected to judicial, review and analyses and refined by experts.NEED FOR A CODE FOR TREATMENT OF MINORITIES Nearly, 20 years have passed since the adoption of the UN Declaration on Minorities in 1992 and resolution of 1998. Many national and regional laws have accumulated over the last 20 years and it is possible, in my view, to initiate the formulation of an International Code for the Treatment of the Minorities which may apply universally to all states-members of the UN system, irrespective of the size of the minority groups, individually and collectively, or the diversities among them in terms of race and religion, language or culture. In formulating a Code for the Minorities the initial road block-recognition of the identity of the minorities - has been by and large surmounted. The international community now swears by multiculturalism and accepts religious, linguistic and racial diversity and, therefore, recognizes minorities on the face of it. The imperative is to recognize distinct groups that are all entitled to full participation in the national life, equality before law, right to their religion, language and culture, protection against hate speech, denigration, demonization or vilification, due share in the fruits of progress and development and due claim on the services, facilities and resources of the state. However, a small minority may or may not have the means to assert its identity or to secure its rights but the law of the nation and national constitutions and laws recognize group rights, subject to law and order and public morality. The real bottleneck for the minorities which remains unbridged is the question of due representation in the policy-making and decision-making bodies-legislative, executive or judicial, and what is more important in the administration charged to enforce the law and execute the decisions. Apart from the well known religious, linguistic and cultural minorities India faces the phenomenon of ‘caste’ which means that even within the majority group or, the minority groups, many ‘castes’ and ‘sub-castes’ find themselves powerless to assert their identities as caste minorities and baradaris. The lowest in the caste hierarchy are described as Scheduled Castes in the Constitution which were historically considered ‘untouchables’. The Scheduled Cates now form nearly 18% of the population and consist of myriads of sub-castes, not to speak of those whose forefathers had converted to Islam or Christianity. But the law limits the term Scheduled Castes to those who profess Hinduism and admits some sections of the Sikhs and of late neo Buddhists but Muslims and Christians by descent or conversion are disqualified. In addition to Scheduled Castes India has Scheduled Tribes, who form about 8% of the population. There is no religious qualification as the overwhelming majority professes indigenous religions, though there is an attempt to bring them within the fold of Hinduism. Both the SCs and the STs, who are together known as Dalits, enjoy reservation in legislatures and public employment and have benefitted for social and educational development. Yet they remain economically the most backward elements in the population, except in some small states/UT’s where the ST’s are in a majority and exercise political power. Over the years both the SCs and the STs have developed ‘creamy layers’ and there is rising demand from those left behind for their share. It shall be not long before these conglomerates get divided into viable sub-groups. The same may happen to the Shudras who form the ‘OBCs’. Another factor that has risen of late is the inherent claim of indigenous groups which live on land or in forests, rich in natural resources, sometimes visible above the surface and sometimes lying underground. They assert a prior claim to these resources and demand that their exploitation by other citizens or foreigners should not be permitted without ensuring that due benefit reaches them. Distinct groups of minorities exist in some parts of the country due to internal migration in search of livelihood, for example, the tribals from Chhotanagpur, now called Jharkhand, who migrated to Assam to serve as plantation labour or the weavers or other craftsmen who migrated from UP or AP to the metropole and after a few generations, settled down to become a distinct minoritie in the state. The most special case is that of the nomadic tribes who have no fixed habitat and are always on the move for work. Since they have no fixed habitat, they are often ignored in distribution of development benefits. Their basic right to register as voters is often ignored. Whatever the emerging pattern of diversity, a comprehensive Code for the Treatment of Minorities shall conceptually cover all identities, protect them against ill-treatment, violence, genocide or ethnic cleansing or social boycott or physical displacement as well as secure them their full rights as equal citizens uniformaly under the law. The point is that the Code for the Treatment of Minorities should be so defined that will apply to all mini and micro groups, irrespective of where they live, their level of development, whenever they are subjected to any atrocities or denials or deprivations, for example, in schooling for their children or in employment under the Employment Guarantee Programme or in health facilities or any scheme for social uplift. They should be able to invoke the Code and claim redressal. The fact however remains that unless these groups acquire literacy and become organised and empowered, they cannot coherently demand or secure their dues from an apathetic or ignorant or corrupt administration, whatever the law, far less challenge state policies or even judicial orders. Before we come to the actual formulation of the Minority Code, let us keep in mind that for all practical purposes, in India the word ‘minorities’ is equated or identified with Muslims and the word ‘Hindus’ as inclusive of the SCs and STs in the widest sense of the term. About 20% form religious minorities and of them about 2/3rd are Muslims. But as explained above the predominant Hindu majority (of 80%) consists of many castes and sub-castes. For historical reasons, the tension between the Hindus and the Muslims has been in the forefront of national politics which at one stage led to the Partition. But the idea of the Code is not to formulate a definitive or final solution of Hindu-Muslim or intra-Hindu problems but to project these problems as part of a much larger common problem. This should make the people of our country conscious of the rights of all citizens and all minor, mini and micro groups which are conscious or identifiable, entitled to enjoy the same rights-political, economic and social, constitutional and legal, as the biggest group in the land. History has communalized our mental outlook and social perspective largely in terms of Hindu-Muslim antagonism to the extent that even legal pundits, social scientists and political experts are not prepared to accept Muslims as a separate category. A common Code will erase this dominant cleavage and make the people conscious of the fact that India is socially and culturally far more multiple than they imagine and the only approach towards securing political equality, social justice and economic progress is to respect the individual and collective rights of every identifiable, equally conscious group, however small, and thus develop greater sensitivity and a more tolerant and inclusive outlook. Once the Indian State has adopted the Minorities Code, placing itself in the vaguard of the human rights movement, it can place it before the international community for adoption. New Delhi 1 November, 2009 (Syed Shahabuddin) NATIONAL POLITICS Growing Dynastic Politics: Voters Asked to Choose between Competing Dynasties On the question of influence of dynasty on Indian politics, I get the usual responses: we are a democracy so if people vote for the sons and daughters of politicians, how can you complain? Or: in India, everything from business to movies is about dynasty so why should politics be any different? And so on. I do not deny that there is some merit in the response. But the truth is that the influence of dynasty is growing exponentially. Very soon, all argument will be pointless because all politics will be about dynasty. Maharashtra politics is dynastically driven. Hardly anybody bothers to mention it any longer but Chief Minister Ashok Chavan is a dynast; his father was former Home Minister and Maharashtra Chief Minister S.B. Chavan. The Shiv Sena-MNS story is entirely about dynasty. Bal Thackeray’s son Uddhav heads the Sena. His estranged cousin Raj broke away to form the MNS. The BJP in Maharashtra is largely the creation of two men: the late Pramod Mahajan and his sister’s husband, Gopinath Munde. This time around, Mahajan’s daughter was in the fray and the Munde family had three representatives among the candidates. The NCP is also now becoming a family affair. Sharad Pawar’s daughter Supriya Sule and his nephew Ajit Pawar will battle it out for the succession. Down the line, the trend continues. Former Chief Minister (and present Energy Minister) Sushilkumar Shinde’s daughter won from Solapur. Former Chief Minister (and present Heavy Industries Minister) Vilasrao Deshmukh’s son won from the family region of Latur. Former Deputy Chief Minister Chhagan Bhujbal’s son won from Nandgaon. The President of India’s son won from Amravati.There were many other dynasts in the fray: Kalpana Patil, Nirmala Danve, Rahul Aher, Prashant Thakur etc. What was most worrying was that the role of dynasty in selecting candidates cuts across party lines. Even the BJP, which claims to be different, nominated several dynasts. In Haryana, politics is about dynasty, and has always been. The state has been ruled by a handful of political dynasties: Bhajan Lal and his family; Devi Lal and his kids; Bansi Lal and his brood etc. There are lesser-known dynasties too. The sitting Chief Minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda is the son of a former minister, for instance. So not only was the election fought on the basis of dynasty but even the post-election squabbles were dynastic. Hooda did not get a majority, so Chautala (son of Devi Lal and father of A.S. Chautala who also won his seat) staked his claim thereby increasing the relevance of Bhajan Lal (whose wife stood and lost) and his son Kuldeep Bishnoi. Politics in the North-east is just as family dominated as it is in the rest of India. For years, Arunachal politics was dominated by Gegong Apang who introduced his son, Omak, to politics as his heir. This time around, the Apangs lost as did the wife of former Chief Minister Mukut Mithi but Takam Tagar, younger brother of Congress MP Takam Sanjoy won. I could go on but I think I’ve made my point: the hold of dynasty on state politics is stronger than ever. And it grows with each election. This exponential growth in dynastic politics weakens the traditional argument about ‘democratic dynasty’. If there are so many dynasts in the fray and if so many battles pit one dynasty against another (as in Haryana and increasingly in Maharashtra) then where is the element of real choice? Voters are not being offered true democracy. They are being asked to choose between competing dynasties. Democracy is about choice and once you restrict the choice (as all parties now do), you destroy the very basis of democracy. Moreover, as politics becomes about dynasty, you make it impossible for outsiders with ideas or capabilities or even sincerity and integrity to join the system. All parties will give most of their nominations to sons and daughters of politicians. Not only does this harm India because we are denied the politicians we deserve but it also greatly weakens our claim to be the world’s largest democracy. In a true democracy, candidates would emerge from the hundreds of millions who are eligible to stand. But in today’s India, easy entry into politics is limited to a small group, numbering not more than a lakh (if you include the states) which gets to fight elections. Rather than being a democracy, we have become an oligarchy where a political caste takes charge and then, keeps everybody else out of the process. The only way to change this is for parties to create mechanisms that allow talented people to join politics, no matter who their fathers are. Only the Left parties remain resolutely undynastic but their presence is restricted to two states. Ironically, it is the Congress, a party that has been dynastically driven for many years that is now looking at creating such a mechanism. And even more ironically, it is Rahul Gandhi, who owes much of his popularity to his family background, who is spearheading the move to create an alternative to dynasty by introducing genuine democracy and fair elections in the Youth Congress and the National Students’ Union of India. It is not an easy task but because of who Rahul is, people believe him when he says that he can guarantee that good people who come up through the system will get the ticket. Otherwise, we can kiss Indian democracy goodbye. And be governed by a ruling caste of dynastic politicians. (Source: The Hindustan Times, 25 October, 2009) BJP’s Persistent Political Decline Unable to Provide Alternative to Congress Creed Turning into Common Sense Swapan Dasgupta The ruling party regained all the three states, thanks to the vagaries of the first-past-the-post system, but there was nothing exciting, resounding and inspirational about its victory. The poetry and romance of politics was markedly absent from the Congress universe. Even its victory celebrations were reminiscent of the relief felt by old-style public sector managers at the fulfilment of five-year plan targets. The party, it almost seemed, won out of habit. The largest chunk of people voted for it because they preferred predictability, even boredom, to uncertain change. It suggests that the Congress creed is fast turning into common sense. The Congress has become something akin to a default preference for peoples and communities who are not driven by either overriding zeal or a fierce sense of distinctiveness, a characteristically Hindu complacency. The Congress’ partial success in identifying itself as the party of the inoffensive middle ground has been accompanied by the corresponding decline of the BJP as the alternative pole of politics. A decade ago, it was assumed that the country was moving towards a broad two-front system led by the Congress and BJP respectively. The horrifying convulsions in the BJP have rung alarm bells in the Indian Establishment. India’s stakeholders want political stability to co-exist with a robust Opposition that is also in a position to offer an alternative to voters. The BJP, it would seem, has abdicated that role. There is a belief that the BJP was never suited for that role in the first place. This argument rests on the belief that the saffron outfit is too narrowly ideological and blessed with too many social angularities and prejudices of ‘Middle India’ to emerge as an alternative common sense. It is often seen to be insufficiently ‘inclusive’ and its appeal is felt to be unduly dependant on a rise in the emotional temperature. In a land of multiple gods and goddesses, the BJP has often conveyed a picture of rigid ‘monotheism’. Ashis Nandy has even suggested it is too European for accommodative Hindu tastes. The BJP will be shooting itself in the foot if it imagines that cloning the MNS with a dose of militant Hindutva is the answer to stagnation and decline. There was nothing inherently flawed in the BJP’s approach to the Lok Sabha polls. It lost, not because its centrist moderation was unviable, but on account of tactical errors: its prime ministerial candidate lacked universal appeal, compared to Manmohan Singh; its track record in Opposition was wildly erratic; and its campaign was derailed by an ugly extremism all Indians found abhorrent. The BJP is caught between the competitive pulls of moderation and backward-looking certitudes. Secondly, it has disengaged from the youth and middle classes who rallied behind the party in the 1990s. Finally, it has entrusted the party organisation to a man with bizarre priorities and a monumental chip on his shoulder. To remain relevant, the BJP has to junk its comedians (Source: The Times of India, 25 October, 2009) Maharashtra Assembly Election Result, 2009 Shahabuddin’s Statement, 23 Oct. 2009 In Maharashtra Assembly Election, 2009, only 10 Muslim have been elected as MLAs against their proportionate due of 31, with 4 from INC, 2 from NCP, 2 from SP, 1 from JSSP. Despite their dissatisfaction with the decadal performance of the INC- NCP government on many counts, the Muslims of Maharashtra had largely pinned their hopes on their alliance but it fielded only 15 Muslim candidates. BJP-Shiv Sena alliances not unexpectedly fielded only two, as a token gesture. The SP had fielded large number of candidates of which its leader Abu Asim Azmi won from 2 Seats. Left-Republican Front did not field a single Muslim candidate. Nearly all Muslim MLAs have been elected from Greater Mumbai and other western parts of the state. Thus, most of Maharashtra Muslims, even those in districts/constituencies of high Muslim concentration, remain unrepresented. Major parties have ignored Muslim voters because their social constituencies, leave little space for divided Muslim voters. Muslims of Maharashtra are both politically conscious and possess intellectual and material resources. They have therefore reasons to feel unhappy with the political pattern which ignores them. They are obliged to apply their mind on how to have an effective presence & voice in the legislature and thus to make it pay more attention to their legitimate grievances and demands. It is obvious that statements and promises by secular parties will not satisfy them any longer and they have to devise better tests. Apart from inclusion of their aspirations in the manifestos, they have to see the number of Muslims they put up as candidates. To raise this they have only two options: to form a Muslim secular party or a non-political Muslim Front, to work out a deal with secular parties and alliances, to identify the Muslim concentration constituencies and to advise the Muslim voters which party to support. Their success depends entirely on the unity the Muslim community forges at the constituency level. Casteism: Just Another kind of Bigotry Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights The degrading practice of making members of a ‘lower caste’ clean public toilets with their bare hands which persists in many places despite prohibition, is not the workers’ choice. Rather, they inherit such tasks because of their social origins and descent. These discriminated individuals then get trapped in a generational cycle of social exclusion and marginalisation. Today caste-affected communities and civil society activists are hoping to tear down the bigger invisible wall of discrimination by trying to promote new international standards of equality and non-discrimination with their determination and courage. ‘Untouchability’ is a social phenomenon affecting around 260 million people worldwide. This type of discrimination is usually associated with the notions of ritual purity and pollution and is a global phenomenon. Caste is the very negation of the human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination. It condemns individuals from birth and their communities to a life of exploitation, violence and social exclusion. ‘Lower caste’ individuals are frequently confined to hereditary, low-income employment and are deprived access to agricultural land and credit. They often battle high levels of indebtedness or debt and labour bondage which is a contemporary form of slavery. Child labour is rampant in descent-based communities and children of ‘lower castes’ suffer from illiteracy. For women, caste is a multiplier that compounds their experience of poverty and discrimination. Laws and policies have been put in place in many countries to combat this scourge. Constitutions prohibit caste-based discrimination and ‘lower caste’ members have been elected to the highest offices of the land. Special legislation has been enacted to provide affirmative action in education and employment, and protection from violence and exploitation. Judiciaries have sought to enforce laws and provide relief to victims. Dedicated institutions monitor the conditions and advocate on behalf of ‘lower caste’ groups. At the international level, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination explicitly lists descent as a ground of racial discrimination. The Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on Racism in 2001, recognised descent-based discrimination. It also provided a comprehensive roadmap to combat it, which was reaffirmed by States in April 2009. Yet, it is imperative to implement education programmes that can change systemic, cultural and social prejudices and customs, beliefs and traditions based on descent, power and affluence. Caste-affected communities must be given a voice and participation in the development, implementation and evaluation of strategies aimed at empowering them. This action to stem an abhorrent form of marginalisation and exclusion is long overdue. We owe it to those ‘lower-caste’ families, which were forced to leave village because they dared to vote in a parliamentary election against the favoured candidate of the upper caste. We owe it to the villagers belonging to the lowest social class starving to death because they were not able to benefit from the public services that they were entitled to. All caste-victims demand and deserve remedies. Their plight can neither be justified as age-old traditions nor regarded merely as a ‘family business’. The Human Rights Council the premier intergovernmental body for the protection and promotion of human rights should promote the 2009 Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Effective Elimination of Discrimination based on Work and Descent. This study complements existing international standards of non-discrimination. All nations must endorse these norms. The time has come to eradicate the shameful concept of caste. Like slavery and apartheid, the international community should come together to tear down the barriers of caste too. ((Source: The Hindustan Times, 14 October, 2009) Who Controls Industry, Politics &The Media? Brahmin-Bania Hold Industry & Media, Shudras, Politics Aakar Patel All economy in India is owned and run by two castes. The Brahmin used his monopoly on knowledge and the Bania used his high-trust culture of trade to become dominant. Their skills are world-class. Given the realities of capital formation, it is difficult for other castes to catch up soon. INDUSTRY & TRADE Industry: The sensex comprises the 30 largest trading companies of India. ACC is run by a Brahmin (Sumit Banerjee). BHEL is run by a Brahmin (Ravi Kumar Krishna Swamy). Grasim and Hindalco are run by a Bania (Kumar Mangalam Birla). L&T is run by a Brahmin (A.M. Naik), NTPC is run by a Brahmin (R.S.Sharma), ONGC is run by a Brahmin (also called R.S. Sharma). Reliance group firms are run by Banias (Mukesh and Anil Ambani). Jaiprakash Associates is run by a Brahmin (Yogesh Gaur), Sterlite Industries is run by a Bania (Anil Agarwal), Sun Pharma is run by a Bania (Dilip Shanghvi) and Tata Steel is run by a Brahmin (B. Muthuraman). Hindustan Unilever is run by a Brahmin (Nitin Paranjpe). BANKING * HDFC is run by a Bania (Deepak Parekh), * ICICI Bank is headed by a Brahmin (K. V. Kamath). * State Bank of India is run by a Brahmin (O.P. Bhatt), Punjab National Bank is run by a Brahmin (K.C. Chakrabarty), Bank of Baroda is run by a Brahmin (M.D. Mallya) and Canara Bank is run by a Bania (A.C. Mahajan). STEEL Of India’s steel companies Essar is owned by Banias (Ruia), Arcelor Mittal is owned by a Bania (Laxmi Mittal), Ispat is owned by Banias (Mittals), Jindal Steel is owned by Banias, Bhushan Steel is owned by Banias (Singhal), VISA Steel is owned by Banias (Agarwal). State-owned SAIL is run by a Bania (S.K. Roongta) and Lloyd Steel is owned by Banias (Gupta). CEMENT Ambuja is owned by Banias (Neotia and Sekhsaria), Dalmia Cements is owned by Banias, Ultratech and Vikram Cement are owned by Banias (Birla) and JK Cement is owned by Banias (Singhania). AUTOMOBILE Hindustan Motors is owned by Banias (Birla) and Bajaj Auto is owned by Banias. SOFTWARE COMPANIES Of India’s software companies, Infosys run by a Brahmin (Kris Gopalakrishnan now and Narayana Murthy and Nandan Nilekani before him). TCS run by a Brahmin (Subramanian Ramadorai). Wipro owned by a Khoja (Azim Premji). Khojas are Shia of the Sevener sect, converted from the Luhana trading community (same caste as L.K. Advani and M.A. Jinnah). AIRLINES India’s two largest airlines are Kingfisher, owned by a Brahmin (Vijay Mallya) and Jet, owned by a Bania (Naresh Goyal). MOBILE PHONE Of India’s mobile phone firms, Reliance Communications (Ambani), Airtel (Mittal), Vodafone Essar (Ruia), Idea (Birla), Spice (Modi) are all Banias. BSNL is run by a Bania (Kuldeep Goyal) and Tatas TTML is run by a Brahmin (K.A. Chaukar). SPORTS & MEDIA Cricket in India is run by a Bania (Lalit Modi) and before him it was run by another Bania (Jagmohan Dalmiya). Media in India is almost entirely controlled by Banias and Jains. Of the two largest English newspapers, TheTimes of India is owned by Jains and the Hindustan Timesis owned by Banias (Birla). The third largest English paper, The Hindu, is owned by Brahmins (Kasturi Iyengar family). The Indian Express is owned by Banias (Goenka). Zee TV is owned by a Bania (Subhash Chandra Goel). Of the two largest Hindi newspapers, Dainik Jagran is owned by Banias (Gupta), and Dainik Bhaskar is owned by Banias (Agarwal). The Agarwals also own Gujarati daily Divya Bhaskar. The largest Gujarati newspaper Gujarat Samachar is owned by Jains (Shah). The largest Marathi paper Lokmat is owned by Jains (Darda). Rajasthan Patrika is owned by Jains (Kothari). Navbharat Times is owned by Jains and Hindustanowned by Banias (Birla). Amar Ujala is owned by Banias (Maheshwari). BUT SHUDRAS CONTROL POLITICS Andhra Pradesh is run by a peasant Christian (Y.S.R. Reddy), Bihar by a peasant Kurmi (Nitish Kumar) and Gujarat is run by a peasant from the Teli/Ghanchi caste (Narendra Modi). Haryana is run by a peasant Jat (Bhupinder Hooda), Karnataka is ruled by a peasant Lingayat (B.S. Yeddyurappa), Kerala is run by a peasant Ezhava-OBC (V.S. Achuthanandan) and Madhya Pradesh is run by a peasant OBC (Shivraj Chouhan). Maharashtra is run by a peasant Maratha (Ashok Chavan), Rajasthan by a peasant Mali (Ashok Gehlot), Punjab by a peasant Jat (Parkash Badal), Tamil Nadu by a barber (M. Karunanidhi) and UP by a Dalit (Mayawati). The largest caste in India is the shudra. We think the shudra means Untouchable, but it actually means peasant. The peasant castes, such as Patel, constitute more than 50% of Indias population. Only one large state in India is run by a Brahmin and he is West Bengal’s Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, a communist. India’s Prime Minister is a Sikh (Manmohan Singh) and President is a peasant Maratha (Pratibha Patil). At independence, India was run by a Brahmin (Jawaharlal Nehru) whose mentor was a Bania (M.K. Gandhi). The chief minister of UP was a Brahmin (Govind Ballabh Pant), the first chief minister of Gujarat was a Bania (Jivraj Mehta). MP was run by a Brahmin (Ravi Shankar Shukla), Rajasthan by a Brahmin (H. L. Shastri), Kerala by a Brahmin (E.M.S. Namboodiripad), Punjab by a Brahmin (G.C. Bhargava) and Assam by a Brahmin (G.N. Bordoloi). At independence, the Shudras had neither political nor economic strength. Democracy transferred power from the Brahmin to him. The Brahmin and the Bania still control the economy, but now the Shudras controls politics. The Brahmin and Bania oppose reservations in the private sector, which they totally dominate. The shudra wants his share, but the Brahmin and Bania say their dominance is from merit. The Brahmin and Bania control the media, but the shudra controls legislation. Sooner rather than later, reservations will come. (Aakar Patel is a director with Hill Road Media.) (Source: Dalit Voice, October 16-31, 2009) PARLIAMEN The National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Bill, 2009 2. In section 2 of the for clause (g), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:— ‘(g) "Minority Educational Institution" means a college or an educational institution established and administered by a minority or minorities;’. 3. In section 3 of the Act, in sub-section (2), for the words "two members", the words "three members" shall be substituted.4. In section 10 of the Act, for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:— "(1) Subject to the provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, any person, who desires to establish a Minority Educational Institution may apply to the competent authority for the grant of no objection certificate for the said purpose.".5. In section 12B of the Act, in sub-section (4), the words "and in consultation with the State Government" shall be omitted.STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS 2. The Commission which has been in existence for four years, has faced certain practical difficulties in implementing some of the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The Ministry of Human Resource Development has also, from time to time, received several suggestions in regard to the aforesaid Act, which were referred to the Commission. The Commission has considered views and suggestions expressed by various stake-holders and have recommended certain amendments to the aforesaid Act. 3. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (NCMEI) (Amendment) Bill, 2009 was passed by the Lok Sabha but lapsed due to dissolution of the 14th Lok Sabha. It is proposed to introduce the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Bill, 2009 on the lines of the earleir aforesaid Bill which lapsed. 4. Clause (g) of section 2 of the Act, 2004 defines the Minority Educational Institution which means a college or institution (other than a University) established or maintained by a person or group of persons from amongst the minorities. It is proposed to substitute the said definition by a new definition so as to omit the words "other than a University" and substitute the words "establish and administer" for the words "established or maintained". The proposed amendment is clarificatory in nature. 5. Sub-section (2) of section 3 of the aforesaid Act provides that the NCMEI consist of a Chairperson and two members to be nominated by the Central Government. It is proposed to increase the number of the said two members to three. 6. Section 10 of the aforesaid Act confers right upon any person to establish a Minority Educational Institution ein. Sub-section (1) of said section 10 provides that person may apply to the competent authority for the grant of no objection certificate. It is proposed to amend the said sub-section (1) so as to provide that the provisions of aforesaid sub-section (1) shall be subject to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. 7. Section 12B of the Act confers power upon the NCMEI to decide on the minority status of an educational institution. Sub-section (4) of said section 12B provides that the Commission may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, and in consultation with the State Government, decide on the minority status of the institution and shall proceed to give due directions, all such directions shall be binding on the parties. It is proposed to do away with the requirement of consultation with the State Government for the purpose of deciding on the status of the Institution, as in certain cases the State Government or its agency may be a party before the commission. 8. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives. The 3rd August, 2009. How not to do Minority Welfare Kashif-ul-Huda, TwoCircles.net In the budget for 2009-10 financial year, Government of India has allocated 1756 crores, an increase of 74% from pervious year’s 1013 crores. But this is a miniscule part of the total budget reserved for 20% of the nation’s population. Since Muslims form 73% of the minority population, most of the schemes for minorities are designed keeping in mind educational and economic backwardness of the Muslims. Annually, the Central Government spends Rs. 5000 crores for minority welfare; through various schame agencies. If even this amount was spent properly it would have led to some benefit to the community. Government schemes designed for minorities are not implemented sincerely and in many cases funds meant for minorities are diverted to areas and projects that will not directly benefit the minorities. For this diversion Ministry of Minority Affairs is itself responcible. For instance, a letter dated December 26th, 2008, Mr. AK Srivastva, Under-Secretary notifies about the sanctioning of the amount of 63 crores for Barpeta district of Assam. The letter directs the Accounts Officer under the ministry to release 31 crores under various schemes meant for the minorities of Barpeta. Copies of this letter are sent to the concerned departments of the Assam government. For each projects sanctioned, the Ministry issues instructions for the state government. This is where it gets interesting and provides mechanism for legally diverting funds away from the minorities. For Indira Awas Yojana, the Ministry of Minority Affairs directs that "the State will ensure that 20 BPL families per village in 50 villages per block having the highest proportion of minority population would be selected." So, a creative administrator can easily identify villages and families with non-minority population as long as the block itself has a high number of minority populations. If there is any confusion, a second guideline gives it the legal cover. It states that the "BPL families figuring in the wait list, even if they belong to communities other than the minority communities, would be selected in the order of their ranking in the list." In other words, funds allocated for minorities are released by the Ministry of Minority Affairs with the instructions that it can and should be spent on non-minority on the basis of some other wait list and poverty level that has nothing to do with the ministry itself. This is against the "Guidelines for Preparation of Multi-sectoral District Development Plans for Minority Concentration Districts," whose under Clause 7.1.(iii) of the guidelines reads: "…the funds provided for the MCDs are additional resources for these districts do not substitute State Government funds already flowing to the districts." All the local administrators have to show that the block or village they have selected has minority population. Though the building of school, toilets, aangan wadi, and hand pumps may or may not benefit the minorities at all. National Minorities Development & Finance Corporation Set up in 1994, NMDFC focus on the economic development of minorities. It provides funds to minorities for self-employment, education, etc. With income from its share capital of 850 crores, it has the power to bring about changes among the Muslims promoting entrepreneurship through targeted loan schemes. But out of 850 crores it has able to raise only 676 crores. 65% of the share capital is Government of India’s responsibility, 26% of State Governments and Union Territories and 9% by organizations and individuals. While Government of India has met 98% of its contributions only 59% of state contributions are in. Most pathetic is 76.50 crores contribution, only 1 lakh has been raised so far. Having to work through SCAs impacts the effectiveness of NMDFC’s programmes. 96% of the funds disbursed by NDFMC is through the Term Loan Scheme which makes loans of upto Rs. 5 lakhs. Corporation annually disburses on an average 10 crores under this Scheme. For the last 5 years it has benefitted 147,820 people distributing 57 crores. Micro Finance Scheme has distributed 6 crores benefiting 79,781 people in the same period . Ranganath Misra Commission report had this to say about NMDFC: "…the total flow of credit from the NMDFC is comparison to other financial institutions is extremely small. This limits the impact of NMDFC assistance on the economic progress of minorities. Moreover, obtaining a guarantee from the State government remains the biggest hurdle to getting a loan from the NMDFC. Also, due to financial constraints, the state governments are reluctant to guarantee loans." Hostages to the SCAs, both these flagship schemes have been implemented erratically. Out of 27 states and UTs, only Kerala shows some consistency. 16 states in one or more years have no distribution. Bihar, for example, distributed 8 crores in 2004-05, nothing in 2005-06, and 3 crores in 2006-07. Another example is Uttar Pradesh has not distributed any money since 2006-07. Similar is the case with Micro Finance Scheme, 19 states had one or more years of no disbursement at all. In addition to 1% extra interest paid to SCAs, Corporation also pays them over Rs. 1 crore in the name of infrastructure development. Over 40 lakhs was given in interest-free loans in 2006-07 to benefit the NGOs. All this money is meant for channelizing agencies and not minorities. These NGOs also get financial support to help in loan recovery. But recovery has been only around 57%. Not only poor performance, some NGOs have adopted unlawful practices, 51 NGOs are facing legal suits by the Corporation to recover over 1.8 crores. Scholarship Scheme The Ministry of Minority Affairs has three types of scholarships: pre-matric, post-matric and merit-cum-means scholarship for minority students. About 6 lakhs students are to benefit from these scholarships every year. But, it wasn’t easy for the intended beneficiaries. Six pages long complicated application was only available in English. Application requires six additional documents, two on stamp papers. Many poor and rightly deserving students are unlikely to have the resources and expertise necessary to correctly submit all the necessary paperwork. A number of students who did qualify complained of not getting the money that was promised. Solutions Muslims can raise funds and establish schools, colleges, and funds for self-help groups but it can not match the funds required to meet the community needs in the entire country. Muslim groups need to monitor these schemes at the grass root level to ensure implementation. Awareness campaigns among Muslims are required to teach them about not only government schemes. (They can also so by establishing Monitoring & Facilitatition Centres in every districts and towns of Muslim concentration with 3-4 committed workers. Long standing demand of the Muslims to setup a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to monitor implementation will also be a step in the right direction depends on how sincere Union and state governments are for minority welfare. SECULARISM Hinduising India: Secularism in Practice Introduction & Conclusion of Omar Khalidi’s Paper I-This paper challenges the academic and media consensus on the notion that India is a secular state, by marshalling empirical evidence that, far from being a state practicing neutrality between the religious affiliations of Indian society or equidistance from all religions, the Indian state is actually and directly involved in Hinduisation of the country, by promoting Hinduism through ‘reform’ and favouritism at state expense. While the constitution guarantees educational and cultural autonomy as well as religious freedom, in practice there are widespread and systematic violations by state institutions. In public employment the state follows discriminatory policies to perpetuate the Hindu majority and restricts religious freedom. The discriminatory policies are most visible in affirmative action policies and recruitment in the army. Contrary to some academic writings, the paper establishes that the Hinduisation of the Indian state is associated with the votaries of Hindutva represented by a ‘family’, or parivar, of Hindu militant groups. The notion of India as a Hindu state pre-dates the creation of the postcolonial state in 1947, and was inherent in the militant right wing of the Congress Party, which perceived Christians and Muslims as foreigners. There is, the paper demonstrates, major continuity between the educational, cultural and employment policies pursued by the Indian state regardless of the party in power. The paper is based on primary Indian sources and interviews in India and abroad. Political secularism may be defined as ‘the separation of church and state.’ Secularism in theory, then, would mean that religion and state cannot occupy the same space. The state in its governmental capacity does not promote any religion or religious group, nor intervene in religious affairs. It cannot even be involved in interpretation or ‘reform’ of any religion much less favour one over any other. This model of secularism may be characterized as maximum separation between state and religion except on manifest grounds of morality, health and public order. Writing in 1963, Donald E Smith posed the question: ‘Is India a secular state?’ Replying in the affirmative, Smith described India ‘a secular state in the same sense in which one can say that India is a democracy’. Prakash Chandra Upadhyaya ‘uses the term "majoritarianism" to characterize the official nationalist brand of Indian secularism.’ According to Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Secularism, in its Indian usage, has … come to mean religious equidistance, not non-involvement.’ Gary Jacobson developed three models in a comparative study of secularism. He characterizes these models as assimilative (exemplified by the USA), visionary (Israel) and ameliorative (India). American assimilative secularism seeks to preserve religious liberty in the private sphere, while urging political assimilation in the republic. Israel’s visionary secularism involves the coexistence of the vision of Israel as a state for Jewish people with commitments to preserve religious liberties and cultural autonomy. India’s ameliorative secularism involves a commitment to promote the transformation of enduring social inequalities, some of which are related to religious belief and practice, while recognizing the autonomy of religious groups in some ways. My paper challenges that India is a secular state regardless of the particular model of secularism it follows. My view is that far from upholding state neutrality or equidistance between various religions and their adherents, the Indian state is in fact engaged in Hinduising it by reforming, promoting and advancing Hinduism, often at the expense of other religions. India’s secularism in fact translates into Hindu assimilationism. Evidence for the Indian state’s policy of Hindu assimilationism comes through an examination of 1) state promotion of Hinduism through reform and favouritism; 2) promotion of Hindu beliefs and practices; 3) erosion of educational, cultural and religious autonomy; and 4) conflation between Hindu and Indian cultures resulting in the exclusion of Christians and Muslims from the national mainstream. II- Indian secularism may be ‘majoritarianism’, if we accept that Hindus constitute the Indian majority population. Contrary to Varshney, I demonstrate that secularism in its Indian usage is in fact proximity to Indian Hinduism, not religious equidistance. Its ‘ameliorative’ character, contrary to Jacobson, is motivated at least partially by a desire to curb conversion to religious other than Hinduism and to construct a Hindu identity out of a myriad of sects, a new primordialism. Again contrary to Jacobson, Indian state secularism in fact restricts cultural, linguistic and religious autonomy. The root cause of state’s Hinduisation stems from the Indian elite’s perception of Christians and Muslims as less Indian than Hindus. Their notion of India as coterminous with Hindus has led them to draft the apparatus of the state in a manner designed to assimilate into Hinduism whoever is not proven to be Christian or Muslim. Many religious Hindus seeking church-state separation, as well as Buddhists, Christians, Dalits, Scheduled Tribes and Sikhs- not to speak of liberal-to-Maoist/ Naxalite shades of Indian opinion are unhappy with the Hindu rashtra. But as William Gould has demonstrated, the making of Hindu rashtra since 1947 has roots in congress’s use of an explicit Hindu idiom in the political language since the late 19th century. The preface to the Hinduisation of the state was written long before 1947.(Omar Khalidi , Aga Khan Programme for Islamic Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Email: okhalidi@mit.edu.) (Courtesy: Third World Quarterly) CONVERSION Policing Faith Judicial Analysis of India’s Anti-conversion Legislation Lasting Damage and Endless Repercussions RAJEEV DHAVAN, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court India’s present controversies over ‘conversions’ have little meaning outside the politics of Hindutva. An anxious and vindictive sangh parivar’s stance that no conversions of Hindus should take place is clearly that conversions out of Hinduism are bad but reconversions back into Hinduism are welcome. What is flaunted as a policy against all conversions has been tailored to suit Hindutva’s needs. There are therefore clear contradictions in the Hindutva standpoint. According to this view, conversions must stop but reconversions are to be encouraged. People should move into Hinduism but not out of Hinduism. The sangh parivar’s policies on conversion are part of a communal policy of persecution of Christians and Muslims. Unlike fundamentalism which consists of a diehard belief in one’s own faith, communalism goes further to pursue a policy of persecution towards other faiths through legal and illegal coercive methods. Fundamentalism and communalism may feed each other. A fundamentalist is entitled to cling to his orthodoxy but a communalist is as menacing as his persecution. Proselytism is not communal per se. Many faiths claim to seek to convert others, just as present-day Hindus seek to ‘reconvert’ non-Hindus. Ambedkar urged Dalits to convert to Buddhism. Islam carries the allure of equality of all in the eyes of Allah. It seems astonishing that Dalits are made to eat excreta in Tamil Nadu and persecuted for leaving the faith by conversion. And it is not altogether true to say that conversions only take place amongst the poor. Way back in the Bengal of the 1840s, there were individual conversions in upper caste households like that of Krishna Mohan Banerjee and Madhusudan Datta. Richard M. Eaton’s article on ‘Conversion to Christianity among the Nagas, 1876-1971’ suggests that many Naga conversions took place after 1947 when missionary activity was falling. The sangh parivar assumes that all conversions out of Hinduism were coercive, achieved by dubious methods or due to perverse influences and poverty. To this is added the demographic fear that the Muslim population is growing faster than the Hindu population and will subsume the latter even though there are over 800 million Hindus as contrasted with 140 million Muslims. In fact, those whose forefathers had changed their faith generations ago are now considered to be true believers, just like any other. Hindutva’s policy on conversion and reconversion has a keen fighting edge. It is uncompromisingly tenacious. It is to be understood along with the physical targeting of Muslims and Christians through various embarrassingly wanton acts of cruelty and violence. As far as the legislation on conversion is concerned, it seems facially neutral. But legislation is what legislation does and is instrumented to do. The present spurt of anti-conversion legislation has been designed to be susceptible to misuse, harassment and intimidation. The latest controversy over conversions has arisen because in late June 2009 the centre refused to approve the 2006 amendments to the old Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam (Freedom of Religion Act) 1968. The 2006 amendments, were passed by the Madhya Pradesh state legislature on July 25, 2006 under chaotic conditions as six other bills were also passed that day. No discussion was permitted, the amendment bill was passed by voice vote. Earlier that year, on April 7, 2006, the Rajasthan assembly had passed the Rajasthan Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam 2006, which was very similar to the Madhya Pradesh bill. This caused an uproar. An attempt to have the bill referred to a select committee for detailed deliberation failed. The bill was passed by voice vote on the last day of the budget session, with the Congress and the CPI(M) boycotting procedures. In September 2006 the Gujarat Freedom of Religion (Amendment) Bill was passed. This bill did not attempt to enhance the provisions contained in the surveillance model that had already been passed (Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act) in 2003. It was a bill suggesting that the surveillance model would not apply to conversion from one denomination to another or to conversions between Hindus, Buddhists and Jains because they were considered part of the same faith! The bill, intended to consolidate one big happy family of Hindus that included all Hindu sects, Buddhists and Jains, was also passed by a voice vote. This happened despite protestations from the leader of the opposition that in 2004 the Supreme Court had recognised the distinctness of the Jain faith. Discussion on the bill took place under shotgun conditions. On July 31, 2007 the then governor of Gujarat, Nawal Kishore Sharma, returned the bill to the legislature. Jayalalitha government introduced a harsh anti-conversion law, the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Act, in 2002, causing a furore. In this case, the governor in fact gave his assent to the bill. Realising the electoral implications of her actions however, Jayalalitha repealed the act in 2004. In Gujarat, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. True democracy had failed in all these cases. Majoritarian Hindutva-dominated state assemblies had ramrodded the discussion through legislatures. But, under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, such a failure is not sufficient reason for the governor to withhold assent to the bill how does one determine the criteria according to which the governor may withhold assent and reserve a bill for the consideration of the president? In brief we must trust the governor and the union government! The anti-conversion bills of 2006 approved by various state governors and the role of the governor itself raise serious issues of communalism, federalism and democracy. Some tentative conclusions are as follows: (i) Democracy can sometimes be at loggerheads with the Constitution which abhors divisive communalism. (ii) Majoritarian Hinduism in various states has tried to flex its muscles to browbeat minorities, often using anti-conversion legislation to do so. (iii) Normally, the validity of legislation is tested by the Supreme Court and high courts. (iv) But our Constitution-makers in their wisdom also made the governors and the president custodians of the public interest. (v) This is a power that can be abused although that has not happened. (vi) Had these bills been approved by the governors, havoc would have been wreaked on minorities and the freedom of conscience. (vii) The mechanism by which bills are reserved for the consideration of the president is part of the constitutional system of checks and balances intended to protect its integrity. (viii) Even majoritarian democracies must be careful not to undermine or subvert democratic values. Anti-conversion legislation already exists in Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Arunachal Pradesh and Gujarat. These are all copycat laws. There have also been several attempts to introduce central legislation regulating conversion. However, the Parliament of India correctly refused to pass the Indian Conversion (Regulation and Registration) Bill 1954 and the Backward Communities (Religious Protection) Bill 1960. As the balance of power shifted in 1966, the efforts to introduce anti-conversion legislation shifted to the states with Orissa being the first state to legislate on conversion through the Freedom of Religion Act 1967. After that, Madhya Pradesh enacted the Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam in 1968. Both these laws were challenged in the respective high courts. The Orissa act was struck down in the Yulitha Hyde case (1973) while the Madhya Pradesh act was upheld in the Rev Stanislaus case (1975). Issues pertaining to the validity of both these acts were addressed by the Supreme Court in the Stanislaus case (1977) where the court upheld the validity of both laws. In spite of the Supreme Court’s approval of anti-conversion legislation in what is generally regarded as an unsatisfactory decision, no similar legislation was immediately introduced other than the Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act 1978. Since the late 1990s, the debate on the regulation of conversions has again emerged as a mainstream issue, especially because of the propaganda by right-wing parties. New anti-conversion laws have been introduced and existing laws have been strengthened in the states of Tamil Nadu (2002), Gujarat (2003) and Chhattisgarh (2006). These various pieces of legislation share a certain commonality in that they were all introduced by right-wing governments and are focused on preventing conversions from Hinduism to other religions. Also, while all the legislation adheres to the general framework of the first law i.e. the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act 1967, the later legislation has become progressively harsher and more restrictive. The Orissa law criminalises conversion i.e. the renouncing of one’s faith and the adoption of another faith through force, misrepresentation or inducement. Its provisions are wide-ranging and include direct or indirect attempts to convert and the abetment of conversion as a criminal offence. The penalty is without prejudice to any civil liability that may apply and includes imprisonment for a period of up to one year and/or a fine of up to 5,000 rupees. However, if the conversion was of a minor or a woman or a person belonging to the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes, the penalty is doubled. There is some control over the proceedings under the law, as the prosecution of any offence under the act requires prior sanction from the district magistrate. Thus what was created was not a civil remedy to have a conversion set aside at the instance of the convert but a statute to potentially criminalise all conversions and to subject them to surveillance through police and magisterial intervention. This framework has been adopted by all later anti-conversion legislation. This Govt. bill also differs from the others in the manner in which the offence of conversion is criminalised. For the first time the offence has been made non-bailable and cognisable, which is a deviation from all the previous legislation. The requirement of prior sanction from the civil administration for prosecution of the offence, which was present in all previous legislation other than the Gujarat law, has been removed. These changes, which are a marked deviation from the earlier legislation, demonstrate that while the Rajasthan bill of 2006 is part of a series of similar legislation, it belongs to a new genus which treats conversion in a far more harsh and restrictive manner. Later, the new Rajasthan Freedom of Religion Bill 2008 replicated much of the old bill but added provisions that attempted to decriminalise reconversion to Hinduism and sought to remove such reconversion from purview of the proposed law. The debate on conversions has to be understood in the context of the constitutional provisions as interpreted in the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in the Stanislaus case. The Supreme Court’s judgement in the Stanislaus case was delivered by a five-judge bench with Chief Justice AN Ray writing the judgement which was read on January 17, 1977, during the emergency. The court concentrated on only two issues: (a) legislative competence; and (b) the meaning of the word "propagate" in the freedom of religion clause. For our purposes we can ignore the issue of legislative competence on which the judgement states that the acts, by prohibiting and penalising forcible conversions, clearly provide for the maintenance of public order (even though the connection with public order is a questionable inference). On the question of "propagation", the court’s observation needs to be quoted in its entirety. The court observed: "The expression ‘propagate’ has a number of meanings, including "to multiply specimens of (a plant, animal, disease, etc) by any process of natural reproduction from the parent stock", but that cannot, for obvious reasons, be the meaning for the purposes of Article 25(1) of the Constitution. The article guarantees a right to freedom of religion and the expression ‘propagate’ cannot therefore be said to have been used in a biological sense. "The expression ‘propagate’ has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean "to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate, diffuse (a statement, belief, practice, etc)". According to the Century Dictionary (which is an encyclopaedic lexicon of the English language), Vol. VI, ‘propagate’ means as follows: "To transmit or spread from person to person or from place to place; carry forward or onward; diffuse; extend; as propagate a report; to propagate the Christian religion". Article 25(1), grants not the right to convert another person to one’s own religion but to transmit or spread one’s religion Article 25(1) also guarantees "freedom of conscience" to every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that in turn postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion. ... It has to be appreciated that the freedom of religion enshrined is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only but covers all religions alike and it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions. What is freedom for one is freedom for the other in equal measure. This is what the Court had to say. And though the premise may be flawed, since it is a Constitution bench judgement, we have no choice but to live with it. But the fact remains that the Court failed to examine the provisions of the statute and test it against Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) and the new jurisprudence of due process. It must be said that the decision in Stanislaus is imperfect and incomplete. The Supreme Court has not examined any legislation or rules for due process and arbitrariness, which is now essential to constitutional practice. (Equally, propagation is also a part of free speech, as repeatedly affirmed by the Constituent Assembly, and subject to reasonable restrictions.). That is why it is necessary to examine the legislation itself. The first-generation legislation, comprising the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act 1967, was relatively simple. It simply prohibited conversion by ‘force’, ‘fraud’ and ‘inducement’. The second-generation legislation, the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam 1968, added the term "allurement" (including gifts) to the list of conversion methods that were proscribed and a provision requiring that the district magistrate be given prior intimation of any such conversion. This law marked the beginning of the surveillance system that would be strengthened in subsequent legislation. As time went on, the milder model gave way to a fuller surveillance-oversight model of legislation. The Himachal Pradesh act of 2006 was different from the Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu statutes in that it permitted the district magistrate to inquire into reported instances of conversion himself or through any agency he may deem fit. Fourthly, the Gujarat bill of 2006 and the Rajasthan bill of 2008 espouse and flaunt the concept of an imperial Hinduism by enunciating a protective approach to reconversions to Hinduism based on the premise that all Indians were Hindus, including sects that broke away from the Hindu fold as well as Buddhists and Jains. The VHP and RSS wanted similar anti-conversion laws everywhere. The effect of such legislation and the procedures it inaugurates have never been tested in a court of law. In the process lies the punishment. There is a wealth of available literature which recommends that legislation must be examined in terms of its purpose, intent and effect, not merely for judicial interpretation but also to consider whom the legislation empowers and for what purpose. Equally, the use to which legislation may be put varies. Meanwhile, the oppression of Dalits continued. In Jhajjar, skinning a dead cow. In protest, a dozen Dalits embraced Buddhism. This triggered off the ‘Jhajjar effect’ by which hundreds of Dalits converted to Buddhism on Diwali day. The oppression of Christians has also continued was demonstrate the validity of the Jhajjar effect; to show that Dalits and others leave the Hindu fold because they find it persecutory and wanting. The legislation of 2002-03 was passed by Hindutva politicians as desperate measures in retreat. Unable to manage its own affairs, Hindutva launched attacks on others. Most conversions are not conversions of convenience, such as conversions to Islam as a device to facilitate marriage which were outlawed by a Deoband fatwa. The other faiths do not want forced conversions. They gain nothing from this. The pressure on Dalits to convert arises because Hinduism no less in belief and practice has no place for them despite the pressure brought to bear upon them to reconvert as seen in the case of 1,000 Christians in Tamil Nadu. The VHP also focuses on tribal reconversions. But much of the North-east is Christian. The truth is that most conversions take place for a variety of genuine reasons that often include persecution. Anti-conversion legislation is not passed so that conversions can be fair but to persecute those who wish to convert through policing and surveillance. Criminalising conversion is not the answer. Unhappy believers must be allowed to convert to another faith and can always declare their reasons for doing so. These are not matters for the police and the district magistrate. In my view: (a) Anti-conversion policies are designed to promote and provoke hatred. (b) Anti-conversion legislation provides the police and magistracy with ammunition to harass minorities and Dalits. (c) The Supreme Court has never examined the actual effects of such legislation comprehensively. (d) Criminalising conversion is fundamentally wrong. (e) In the process lies the punishment. (f) This legislation is linked to political Hindutva and is always subject to abuse. (g) These laws must be abolished. (Source: Communalism Combat, August-September, 2009) DESI TERRORISM Alternative Theory of Mumbai-CST Terror Attack Extract from Who Killed Karkare? by S.M. Mushrif, Retd. IGP, Maharashtra If all the above parts I to IX i.e., right from the receiving of the specific intelligence by the IB on 19 November 2008 to ht encounter at Girgaum Chowpattty in the night of 26/27 November 2008 are collated and arranged in a logical sequence, the alternative story would go like this: (1) Not ten but eight Pakistani terrorists came in a rubberised dinghy to Mumbai shores. (2) Out of them six landed at Bhai Bhandarkar Machimar Coloby near Bakhwar Park, Cuffe Parade, and two sailed further towards Hotel Oberoi in some dinghy. (3) The six who landed at Badhwar Park wreaked havoc at Hotel Taj Mahal, Café Leopold and Nariman House and the two who had gone towards Oberoi Hotel caused mayhem at Oberion Hotel and Hotel Trident. (4) The terrorists who caused heartless bloodbath at CST, CAMA Hospital and Rangabhavan Lane were not from among the terrorists who had come from Pakistan, but were local terrorists. (emphasis added) (5) The CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane operation was planned, scripted, directed, choreo-graphed and executed jointly by the Brahminists involved in nationwide terror plot and their well-wishers In the IB with the sole objective of elimination Hamant Karkare who had unearthed the plot. The following could be the logical sequence of events from planning to execution of the operation: i) As the ATS Maharashtra, under Hemant Karkare, had exposed the Hindutva( Brahminist) terrorism inside out and as Karkare was only inches away from arresting some of the most important Brahminist leader in the country, the RSS, the VHP, and other Brahminist forces and their all-time savior, the IB had been thinking of many alternative "secret operations" for saving their masters, a God-sent opportunity came their way when a hot and absolutely specific intelligence arrived from the U.S and the RAW about some terrorists setting sail in a launch from Pakistan to attack Mumbai. ii) They, instead of alerting the Mumbai Police and the Western Naval Command about this specific input, only cautioned their masters in Maharashtra and asked them to be in a high state of readiness so as to be able to swing into action within minute of getting a signal from them and to coincide their operation with the main terrorist attack. iii) The Brahminists in Maharashtra selected six to eight youths, well,-trained in their camps at Nagpur and Pune during the last few years. iv) The youths were divided into groups of two each and they were briefed by some hardcore Brahminist leaders as well as serving and retired Brahminist IB officers about the role of each group. They were also explained the plane of action on the map. v) As per the plan, they were to be in readiness a couple of days prior to the anticipated date of the arrival of the terrorists. vi) They were to be in such a high state of alert that no sooner than did they receive the first signal alerting that the terrorists had landed at the Mumbai shores, they should start from their respective places and take positions at pre-decided points in the vicinity of CST, CAMA Hospital and SB office. vii) As soon as they received the second signal that the terrorists had reached their targets such as Taj, Oberoi, Nariman House, etc, they were unleash their operation at the places assigned to them. viii) They would receive the signals on specific mobile phones already provided to them. The mobile phones contained SIM cards specially obtained from Satara (Maharashtra). They were not to use any other mobile phone or SIM card for communication even amongst themselves. ix) The firing was to be first started at the CST followed by firing at CAMA Hospital with a gap of about 10 to 15 minutes. CST team, after completion of its task, was to cress over to the lane by the side of The Times of India building and to act as a back-up to the other teams. x) Arrangements had been made by the concerned IB officers to direct the ATS chief, Hamant Karkare, towards CAMA Hospital as soon as he arrived at any of the sites of the incident. xi) The group in the SB office –Rangabhavan a Lane area was to attract attention by opening fire when the target officer came in the vicinity. xii) The group in SB office –Rangabhavan a Lane area were to accomplish their "task" as soon as Hemant Karkare came within their rage. xiii) After the signal about the successful accomplishment of the task was received, all the group members were leave their areas immediately and return to their original places as fast as they could. xiv) The IB with the help of the Mumbai Crime Branch were to produce two "terrorists" from its "stock" at the scene for being driven in a special vehicle (Skoda) for an "encounter," but one of them was to be kept alive. Almost everything went as per the plan. But like any operation or war or project in the world, this operation also did not work out ditto as per the original plan. It, apparently, encountered many surprises and its operatives omitted some blunders as described below. 1) The group of two inside the CST, having been brainwashed for years with the hate-Muslim doctrine, could not control their ire against Muslims and forgetting that they had donned the role of "jihadi" Muslims, killed a large number of skull-cap-clad and bearded Muslim men, veiled Muslim women and their children among others. 2) After wreaking havoc at the station, the duo failed to cross over towards CAMA Hospital, as planned, as the police near the subway and The Times of India building forced them to retreat and hence they had to exit from the Masjid Bundar side. 3) As the police at the Girgaum Chwpatty, either due to over-enthusiasm or due to lack of coordination, killed both the "terrorists" produced in the Skoda vehicle, thus leaving none to narrate the story, the IB had to make last minute arrangement for producing another terrorist from among their "stock". Notwithstanding these unforeseen happenings, and some serious blunders on the part of the perpetrators, the conspirators were apparently successful in their main objective, i.e., to kill Hemant Karkare. From the facts mentioned above, it is abundantly clear that the operation at CST-CAMA-Rangbahvan Lane section had nothing to do with the main attack at Taj-Oberoi-Nariman House. Those were two distinct operations having nothing in common between them-neither their modus operandi, nor their targets. The only connection factor managed to synchronise the attack by the native Brahminist terrorists CST-CAMA-Rangbhavan Lane section with the attack by the foreign terrorists on Taj, Oberoi, Nariman Hoouse section, which they knew in advance. Thus, the Brahminist-dominated IB very seriously compromised the security of the country in order to save the Brahminist organizations and their leaders form the ignomity of being stamped as "terrorists" which they really had been. HINDUTVA TERRORISM Mushrif Exposes Hindutva Terror Network Stretching to Israel & Nepal And Smashes India’s "Islamic Terrorism" Myth Review by M Zeyaul Haque of Mushrif’s ‘Who Killed Karkare?’, Pharos, 2009 The book curiously titled Who Killed Karkare? says a nationwide network of Hindutva terror that has its tentacles spread up to Nepal and Israel is out to destroy the India most Indians have known for ages and to remould it into some kind of Afghanistan under the Hindu Taliban. The writer, a former IG Police of Maharashtra, SM Mushrif, has reconstructed a fearsome picture out of former Maharashtra ATS chief Hemant Karkare’s chargesheet against alleged Hindutva terrorists like Lt. Col. Purohit, Sadhvi Pragyasingh Thakur and others. The chargesheet pointed towards a mind-boggling nationwide conspiracy with international support to destabilise the constitutional order and the secular state that upholds it, to be replaced by a Hindutva state run according to a new Constitution. For that the conspirators were prepared for a massive bloodbath, using bomb attacks on religious places to trigger anti-Muslim holocaust. Mushrif, with over three decades of diligent policing behind him whose feats include exposing the Telgi scam, has made an elaborate case out of nearly a dozen blasts over a large area of the country conducted by Hindutva terror groups of different stripes. His case: a section of India’s intelligence services, a miniscule group in the armed forces and a section of different state police forces have been compromised and infiltrated by these elements, a development that bodes ill for the future of the country. Hemant Karkare’s net of investigations, had trapped many big and small fishes of VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and Sanatan Sanstha (which has been recently found to be involved in Diwali-eve blasts in Goa. Among the plans unearthed by Karkare was a blueprint for the assassination of 70 prominent Indians who could be a hindrance to the project of Hindutva. Interestingly, most of the persons marked for elimination would, naturally, be Hindus because it is they who are an powern. The conspirators were also unhappy with organisations whose Hindutva they suspected to be less virulent than desired. Mushrif, who knows well the power of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to make or mar lives and careers, says he is prepared to face the consequences of its hostility. He musters "evidence" to show that the IB has regularly been interfering with regular police investigations to let Hindutva terrorists slip out of the net and replace them with random Muslim youth. To fudge the issues further obliging police officers in the states would not mind ‘encountering’ a few Muslim youth branded as "terrorists". This is done to cover tracks of Hindutva terror. Mushrif says a "Brahminist" network that has its origins in Maharashtra, and is closely knit across political parties, government services, including IB, and other vital sectors of national life is behind the terror that seeks to destroy the secular, democratic state. He does any identity Brahminists with Brahminsm, many are from other high castes, some even from intermediate and lower castes. It is pertinent to note that "Brahminism" and "Brahminical order" first appeared in Dalit protest vocabulary in the Dalit movement in Maharashtra towards the turn of the 20th century. Mushrif, who appropriates part of Dalit vocabulary for his discourse, says that Maharashtra still remains the centre of this ideology that, among other things, has the dubious distinction of killing the Father of the Nation. The establishment that runs the affairs of the country does not want to expose the Hindutva terrorism. One example is the blasts in Samjhauta Express, which the IB said was carried out by Pakistan’s ISI. Mushrif bringout, during a narco-analysis test under Karkare, Lt. Col. Purohit had admitted having supplied the RDX used in the blast. The IB, did not want Karkare’s investigation that exposed the IB’s shenanigans, to continue. Karkare removed, the IB moved in to fill his position with KP Raghuvanshi, a pliant police officer with extremely low credibility among Muslims for his record of letting off known Hindutva terrorirsts and implicating innocent Muslim youth even in bomb attacks on mosques. There are quite a few interesting vignettes here, like Raghuvanshi Col. Purohit’s association with Abhinav Bharat in Maharashtra, whose hand was evident in a series of blasts across the country. With connections with men like Veer Damodar Savarkar, Dr Moonje, who led the Hindu Mahasabha, and other Hindutva luminaries. It is at the Bhonsala Military Academy run by these groups that Purohit trained police officers. Mushrif asks a pertinent question: will Raghuvanshi pursue the Karkare investigation against Purohit. Already charges have been dropped by a special court under MCOCA against 11 accused, including Purohit, on the grounds of insufficient evidence. This was just the beginning of the undoing of Karkare’s painstaking investigation. Mushrif says slowly the system is working to undo all of Karkare’s work and let off the terrorists who over the years destroyed scores of lives and wreaked irreparable economic damage. The ATS team under Karkare had pointed out VHP leader Praveen Togadia’s role in the blasts. The ATS under Raghuvanshi dropped the investigation against him saying that they do not know who Togadia is! A number of investigations have been thus sabotaged by the powers that be and the tracks of the Hinduta terrorists duly covered. The 319-page book is crammed with such information. Then what about ‘who killed Karkare? Mushrif’ says two teams were at work on 26/11 – one which did the maximum damage was from outside. The other team took advantage of the confusion of the moment and acted only on the relatively small CST-CAMA-Rangbhavan stretch that killed Karkare. It was a desi unit which operated in this sector. Mushrif make out a strong case for high level investigation into IB’s Hand in killing Karkare. STATE-TERRORISM Extrajudicial Killings by the PAC in Hashimpura, 22-23 May, 1987 Amnesty International’s Report Introduction At the height of communal tension in the city of Meerut, Uttar Pradesh (UP) in May, members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) are alleged to have deliberately killed unarmed civilians and disposed of some bodies by throwing them in rivers and canals. The PAC had been called in to assist the state police to deal with the violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. They have denied the allegations, which concern two separate incidents on Friday 22 and Saturday 23 May. On 22 may several hundred men from the Hashimpura area of Meerut were seen being taken away in several trucks by PAC members. Witnesses said most were taken to local police stations but several dozen in the first two or three trucks were reportedly taken to the banks of the Upper Ganga canal near Muradnagar, shot and their bodies thrown in the water. By the last week of May, over 50 bodies had reportedly been found in the canal. Eighteen more were officially admitted to have been recovered from the nearby Hindon canal at Ghaziabad. Two of the five survivors of the incident have testified that they were taken to the canal at Muradnagar by uniformed men who they identified as the PAC, who shot them and threw them in the canal. It is now believed that all the bodies found in the water were of men taken away from Hasbimpura although initial reports had indicated the bodies found in the Hindon canal were of victims of the killings which subsequently took place in Maliana. The central and state governments have repeatedly denied allegations that the PAC were responsible. Amnesty International was informed by an Embassy official that "there is a reason to believe that police uniforms were stolen and used as a disguise by anti-social elements." Amnesty International does not believe this is a credible explanation. The reports of exactly what happened to those listed as missing from Meerut are hard to verify. The identities of those whose bodies were found in nearby rivers and canals could be known only to the PAC and the police, and to Amnesty International’s knowledge, no names have been published. Amnesty International has the names of the five survivors of the alleged secret shootings by the PAC and has included some of their eye-witness accounts in this paper. It has also the names of 36 men from Hashimpura area who "disappeared" after reportedly being taken away in trucks driven by the PAC. It is not known how many post-mortem examinations have been carried out or how many bodies have been identified. The state government has ordered the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to conduct an inquiry into the "unexplained recovery" of the bodies in the Hindon and Ganga canal. There have been some discrepancies in the various reports describing the incidents hich took place in Hashimpura and Maliana. Amnesty International has therefore closely examined various press reports abut the incidents, has spoken to journalists wh have visited the areas and has now received first-hand accounts from victims and eye witnesses, some of whom have made sworn statements alleging PAC responsibility for the killings. These have led Amnesty International to conclude that there is strong evidence to suggest that members of PAC have been responsible for dozens of extrajudicial killings and "disappearances" in the Meerut area on 22 and 23 May. This paper also describes that at least five people arrested during the communal rioting died in detention apparently as result of beatings while in custody. It reviews the record of the PAC on previous occasions when it was called in to maintain law and order and makes some recommendations to the Indian Government. Amnesty International believes these recommendations could contribute to preventing future abuses. Background Meerut is known for its power looms, handicrafts and metal work, much of it produced by Muslims and traded by Hindus. Tensions between the communities have led to communal rioting in Meerut on eight occasions since Independence. Dozens of people belonging to both the communities were killed in rioting in the city in 1968, in 1973 and in October 1982, when the PAC was accused of killing many Muslim civilians. In mid-April 1987, 12 people from both communities were killed. At that time the police were criticized for failing to act to halt the rioting and their presence was subsequently reduced despite reports that tension remained high between two communities. Communal tension had increased in northern India over the controversy surrounding the Ram Janam Bhumi Babri Masjid shrine, especially since February 1986 when a court permitted Hindus access to the Babri Masjid. The latest outbreak of communakl rioting in Meerut claimed 91 lives according to official reports from the Meerut administration, although the unofficial death toll is estimated to be at least twice that number. The Rioting started on 16 May after the murder of Ajay Sharma, a Hindu from Kainchiyan Mohalla in the Kotwali area, Meerut. According to some reports he was killed in a property dispute while others state that Muslims believe he had been instrumental in organizing attacks on them during the April rioting. When police went to arrest six men living in the Muslim suburb of Imliyam Mohalla two days later during Ramadan (when Muslims fast all day), rioting broke out, later spreading to other areas of Meerut. There were reports that speeches were made from mosques inciting Muslims and that stones were thrown at the PAC who had gone to the area to conduct a search. Arrests were made apparently without discrimination. Muslims and Hindus armed themselves with guns and knives and stocked acid and went on the rampage, burning hopuses and stabbing and killing members of both communities. The Hshimpura area where many Muslims f the weavers community live wasmparticularly affected. The police and local administration were accused of standing by and failing to act decisively to halt the violence. Those with unlicensed arms were ordered to hand them over to the district administration, but the rioting had spread and the order was apparently not complied with. After two days of violence, a curfew was imposed in Meerut on 19 May and the PAC assumed a prominent role in dealing with the rioting. The UP police, estimated at between 60,000 to 70,000 strong, was reportedly assisted by 28 PAC companies, eight battalions of the army and seven battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). However, according to the local administration, the state police officially remained in charge. The allegations of atrocities over the following days centered on the PAC, a mainly Hindu paramilitary police force employed by the UP government of whom only 2% are Muslims. Its record on previous occasions when it was called into stem communal rioting had been seriously questioned in the Indian press. On this occasion, the PAC was again accused of siding with Hindu mobs, condoning and participating in violence against Muslims and their property. Rehana Parveen, a 33-year old woman from the Hashimpura area, was nearly hit by a bullet fired by the PAC who had taken position on a nearby roof top. The shot also just missed a press correspondent to whom she was talking. In his report of 24 May, the journalist wrote: "the firing was unprovoked". The PAC was also accused of deliberately killing people in their homes. According to a report in the Statesman on 24 may, members of the PAC and others not identifies entered a house at Mohalla Pariyan in Sarai Jeena on 21 May whose inhabitants had been fired at. Eye-witnesses reported that the PAC killed two boys, Shafiq and Atiq, 14 and 16 years old respectively. 2. Reports of "disappearances" and extrajudicial Killings of dozens of men from Hashimpura, Meerut on 22 May.The worst affected area was Hashimpura where, on the night of 22 May, several hundred youths and middle aged men were reportedly rounded up and taken away in several trucks driven by the PAC men. Although the precise number is not known, between 300 and 600 men are reported to have been arrested that night. (the People’s Union of Democratic Rights, New Delhi, which has carried out on-the-spot investigations, reported that 611 men were taken away by the PAC, many of whom were beaten) some were taken to the jail but the whereabouts of dozens of others remains unknown. Their relatives have addressed inquiries about them to the state government, but have not received reply: the arrested men have "disappeared". Several eye-witnesses have made statements about the arrest and some have submitted reports to the Police. Amnesty International has also received two detailed reports from survivors, which state that the "disappeared" men were taken to a canal, identified by some as the Ganga canal near Muradnagar, and shot by the PAC who threw the bodies into the canal. By the last week of May, over 50 bodies were reported to have been found floating in the canal. Although the police officer in charge apparently initially threatened to arrest a journalist for interviewing residents from the area, journalists later spoke to some of the five survivors. One of them was 1y year old Zulfikar nasir (son of Abdul Jabbar,), a student, who said he was put in one of the trucks driven by the PAC. He was quoted as saying: "There were 30 to 35 men in each truck… and when we were driven away the other trucks were still being loaded. They were taking away all the young and men of our locality. The only think I know is that we were brought down near a canal late in the night. The dozen or so PAC men then discussed something, loaded their rifles and began shooting people one by one." He said that an old man named Yasin and a young man, Ashraf were shot dead in front of him. He pretended to be dead after being shot in the armpit: "I did not see the others being killed with my own eyes but as I lay, feigning death, in the thicket beside the canal, I could hear the shots ringing out continuously and thousands of the bodies splashing in the canal." Two others, Mujibur Rehman and Babudin (son of Khalil), also survived after being shot in chest and thrown into the river. They were found by the Muradnagar police downstream from the place of the shooting and taken to the Narendra Mohan Hospital where they were kept under heavy guard, apparently on orders of the Union Home Ministry. They made a statement to a magistrate and one made a report to the police. Mujibur Rehman (son of Shabir Ansari, resident in Plice Station Behra District, darbhanga, Bihar) stated in First Information Report no.141: "I am the doorkeeper at the Gulmarg cinema. On the night of 22 may I was arrested in the evening at 7 by some people claiming t be policemen who were wearing khaki uniform. They searched our locality and got hold of some of us and made us ist in a police truck. On the way to Muradnagar some of the people were shot and thrown into the canal. I, along with my friend Mohammed Usman and another whose name I don’t know, were shot and thrown into the canal (bank) but somehow we were able to swim back to the (bank) and we crawled out and came to a bridge. A man gave us water to drink and went to report to the police station. At 2—2.30 some people came from the police station (Muradnagar). On 4 June a team of officials of the CID arrived to enquire into the "unexplained" recovery of the bodies from the Ganga canal. The inquiry was to be conducted by jangi singh, a Deputy Inspector General. On 28 June, the central bureau of Investigation (CBI) announced it would enquire into the abduction and shooting at Muradnagar of three of the five survivors: mujhibur Rehman, Usman (son of Bashir Ahmed) and Allur who has since died in hospital. The findings of this inquiry are not known to Amnesty International. By 25 May, according to official reports, 18 bodies have been recovered from the nearby Hindon River and canal, mostly between Ghaziabad and Meerut. They had gunshot wounds and injuries from sharp edged weapons. On 30 May, the UP Home secretary was reported as saying that a total of 23 bodies had been found in the Hindon canal at Muradnagar, Ghziabad and Bulandshahr. The police failed to clarify how the victims had dies but Indian news papers reports quoted villagers from Musuri who were by the canal whose bodies were found as saying that the bodies had been thrown in the water by the ‘men in uniform" . Only the CID, who on 25 May were asked to conduct investigations on the bodies, have knowledge of the conditions in which the bodies were found and are therefore in a position to clarify their identities and the circumstances of their deaths. Post-mortem reports were carried out on 18 bodies but the results were not made public nor is the outcome of the CID inquiry known. The Meerut administration has denied that the bodies recovered were connected with the PAC operations in the city. On 3 June the UP Government announced that a three-member committee (consisting of former auditor Gian Praksh, the former vice-chancellor of Avadh University and ram Kishen of the Public Works Department) would investigate incidents between 18 and 22 May (the enquiry excludes the allegations concerning killings in Maliana as described in section 3, which are the subject of a judicial investigation but includes the allegations of arrests and "disappearances" from the Hashimpura area). The committee reportedly received statements from eye-witnesses and victims. It was asked by the Minister of state for Home affairs, P.Chidambram, to submit its report to the central government within 30 days. According to a report of 29 August, the Home Ministery had received the Gian Praksh committee report. Its findings have not been published although the Indian Express, 30 August, quoted a member of the opposition as saying the report "confirmed that 40-60 youths were indeed taken from Hashimpura area in Provincial Armed Constabulary trucks and were since untraceable." Amnesty International has the names and details of 32 persons reported to have "disappeared" after being taken away by the PAC from Hashimpura. KASHMIR SITUATION Time to Admit that Kashmiri Militancy is still Unresolved PREM SHANKAR JHA, Eminent Journalist THREE PREVIOUS ESSAYS in this series have described how an inability to respond decisively to threats emanating from a rapidly changing world is endangering India’s future. Nowhere is this more true than in the government’s handling of the problem of separatism in Kashmir. Two weeks ago, after a long period of political hibernation, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, the chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), suddenly appeared in New York and exhorted the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) to appoint a special envoy for Kashmir. This set the cat among the pigeons in Delhi. But when he went a step further, visiting Washington and announcing on his return to Srinagar that the US too had agreed to appoint a special envoy for Kashmir, New Delhi’s consternation turned to anger. At another time, a more self-confident Delhi might have curbed its annoyance and probed the Mirwaiz’s motives and statements more closely. But today it does not want answers, because it has painted itself into a corner from which it seems not to want to get out. In the corridors of North Block, the unexpectedly high turnout in the December state elections despite the crackdowns, police firings, house arrests and curfews of the previous four months, gave a significant victory to the hawks who have always insisted that the Kashmiris understand only force over the doves, who advocate engaging the separatists in the search for a political settlement. The prime minister, who was previously very much in the latter camp, suddenly sealed the hawks’ victory when he proclaimed from the ramparts of the Red Fort on August 15 that "separatism had lost its relevance". But even before his speech was drafted, this claim had become hard to sustain. No amount of juggling with the voting figures could change the fact that the December vote in the Valley was 20 per cent below the peace-time norm of 71 to 72 per cent witnessed in 1977 and 1983. Nor could the government slur over the fact that the abstainers remained concentrated in the cities and formed the bulk of Kashmir’s educated youth and virtually its entire intelligentsia. In other words, the elections had not even dented the intellectual core of Kashmiri separatism. The dissident core has shown how adept it is at keeping Kashmiri anger on the boil within three months of the formation of the Omar Abdullah government, this dissident core had shown how adept it was at keeping Kashmiri anger on the boil. Through a barrage of unproven allegations, it was able to turn three purely local incidents the death in suspicious circumstances of two girls in Shopian, the kidnapping of a minor in Baramulla and the rape of a young woman by a besotted cousin in the Kashmir Police into indictments of a quisling government in Srinagar, and of Indian security forces posted in Kashmir. The Shopian incident was particularly revealing as the villagers forced two sets of doctors to declare that the girls, Asiya and Neelofar Jan, had been raped and then murdered. This remained the basis of all investigations for more than two months till a forensic investigation carried out in Delhi, after the exhumation the bodies, showed that there had been neither rape nor, in all probability, murder. The presence of a CRPF camp not far from the site of the two deaths had been sufficient to give rise to the worst suspicions among the villagers. This had given the dissidents the opportunity they had been waiting for. The striking similarity between Shopian and the tragic Watlab incident four years earlier when the drowning of two dozen or more schoolchildren after a naval boat overturned in the Wullar lake had been immediately ascribed to an attempted molestation of a schoolgirl by a drunken Indian naval rating that went sour shows that very little has really changed in Kashmir. But having boxed itself into a corner, New Delhi is now left with no option but to defend it. And it fears that simply entering into a dialogue with the Mirwaiz will undermine its claims of victory. A necessary corollary to the belief that separatism has ended is the need to treat all those who raise the issue as politically-irrelevant troublemakers. This explains the timing and the vigour of the Mirwaiz’s diplomatic offensive. For New Delhi’s insistence that separatism was dead left him with no option except to sink into obscurity. It remains to be seen whether the Obama administration or, for that matter, other Islamic states will act on the cautious assurances they may have given to the Mirwaiz. But New Delhi could easily turn his initiative into an opportunity to put some pressure on Pakistan to resume the back channel talks where they were left when Musharraf lost his power to push difficult decisions through the Pakistan assembly in April 2007, for that is precisely what the Mirwaiz wants. It’s still to be seen if Obama or other Islamic states will act on the assurances they gave to Mirwaiz This was spelt out on October 11 in the most unambiguous possible manner at a three-day intra-Kashmir conference organised by the Mumbai-based Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation in Srinagar. Speaking on behalf of the Mirwaiz and the Hurriyat’s executive council, Fazal-ul-Haq Qureishi, perhaps its most respected member, stated bluntly that neither the UN resolutions nor Delhi’s insistence that Kashmir was an integral part of India, provided any kind of basis for a resolution of the dispute. "Times have changed, the world has changed and the people have changed," he said. The Hurriyat accepted that any solution to the dispute had not only to meet the needs of the Kashmiris but also respect the security concerns and national constraints of Pakistan and India as well. The Hurriyat therefore was prepared to accept limits on ‘azadi’ within the framework of Indian and Pakistani sovereignty over the currently administered areas and leave the task of defending Kashmir to the two countries. The Hurriyat, Qureishi said, "was aware that similar proposals had been made by other major groups in Kashmir, including some of the mainstream parties". It was therefore prepared to discuss how to take forward the dialogue on the future of Kashmir with them. Its aim and its hope, was to be able to provide a bridge between the two countries so that they could resume the dialogue that had been broken first by Musharraf’s fall from power and then the terrorist attack on Mumbai. The Mirwaiz confirmed that these were indeed his views, when the very next day he told at a seminar organised by the APHC to remember his father, the late Maulvi Farooq, that, "Our people are being killed. We will put all our efforts to resolve this conflict through dialogue but we will take no decisions in haste." After over two decades of mutual incomprehension, Delhi has tended to treat the statements of the Mirwaiz with a large dose of mistrust. But this is not the first time that the Mirwaiz has asserted his commitment to a solution that is acceptable to Pakistan and India that requires the least disturbance of the delicate political and social balances in each country. He said exactly the same things at a conference organised in 2006 by Pakistan’s National University of Science and Technology in the presence of a large number of officers of the Pakistan army. He stuck to the same position during a hugely attended seminar of Kashmiri intellectuals in Srinagar in May 2007, at a time when the hastily-cobbled demands for self-rule and autonomy by mainstream parties gearing for the coming state assembly elections were steadily eating into the Hurriyat’s platform and provoking demands from nervous cadres that the Mirwaiz adopt a stance closer to Geelani’s. Perhaps the time has come for Delhi to emerge from its state of denial, admit that the problem of militancy has not yet been resolved, and that both in order to do so and to insulate Kashmir from a possible overflow of Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorism from Pakistan in the coming years, it needs to work with moderate and responsible leaders like the Mirwaiz, instead of against him. (Source: Tehelka, 24 October, 2009) Four D’s For A New Kashmir Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, JNU Kashmir is the ground zero of the India-Pakistan relationship. A signal from PM on India’s willingness to engage its troubled neighbour - in spite of its recalcitrance would generate tremendous enthusiasm within Kashmir. The Kashmiri people know through their own traumatic experience how essential India-Pakistan reconciliation is to ensure durable peace in the state. For all Kashmir’s apparently complex problems, there are in reality only four principal challenges that need to be addressed. First is the issue of the three dialogues that are vital to rebuild the culture of mutual respect, tolerance, accommodation and faith in peaceful conflict resolution. The most inclusive elections did not end popular alienation mellow or separatist sentiment. The challenge is to ensure a larger dialogue with separatists and even former militant groups which need not delegitimise the elections or undermine elected representatives. This should not be difficult to engineer if there is clear political will and the task of interlocuting is not left to intelligence operatives or retired babus. Dialogue must be unconditional and continuous and should address both political and humanitarian issues that could build confidence and trust (including the issue, for example, of the release of political detainees and ensuring a stricter enforcement of human rights). Internally, it is also vital to build, through talks, a process of reconciliation between Ladakh, Kashmir and Jammu and the sub-regions. There has been growing regional and communal polarisation, which needs to be urgently addressed. The dialogue within should be complemented by restarting the New Delhi-Islamabad backchannel on Kashmir, to ensure that Pakistan has no incentive to subvert the internal track. The second challenge is to arrive at a consensus on devolution and decentralisation of power. An important working group of the prime minister on J&K dealt with Centre-state relations, but it was unable to arrive at a breakthrough. This does not mean that we have arrived at a cul-de-sac. There are many proposals on the table, including those on autonomy, self-rule, self-governance and achievable nationhood. Sincerity of purpose, together with a creative play with many of these ideas, should make it possible to arrive at an agreement amongst the main stakeholders in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh on the quantum of political space needed, at every administrative level, for true empowerment of all the people of the state, and on the institutions and mechanisms needed to support this architecture. These internal discussions must flow into the backchannel, which can then attempt to work out a non-territorial India-Pakistan settlement on J&K based on providing a similar political architecture on both sides of the Line of Control while working towards converting the LoC into a line of peace that allows free movement of people, goods, services and ideas. Cooperation in areas of mutual interest like water, transport, agriculture and education will require the creation gradually of trans-LoC mechanisms and institutions. Implementation of such an understanding should create conditions for a win-win solution without needing to address hard issues of political sovereignty. An issue that is both controversial and essential to building peace is demilitarisation. Militarisation must not be confused merely with withdrawal of troops. It is a culture that legitimises use of violence and force, rewards machismo and physical aggressiveness, patronises intolerance and repression and is contemptuous of marginal groups. No one actor can be held responsible for J&K’s militarisation, particularly over the last two decades, and no one action will change this reality. All stakeholders, state and non-state, have an obligation to recreate a demilitarised culture of peace. What is required is deep introspection, a changed mindset and, of course, a change of heart and policy. A truth commission would be an ideal starting point. Symbolically, the withdrawal of troops from the main cities will send an immediate signal of the government of India’s sincerity of purpose. But much will also depend on Pakistan’s actions in ending sponsorship of violence as well as the ability of Kashmiris themselves to resist attempts that legitimise violence and force them to abandon once again their distinctly non-violent historic identity. Finally, of course, is J&K’s development, a central part of the prime minister’s vision for the state. Other than improved connectivity and infrastructure, it is essential to give J&K’s youth a greater stake in the country’s booming knowledge economy. Given the geography of the state, and its growing endowment of skills, (and) export of services may play a more significant role in its beneficial economic integration than the export of apples and handicrafts. (Source: The Times of India, 27 October 2009) OTHER MINORITIES Sikh Separatism Raising its Head Again Some Disgruntled Akali Leaders are Encouraging Separatists to Destabilise Government Tom Deegan, British Journalist History teaches that if there is just one common factor such as ethnicity, cultural,tribal or religious differences, which can be used to divide people from their neighbours and compatriots, then some people, sometime, somewhere, will seek to exploit the situation to undermine the natural unity of man in favour of division and separation. Their motives are either a genuine concern to put an end to a perceived persecution of their people, in which case they may be heroes; or else they are simply personally ambitious, in which case they are certainly demagogues. The critical factor in determining the nature of the separatist cause is the existence or absence of persecution. The early Mormons were persecuted by orthodox Christians. Their claims to be a ‘chosen people’ and their belief in a new ‘latter day’ prophet angered Christians. Joseph Smith was murdered by a mob in Illinois in 1844. After that, the Mormons trekked to Utah where they established Salt Lake City in what was a virgin country at that time. The world has plenty of separatist movements born out of the desperation of a persecuted minority population but, alas, there are also far too many such movements inspired by ambitious little people who see themselves as very important figures in their own districts, or provinces but not quite so important on the larger canvas of a big nation. Why be just a mayor or a governor when it might be possible to be a president? Usually, but not always, as the partition of the subcontinent itself proves, separatist movements which rely upon nothing more than religious differences fail to divide people sufficiently to split up a united country. If, on the other hand, there is persecution of a minority people by a majority exercising hegemony then the separatists will usually, but not always, gain support and will ultimately divide a country or bring about an end to the persecution. There is recurrent news items in the UK press about resurgence in the activities of expatriate Sikh separatists in the UK and North America. It is a subject about which there appears to be very little information outside the Sikh community. This with Irish republican sympathies, this writer decided to search for the raison d’être of the Sikh separatist movement. That is, to reveal the religious or other forms of persecution that motivated some Sikhs who, just twenty-five years ago, engaged in the armed occupation of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, murdered an Indian prime minister and went on to slaughter Hindu men, women and children on a train in Punjab and destroy a full Boeing 747 passenger aircraft over the Atlantic ocean. These horrific events and terrorist outrages are about as much as people in the West would be likely to know about Sikh separatism. The Sikh religion emerged in India in the latter part of the 15th century inspired by the first Guru, Nanak, as a reconciliatory spiritual movement during a period of tension and conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. The central belief of the Sikhs is that it matters not what name a man gives to God, Jehovah, Allah or Vishnu, because He is the same creator. This was an early exposition of anarchic thinking about religion (that each should be his own church). Later, another Sikh Guru, Govind Singh, reformed the previously peaceful Sikhs into a new army to defend their own faith and that of the Hindus from the persecution initiated by Islamic rulers. Thereafter, Sikh males adopted the name Singh (lion). Guru Nanak had no ambitions for statehood or the office of a presidency. Rather, he identified with the older culture and traditions of India, which have unity as a social principle. He was a unifier of man according to the available literature on him and the subject. The fact that most of the converts to Sikhism happened to live in Punjab was a coincidence. Can a nation come to exist, to secede from an established and unified social, cultural, political order simply because at some point in its history most of its local population adopted a new faith? The Mormons believe in a new Christian prophet. This can be compared to the Qadianis, a sect of Islam, who believe in a new ‘latter day’ prophet. Interestingly, there are no Mormon or Qadiani separatist movements. The idea just would not fly in America because, for all its faults, the United States is a secular society, tolerant of all religions and the Mormons have nothing to complain about. They enjoy equal constitutional rights and, of course, they know the value of being part of a big, influential country. Furthermore, their majority in Utah ensures that they rule that state in the same way that Sikhs rule Punjab. India is also a religiously tolerant and secular society. Sikhs are not now and never have been persecuted by Hindus or by the modern Indian state. The communal violence against Sikhs in India after the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi was mob violence of the sort that killed Joseph Smith and other Mormons in Illinois in the 19th century. An earlier persecution of Sikhs was carried out by Muslim fanatics in the 17th century but Islam has declined in Punjab since. So why is there a separatist Sikh movement today but no equivalent amongst the Mormons in the U.S.? Could it have something to do with the ambitions of a few leaders who are not satisfied with their present positions in the larger nation? History is replete with examples of demagogues who whipped up racial, sectarian or tribal conflicts because they stood to gain most from a separation or because they were mentally unbalanced, electing themselves as ‘messiahs’ of their people. Their legacy is always death, destruction and suffering for the people they seek to govern, most likely as dictators. The Sikh separatists call themselves Khalistanis, Khalistan being their chosen name for the Sikh-dominated Punjab. It is not clear what case they were making for separation before 1984, the year Indira Gandhi was assassinated. They were certainly not a persecuted minority. As far as this writer can gather, the modern Khalistani separatist case seems to rest upon the historic events of June and October 1984 when a Sikh separatist leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, led hundreds of his followers, armed to the teeth, into the Golden Temple in Amritsar and occupied it in defiance of the temple’s elected management committee and the law of the land. The Golden Temple is the holiest shrine in the Sikh religion. It is a huge complex of buildings with large food and water resources and electricity generators. Accounts of this armed occupation differ, depending upon which media one consults, but it is clear that the insurgents built barricades inside the temple complex and that the occupation was a direct challenge to the authority of the democratically elected Indian government and the Punjab state government. It is also clear that the insurgents held hostage hundreds of visitors who were already inside the temple as human shields to deter attack. They would not allow anybody to leave. They did, several days later, release some people who were old or sick. Many of the remaining hostages died in the ensuing fighting when the Indian Army, led by a Sikh officer, stormed the building and killed most of the insurgents in a massive military operation known as Bluestar, which cost hundreds of casualties amongst the insurgents, the army and the unfortunate hostages. The then Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, had attempted to negotiate an end to the occupation for a week or so before, ill-advisedly, authorising Bluestar. A few months later she was assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards and that triggered widespread mob violence whipped up by frenzied Hindu leaders and, no doubt, by some Hindu politicians. This communal violence led to the deaths of two to three thousand Sikhs in and around New Delhi. No prosecutions took place against Hindu leaders or politicians or against those police officers who made no serious effort to prevent the riots. That is the history which Sikh separatists use as a rallying cry for an independent state. If a future Mormon religious or political leader fancied himself as the president of an independent Republic of Utah, & spent large sums of money, possibly derived from enemies of America, separatist ideas, he might attract a few more followers from among the Mormons. But, even then, the movement would be unlikely to get very far because the unifying factors in American society are strong enough to withstand any shallow claims to separate nationhood made by a demagogue. Nevertheless, if he was to pay criminals or incite fanatics to start a war with the non-Mormon community by committing an atrocity against innocent non-Mormons in the knowledge that there would be a retaliatory atrocity against Mormons then the tit-for-tat conflict could easily escalate into a full-blown civil war. Civil conflict is meat and drink for separatist demagogues. That appears to be the game plan of the so-called Khalistanis in Punjab. Most of the separatist leaders live safely abroad in Pakistan, Europe and North America from where they encourage separatist ideas and acts of terror against Hindus. They appear to be well financed perhops by Pakistan’s ISI. So, even in the absence of any sort of persecution, religious, political or economic (Sikhs are the most prosperous sector of the Punjabi population), they still manage to create division and fear. These expatriate leaders seem to have been easily able to recruit misguided or socially alienated young men or criminals to commit outrageous acts of in Punjab in order to destabilise the state and facilitate their take-over. Their failure to create the chaos and civil war they wanted is a tribute to the majority moderate Sikh population who do not subscribe to the idea of separation. Most Indians, and more than just a few Pakistanis, know only too well the consequences of partitioning countries whose population has so much in common. Nevertheless, unity is strength only when there are no cracks to be exploited by those minnow in a lake that would prefer to be pike in a pond. There appears to be quite a few Sikh ‘leaders’ looking for cracks. The moderate Akali party, composed entirely of Sikhs, lost power in Punjab in recent elections (Sikhs represent about 60 per cent of the population with the remainder being mostly Hindu) but some disgruntled Akali leaders seem to encourage the separatists as a means of destabilising the existing Congress government who won the election with the votes of both Sikhs and Hindus. The threat of a resurgence of the Khalistani movement is used by some of these people to try to lever themselves back into power in the state but it is a dangerous political gambit. This sort of politicking can lead only to a renewal of communal violence and some of those Akali leaders who have a moral duty to accept the will of the people may well find themselves among the victims if the criminals and fanatics are incited again. The most recent Sikh separatist activity in the UK seems to be based entirely upon the events of 1984 and the storming of the Golden Temple with its consequent deaths and then the following mob violence and attacks upon Sikhs after the assassination of Indira Gandhi. That is the persecution upon which the separatists stake their claim. There is also a spurious claim made by the separatists that the Sikhs were promised an independent nation when British rule came to an end in 1947. There is no historical record of any such commitment by British or Indian leaders of the time. A recent demonstration in London organised by Sikh separatists displayed a banner announcing that ‘Khalistan is the Only Solution’ and that begs the question, solution to what problem? Earlier this year, Belgian police raided a Sikh temple and arrested several Sikhs who were running a lucrative immigration racket from inside the temple. Protests about this police action were made by Sikhs around Europe. Regrettable as these police or military raids may be, Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, Jews and Christians cannot reasonably protest when their temples, their mosques, their synagogues or their churches are used by terrorists or criminals as sanctuaries which are then raided by state authorities. That is a violation of sacred ground for which the terrorists and criminals are solely responsible and that applies to the Golden Temple as much as it does to any other sacred place of worship in any religion. As a believer in the unity of people of the world and as an independent observer, this correspondent’s recent research reveals no moral, political or economic case for the creation of a republic of Khalistan. (Source: Asianaffairs, September, 2009) HUMAN RIGHTS Politician-Bureaucracy-Criminal Nexus Results in Encounter Killings COL R HARIHARAN There are many news stories with a common thread extrajudicial killings by policemen. "Encounter killing" a euphemism for unlawful killing by policemen is not rare in India. Usually, not only the police but also the state government draws media flak. At times, the ruling party is also drawn into the controversy. Civil society action keeps pace with the media coverage. Usually, after the noise dies down, the media jumps to hardy perennials. The encounter killing is forgotten till it develops into a more juicy one. And the cycle continues nothing seemingly changes for the police, politicians, governments or even the victims. The media response is neither uniform nor even-handed. But it may not be the same for the Tamil Nadu government, which has its own gory record of encounter killings. In 2005, the Justice Sadashiva Committee had indicted the Special Task Force (STF) of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu for killing 66 tribals in "encounters" when they were hunting out Veerappan. But in the Rajan death, Tamil Nadu is a little better placed because he was not termed a terrorist. Moreover, the state is led by the aging M Karunanidhi who keeps the media humoured, despite a few skeletons rattling in his party’s cupboard. So Rajan’s killing may not set the media on fire. Although many of the deaths in police shootouts and in custody are genuine, in public belief any death in police custody or transit is a cover-up of an extra-judicial killing. In spite of this, there is public inertia in reacting strongly against police misconduct. There is probably a cynical acceptance of unlawful killings by policemen as an inevitable part of the system. The perception appears to be universal. But police forces in the West have in-built structural mechanisms to check police misconduct and punish the culprits. This is not the case in South Asia. Police forces in South Asia are a legacy of the British Raj. During the Raj, coercive power of the police was a vital instrument of state policy after the Congress party emerged as a political threat to British rule in the 1930s. The police started equating force with authority and made political defiance a crime. This policy orientation bred lack of accountability for police actions. It reinforced the paramilitary character of colonial police. AFTER the British quit South Asia, India, Pakistan (including its eastern wing) and Sri Lanka retained the colonial administrative, police and judicial structures without the changes essential to meet the needs of an independent nation. Thus their police forces, by and large, retain the repressive character of the colonial police to this day. The intelligentsia, despite its muted protests, also appears to tacitly accept encounter killings as a necessary evil for controlling rapidly criminalizing society. This attitude has grown out of the seeming inability of rulers to get criminals convicted. Criminals develop political clout as they grow in notoriety. They can bribe their way through. And they can intimidate witnesses from giving evidence against them. Even when witnesses give evidence, they can be "persuaded" to turn hostile. There is no worthwhile witness protection system and rarely does the judiciary penalize witnesses for retracting. In this environment, it is not too difficult for the accused to be acquitted for want of evidence. So execution of such criminals in police shootouts, whether fake or real, is often silently approved by the public as a mode of delivering speedy justice. That was how the public accepted the wholesale extra-judicial killing of suspected Naxalites in Calcutta in the 1970s, and the encounter killings of Sikh extremists in Punjab in the 1980s. In the late 1990s, the Bombay Police cleaned up the criminal underworld dogging the city in a series of encounter killings. Delhi Police adopted the same method to curb interstate criminal activity in the capital. And, in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, there have been frequent reports of encounter killings of Naxalites. A new genre of "encounter specialists" yet another phrase of Indian coinage has emerged in the police. These urban cowboys flaunt their killings in public. Famous encounter specialists basking in the after-glow of anti-heroes include Inspector Pradeep Sharma with a score of 113 kills. Bollywood movie-makers have cashed in on the morbid public fascination with such "encounters" by producing movies woven around the theme of custodial killings. POLITICAL parties have an opportunistic attitude to aberrations in policing, conditioned by popular perceptions, depending upon whether they are in power or not. The Congress, on coming to power after Independence, had no alternative people- oriented model for replacing the colonial administrative and judicial structure. So, in spite of the liberal democratic character of the Constitution, beyond pious pronunciation, there has been little value addition in redesigning the overall administrative structure. Not only the Congress, but all parties, including the Communists in West Bengal have continued to use the police force as an instrument of power. As a result, systemic improvements have been few in the administration of law and order, and criminal justice.Two watershed events affected the working of the police. First was the formation of non-Congress state governments in 1967 when the Congress was in power at the Centre. The widening divergence between the Centre and the State triggered the process of politicization of the police. The Centre used its intelligence apparatus for collecting political intelligence in the states. The Union government started to increase the strength of the Central police forces as its intervention in the state for political or other reasons became frequent. The process of politicization of police at the Centre became a reality when the Emergency was imposed. As KS Subramanian noted, "The Police faced the ‘Nuremberg dilemma’ on whether or not to implement illegal orders by persons in political authority." By the end of the Emergency, politicization of the police was almost complete and there was no going back.The policemen in the states serve their tenures based on the whims of politicians; police postings for "lucrative" thanas are routinely sold to the highest bidder. In this environment, encounter killings for that matter, all lawless activities appear to have a political link. Can committed policemen escape this no-win situation? Union Home Minister P Chidambaram, on September 14, asked why Police men remain silent when arbitrary postings and transfers are made by the state government. The answer is very simple; the DGPs themselves are knocked around like footballs by political masters. The starting point is freeing law enforcement and administration of criminal justice caught in the politician-corrupt bureaucracy criminal nexus. Encounter killings will die a natural death when the rule of law is applied uniformly. That requires a society determined to cleanse itself; and it is not impossible. But where is the leadership to motivate and take the people through this process? (Courtesy: GFiles October 2009 issue) COMMUNAL VIOLENCE Bombay’s Mass Murder in Jan-March 1993 Ingredients: Historical Memories, Contempt & Hindutva Ideology Late A. M. Rosenthal, Renowned US Journalist This huge stew of a metropolis, so long so proud of being India's greatest city, is in a condition of shock and shame, but it is searching. Its political chieftains, its business and intellectual elite, its artists and movie stars and its victims search for answers to questions they never believed they would face. Why does a man set fire to his neighbor's house, kill him as he runs out, then rape his wife and knife his children? How can this possibly be-that suddenly in this city, thousands of men could do this to people who look and speak as they do, who work and trade on the same street, whose children they knew since birth, the children they were to slaughter, suddenly, in 10 days in January? The same questions shock and shame more and more cities and countries around the world. How can these unspeakable things, or worse, keep happening today in Bombay, the Sudan or Bosnia as yesterday in Berlin or Phnom Penh? SHOCK AND SHAME: The best time for an outsider to look himself for answers is when the shock and shame are fresh. And in Bombay, these early days after the killings, the clues can indeed be found about how people can be pulled across the line from bigotry to murder. Six hundred people died in the riots. They came a month after a mosque was destroyed by militant Hindu nationalists hundreds of miles from here. Ten thousand homes were burned down. Hundreds of thousands were made refugees. Hindus as well as Muslims died in those riots. Criminal gangs of smugglers, Muslim and Hindu, took part. Fires were set by landowners trying to burn away squatters and their dreadful hovels. But the riots were essentially an anti-Muslim pogrom set off by Hindu fanatics and their political masters. The national and state authorities refuse to say so plainly. This is an act of denial that makes repetition of the pogrom more likely. HISTORY AND MUTUAL CON: Bombay shows that the recipe for killing of neighbor by neighbor consists of several indispensable ingredients. The first is a historic grievance kept festering by the retelling. In Bombay it was centuries of Hindu resentment of Muslims as their conquerors and rulers. That is remembered as if it happened yesterday. The memory is honed by bitterness at the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Muslim Pakistan -- seen by so many Hindus as an act of Muslim treachery. The second ingredient is contempt. Hindus perceive Muslims as dirty, slothful, deceitful. Muslims return contempt for contempt: Hindus are devious, passive, weak, money-lending grubbers. Just the same since independence in 1947, the Hindu majority of 730 million and the huge Muslim minority of 110 million usually managed to live with each other as part of the same nation. Without that, India cannot endure. So to move Hindus from disliking Muslims to killing them required another ingredient poison. It was plentifully stirred into the mixture by the Hindu nationalist political party Bharatiya Janata, and its storm troopers, the Shiv Sena. Every day "Shiva's Army" preaches that Muslims are traitors. They were importing automatic rifles from the Mideast for the day of mass murder of Hindus. They were destroying Hindu temples in Kashmir. They were "pampered" by the central Government. They were breeding huge families so they would be the majority and again enslave Hindus. Secret protocols showed their plans to conquer India once again. All lies. Nothing changes much in the hate business. The leader of Shiv Sena is a great admirer of a famous modern leader Adolf Hitler. Hindu hate literature against Indian Muslims is almost exactly the same in manufactured paranoia as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Hitler's favorite, which is distributed still by Muslims in the Middle East and on 42d Street in New York City. GOVT COWARDICE: Shiv Sena could have been put down in hours. The state and national governments behave like Weimar reborn -- disorganized, frightened, gutless. That was the last ingredient. So in Bombay, the recipe for the alchemy that changes prejudice into murder can be known -- history, contempt, poison, cowardice. (Source: The New York Times, 3 November, 2009) URDU Non-Implementation of Gujral Committeee Report on Urdu Findings of Ali Sardar Jafri Committee BackgroundThe Government of India appointed a Committee for Promotion of Urdu under the Chairmanship of Shri I.K. Gujral, the then Union Minister of State for Works and Housing by a Resolution dated May 5, 1972. It was requested to advise the Government on the measures to be adopted for the promotion of Urdu language and the steps required to be taken to provide adequate facilities for Urdu speaking people in educational, cultural and administrative matters. The Report of the Gujral Committee was received in the Ministry of Education on May 8, 1975. It runs into 269 pages and contains 187 recommendations covering a very wide spectrum of problems and issues. Stage-I The Gujral Committee Report was placed before the Cabinet on January 30, 1979. Thereafter, it was laid on the Table of both the Houses of Parliament on February 21, 1979. The Cabinet did not take any decision on the recommendations and instead decided that, since most of the recommendations of the Report would have to be implemented by the States, copies of the Report may be sent to the State Governments for ascertaining their views. Accordingly, copies of the Gujral Committee Report were made available to all the State Governments/Union Territory Administrations and the Institutions concerned, for examining the recommendations and sending their views to the Ministry. The major recommendations of the Gujral Committee Report include the amendment of the Three Language Formula, use of Urdu for official purposes where there are 10% or more speakers of Urdu and provision of adequate safeguards for the Urdu linguistic minority. Besides, there are other recommendations regarding the use of Urdu as medium of instruction, training of Urdu teachers, setting up of Urdu Research Institutes) starting of Correspondence Courses in Urdu in Universities, development of Urdu journalism and literature, increasing the frequency and the duration of Radio and TV broadcasts in Urdu and strengthening of the Bureau for Promotion of Urdu. The Report of the Gujral Committee was also considered by Taraqqui-e-Urdu Board in its meeting held on June 4, 1979. Stage-II On the recommendations of the Board, a Sub-Committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of Professor A.A. Suroor, the then Vice-Chairman of Taraqqui-e-Urdu Board, by the Ministry of Education and Culture, to consider the recommendations which could be implemented by this Ministry. In the meeting of the Taraqqui-e-Urdu Board held on May 20, 1980, it was decided to enlarge the scope of this Committee so as to cover the role of Urdu in all the Ministries of the Union Government. The Sub-Committee submitted its report on November 12, 1982. When this report was placed before Taraqqui-e-Urdu Board in its meeting held on January 7, 1983, it was decided that the report may first be considered by the Standing Committee of the Taraqqui-e-Urdu Board. The Standing Committee considered the recommendations of the Sub-Committee in its meeting held on August 20, 1983. It proposed that: (i) the most important and basic recommendation to accord official status to Urdu by modifying the official language Acts on the model of the Bihar Government be pursued with the State Governments; (ii) the State Governments may also be persuaded to recognise the Urdu educational system with Urdu medium from primary to secondary and collegiate levels as recommended by the Gujral Committee; (iii) the Government should establish an autonomous central body for Urdu with statutory powers with the Bureau for Promotion of Urdu providing the base; (iv) the Ministry should set up a permanent Standing Committee to watch the progress of implementation of Gujral Committee’s recommendations; and (v) the recommendation of the Gujral Committee that the qualifying percentage with regard to the facilitaties in the spheres of administration for Urdu speaking linguistic minorities be reduced from 15 to 10, should be implemented. The above recommendations were referred to the State Governments on April 6, 1984. On March 28, 1984, a Standing Committee to watch the progress and implementation of recommendations of the Committee for Promotion of Urdu was set up under the Chairmanship of Kunwar Mohinder Singh Bedi. On March 23, 1989, the Committee was reconstituted under the Chairmanship of Shri Sibte Razi, Member of Parliament. Stage-III On February 15, 1990 the Government of India constituted a Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Shri Ali Sardar Jafri to examine implementation of the recommendations of the Gujral Committee. Its report follows:Status of Implementation By The Central Government (i) the Gujral Committee made recommendation (5.175) that the Central Government should discuss the matter of the use of Urdu by the Legislatures and the publication of agenda papers etc. with the Chief Ministers and Speakers of the various State Legislatures and formulate acceptable guidelines. We find that only in Andhra Pradesh the Bills are introduced in Urdu and Urdu speeches are also recorded in Urdu. However, the Central Government has not conducted any dialogue or discussion and has not formulated uniform guidelines; (ii) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation (5.179) regarding printing of electoral rolls in urdu where Urdu speaking population is 10% and above, is not being implemented in any State except Maharashtra and Delhi; (iii) according to a Resolution of the Parliament in December, 1967, the Union Public Service Commission has allowed the use of any language included in the 8th Schedule and English as a medium for answering papers in general knowledge and essay. Two years later, it 16 included an optional paper on any one of the 15 languages. However, the recommendation of the Gujral Committee that this facility should be extended to the concerned State Public Service Commissions also has not been implemented so far; (iv) with regard to Post and Telegraph Department, the Gujral Committee recommended (5.186 to 5.188) that it should print the various forms, including Money Orders forms, in Urdu, in substantially large quantities, to meet the demand from Urdu speakers all over the country) in areas with an Urdu speaking population of 10% and above. The Committee finds that this recommendation has also not been implemented; (v) the Gujral Committee recommended (5.189) that important notices and circulars of the Post and Telegraph Department should, in accordance with the norms suggested by the Committee, be published in Urdu in areas where Urdu speaking population is substantial. Even this has gone by default. The sign-boards of the Post and Telegraph Department are also not provided in Urdu anywhere except in some places in Andhra Pradesh; (5.190) (vi) with regard to the Railways, the Gujral Committee had recommended (5.195) that the names of the railway stations should be displayed in Urdu also in certain states specified by it. It also recommended (5.196) that if the stations from where the journey begins are 17 in areas where Urdu happens to be second largest language after the regional language, the name of the station should be displayed in Urdu also. With regard to making available the Railway Time Table in Urdu, the Gujral Committee had recommended (5.192) that private individuals or organisations could print the Time Table in Urdu with the cooperation of the Railway Board. The Committee finds that the Time Table is not available in Urdu and that no effort has been made to involve the voluntary Organisation in the process; (vii) Education: Three Language Formula as enunciated in the 1968 Policy and reiterated in the 1986 Policy makes no mention of Urdu. The Formula recommended by the Gujral Committee (4.240 and 4.241) has not been implemented. The Constitutional guarantees given to the linguistic minorities, in this case, the Urdu-speaking linguistic minority, have also not been fulfilled. The Gujral Committee modifications of the 10:40 and 15:60 Formulae have also been disregarded.(xi) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation (5.77) regarding the translation of laws and regulations has not been implemented. The representative from the Ministry of Law, in his evidence, however, stated that till date 222 Central Acts have been translated into Urdu out of which 204 have been approved by the Working group of the Official Language Wing, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law. These Acts, however, have not yet been printed; (xix) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation with regard to PIB have, by and large, been implemented. So far as DAVP is concerned, their performance has improved. However, with regard to advertisements to Urdu press, the DAVP still adheres to the circulation criteria and 20 has ignored the Gujral Committee’s recommendation that the criteria should be relaxed in favour of Urdu press. Regrading Publication Division (5.229), Gujral Committee noticed that the number of books brought out in Urdu comprise only a small proportion of the total number of books published by that Division. STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION IN STATES The salient features of the report are as follows: (i) article 350(A) of the Constitution has been disregarded in all the three aspects it emphasises viz. "endeavour", "adequate facilities" and "directions" to the States; (iii) the state of primary education in Urdu in the country is highly unsatisfactory both quantitatively and qualitatively. To give only one example, there are only 1375 Urdu medium primary schools in Uttar Pradesh, which has an Urdu speaking population of 1,07,67,175 (according to 1981 census). (iv) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation to set up Urdu medium primary schools where there are 10% or more Urdu speaking people has not been implemented in any of the states; (v) the condition of the Urdu medium secondary schools in the states is also highly unsatisfactory both quantitatively and qualitatively. In Uttar Pradesh, of example, there is not a single Government Urdu medium secondary school (Classes VI to X). The Gujral Committee’s recommendations for setting up of one Urdu medium higher secondary school for groups of 8-10 primary schools in states having concentration of Urdu speaking people has not been implemented in any of the states; (vi) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation regarding the Three Language Formula has not been implemented in any of the states in its true spirit; (vii) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation for setting up of one Urdu medium college in each state has not been implemented (except in Andhra Pradesh) (ix) The Gujral Committee’s recommendation regarding training of Urdu teachers, short-term courses to meet the acute shortage of Urdu teachers, reservation of seats for Urdu in general training programmes, have not been implemented; (x) The Gujral Committee’s recommendations (4.323 to 4.326) regarding production and availability of Urdu text-books have not been implemented. (xii) the Gujral Committee’s recommendations in respect of Constitutional Safeguards and Legislation for Urdu speaking people under Article 345 of the Constitution to provide for official use of minority language or languages in the States/UTs have not been implemented. Although the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have declared Urdu as the 2nd Official Language, no guidelines have been incorporated in the law to determine the purposes. Similarly, the Andhra Pradesh law provides for the official use of Urdu but does not give the guidelines to identify the purposes and the areas. The process of use of Urdu in administration in these states has also not yet been started; (xiii) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation for setting up of suitable machinery for the redressal of grievances of Urdu speaking people under the Chairmanship of State Chief Ministers has remained unimplemented in many of the states; (xiv) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation that State Governments should reassure the linguistic minorities that entry into services will not be denied to them on the basis of lack of knowledge of the language of the state, and that the candidates will acquire proficiency and pass departmental tests in it before confirmation, is not being,implemented in the letter and spirit. (xv) the Gujral Committee’s recommendation that criteria for advertisements to Urdu journals should be relaxed has not been followed by the State Governments. The Offices of the PIB in the states do not prepare and release news and features in Urdu even in most vital areas of national life. The number of Urdu books in state-owned libraries, even in Urdu speaking areas, is highly inadequate. MADRASA EDUCATION The Case of Madarsas Sachar Report on Madrasa Education (Extracts) Choice of Educational Institutions:The type of educational institution in which children study is also an important marker of educational status. This is because the quality and cost of education varies in different types of schools. Both Muslim and ‘Other’ children mostly attend the inexpensive Government or Governmentaided schools; about one third attend private schools. Many of the government - aided schools may effectively be privately run; an analysis of the proportion of children going to government versus government-aided schools would be instructive. A small proportion (4%) of Muslim children also attend Madarsas. It is often believed that a large proportion of Muslim children study in Madarsas, mostly to get acquainted with the religious discourse and ensure the continuation of Islamic culture and social life. A persistent belief nurtured, in the absence of statistical data and evidence, is that Muslim parents have a preference for religious education leading to dependence on Madarsas. It is also argued that education in Madarsas often encourages religious fundamentalism and creates a sense of alienation from the mainstream. In actuality the number of Madarsa attending students is much less than commonly believed . NCAER figures indicate that only about 4 % of all Muslim students of the school going age group are enrolled in Madarsas. At the all-India level this works out to be about 3% of all Muslim children of school going age. The importance of Madarsas as a source of education is not high in any of the regions, except the Northern one. But even here, according to the higher NCAER estimate, less than 7 % children of the school going age group attend Madarsas. One reason for the misconception that the majority of Muslim children are enrolled in Madarsas is that people do not distinguish between Madarsas and Maktabs. While Madarsas provide education (religious and/or regular),26 Maktabs are neighbourhood schools, often attached to mosques, that provide religious education to children who attend other schools to get ‘mainstream’ education. Thus Maktabs provide part-time religious education and are complementary to the formal educational institutions.Modernization Project When modernization of Madarsas is planned, policy makers should be careful to distinguish between these two types of institutions. The Maktabs and residential Madarsas are necessarily traditional and meant only for religious education, because their social function is to carry on the Islamic tradition. On the other hand, it is the constitutional obligation (under Article 21A) of the Government to provide education to the masses. The solution in such cases is not only to modernize Madarsas, but also to provide good quality, subsidised ‘mainstream’ education and create an adequate infrastructure for education. Therefore, the state must also fulfill its obligation to provide affordable high quality school education to the masses through the formal education system.Question of Equivalence Apart from the role Madarsas have played in providing religious education one needs to recognize their contribution towards the education of Muslims in the country. Very often one finds that Madarsas have indeed provided schooling to Muslim children where the State has failed them. Many children go to Madarsas and thereby acquire some level of literacy/education when there is no school in the neighbourhood. This effort needs to be recognized. This could be done by establishing ‘equivalence’ to Madarsa certificates for subsequent admission into government schools and universities. For this purpose, equivalence between the two systems of education will need to be established at different levels. Many Madarsas provide education that is similar to that provided in ‘mainstream’ schools. This needs to be understood in a transparent manner. Many Madarsas have shown an interest in the modernization scheme of the government and are keen to incorporate science, mathematics and other ‘modern/regular’ subjects in their curriculum and introduce modern methods of pedagogy. However, given the small number of children attending these institutions the ‘modernization scheme’ cannot be a substitute for mainstream education. (emphasis added) Moreover, has the implementation of the Scheme for Modernisation of Madarsas a number of deficiencies. The number and quality of teachers assigned to Madarsas for teaching modern subjects and their remuneration were inadequate. Besides, the important aspect of finding space for modern subjects in the Madarsa curriculum appears to have been ignored. The modern stream remained un-supervised at the Madarsa level and un-inspected at the state level. A fresh evaluation of the scheme which may result in its being overhauled is needed.It is also important to recognize that Madarsas although primarily and usually intended for producing human resources for manning the mosques and the Madarsas themselves are also expected to produce Ulema who are looked upon by Muslims for guiding them in matters of importance in daily life and in social and political discourse. The modernization scheme is designed also to make them aware of what is considered the domain of secular learning and enable them to participate in interfaith dialogues. (Source Sachar Committee Report, 2006) The Madrasa Challenge-Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan Reviewed by Yoginder Sikand Long ignored by the international media, policy makers and academics, traditional madrasas or Islamic schools shot into the limelight following the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and, not long after, the take-over of Afghanistan by the Taliban, led by madrasa graduates. Today, madrasas in general, and Pakistani madrasas in particular, are routinely projected in the international media as ‘dens of terror’ and ‘factories of militancy’. Governments and international organizations continue to issue calls for radical reforms in Pakistan ‘s madrasas, warning that failure to do so will allow these schools to turn out literally tens of thousands of militants every year, posing grave danger to regional, indeed international, stability. The raging debate about madrasas in Pakistan is at the centre of a war of ideas in Muslim South Asia . Fair’s basic concern is to seek to understand the reality or otherwise of widespread accusations about Pakistan ‘s madrasas being heavily involved in promoting terrorism and other forms of violence. Fair’s central contention, which she backs with an impressive array of statistics, is that unqualified and sweeping claims about Pakistani madrasas in general as training centres for militancy in the name of jihad need to be viewed with circumspection. She argues that only a small minority of Pakistani militants active in the violence in Kashmir have a madrasa background. The vast majority of these men had studied in regular public, or, less often, private, schools. Relatively few were madrasa students or graduates. One reason for this, she argues, is that Pakistan-based militant groups involved in warfare with Indian forces in Kashmir need better qualified activists than what madrasas can offer. At the same time, however, Fair notes a heavy presence of Pakistani madrasa students and graduates in suicide bombing operations in Afghanistan and in Pakistan ‘s Pakhtun borderlands, as well as in sectarian violence involving rival Muslim sects in large parts of Pakistan . Although Fair contends that, overall, the proportion of Pakistani madrasa students and graduates involved in international militancy is relatively low, she notes that madrasas might help create an atmosphere conducive to calls for what they often describe as jihad. In particular, this has to do with how madrasa students are socialized to view the world around them, including what they are taught about non-Muslims and religions other than Islam. Fair rightly concludes that madrasa teachers and students tend to be considerably less tolerant of other religions and their adherents, and significantly more supportive of violence as a means to solve territorial disputes, as, for instance, with regard to the conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. It would have added weight to her contention if she had surveyed the texts taught in Pakistani madrasas that deal with issues related to the notion of jihad and the portrayal of non-Muslims in these texts. She could also have conducted in-depth interviews with her numerous Pakistani respondents on these crucial issues that are central to the debate about madrasas and militancy. Another interesting finding that Fair presents is that, contrary to what is generally thought, full-time madrasas account for probably less than 5 per cent of all students in Pakistan, they being greatly outnumbered by students enrolled in public and private schools. This indicates that the influence of the madrasas is considerably less than what is often imagined. Not all madrasa students come from impoverished families, as is generally supposed. Fair estimates that more than 10 per cent of madrasa students are sons of fairly rich parents. Then, again, contrary to popular perception, not all Pakistani madrasas teach only religious subjects. Many of them have included basic secular subjects in their curriculum. Others allow for admission only to students who have completed at least a few years in a general school. Madrasas might not simply produce what Fair calls ‘intolerant’ students. It may also be the case that ‘intolerant’ families might choose to send their children to madrasas because they believe that madrasa teachers espouse similar worldviews. But even here generalizations are hazardous, Fair writes, as most parents who have at least one child studying in a madrasa choose to send at least one of their other children to a general, private of public, school. She adds that it is not just Pakistani madrasa students who are generally characterized by considerable hostility to religious minorities and advocate what they consider as jihad with India over Kashmir . Almost the same proportion of students in government schools hold similar views, she tells us. This points to the fact that Government-approved Pakistani textbooks are replete with negative references to India and Hindus and reflect a particular version of Islamic supremacism that promotes extreme intolerance towards others. It is thus not just Pakistan ‘s madrasas’ whose teachings about other faiths and their adherents need to be critically examined and reformed. The same holds true for Pakistani Government-approved texts. Fair misses out on numerous other factors (perhaps deliberately, for hers is a study funded and published by a Right-wing organization close to the US establishment) that continue to fuel considerable Muslim resentment, including among madrasa students, in Pakistan the on-going conflicts in Palestine and Iraq, in which the US is heavily implicated, and the continued American bombing of Afghanistan and now parts of Pakistan, too, being the most important. Fair also misses out the role of Pakhtun nationalism in the current militancy in Pakistan’s North-West frontier as well as the role of Islam as a vehicle for expressing violent dissent against Pakistan’s corrupt ruling class and its deadly alliance with the United States. The book’s concluding chapter looks at the halting efforts on the part of the Pakistani state in promoting madrasa reforms. These reforms, Fair argues, have been largely, though not entirely, sought to be introduced at the behest of the United States . She frankly admits, based on her conversations with high-level officials in the US State Department, that that ‘de-Islamisation’ of Pakistan ‘s education system is, in fact, one of their goals’.Fair frankly confesses that US involvement in ‘reforming’ Pakistani madrasas has ‘hurt more than it has helped, because it has served to de-legitimise the Government’s efforts and reduced them to mere action items directed by Washington and London.’ Hence, she argues, ‘the US would do well at least to consider ceasing public calls for madrassah reform in Pakistan’ because of the backlash these calls have produced, making such ‘reform’ increasingly difficult. At the same time, Fair admits that many madrasa managers, as well as the majority of ordinary Pakistanis, do feel the need for substantial reforms in Pakistan ‘s madrasas, in order to produce a class of ulema who can suitably address and respond to contemporary needs and concerns. Given this, she suggests that, ultimately, the ulema themselves have to take the lead in promoting madrasa reforms internally. It cannot be a top-down process, induced or ordered by the Pakistani Government or USA. This an immensely absorbing book about Islamic or Muslim education. (Source: Islamic Voice, October, 2009) HISTORY Nalanda was Alredy in Decay Muslim Invoder of Bihar Bakhtiar Khilji did not Destroy it Indologist Dr. A.S. Altekar on Tibetan Monk Dharamaswamin’s Account Dharmasvamin’s account is very valuable because it gives us first hand information of the effects produced by the Muslim conquest. The conquerors had overrun the country but had not yet succeeded in establishing any stable administration. In Bihar there were several Hindu or Buddhist Kings, who were leading a precarious existence. They were too weak to oppose the Muslim forces, but strong enough to emerge from their forest retreats and reestablish their rule when the invading army had passed away, as is shown by the case of Buddhasena. Bands of Muslim soldiers were roaming about the country creating consternation among the population, probably by their loot and exactions. When Dharmasvamin reached Vaisali on his way to Bodha-Gaya, the town was all deserted on account of the apprehended arrival of Muslim force. People used to desert their houses by day and used to come back to them at night. Vikramshila had been completely destroyed before 1206 A.D. and its foundation stones had been hurled into the Ganga. The Bodha- Gaya establishment had been deserted by all except four monks. The ancient image had been walled up by a brick wall and a new one had been put in the anti-chamber. The king of Bodh-Gaya had fled to forest. Dharmasvamin himself had to flee away for seventeen days. When it became clear that the Muslim force had gone away, people returned. The wall was removed; the ancient image was made available to the devotees. The king Buddhasena also reappeared on the scene with his small force of 500 soldiers. The general impression that Nalanda was completely destroyed by the beginning of the 13th century is not confirmed by Dharmasvamin’s account. He had lived there for about six months and gives us eye witnesses’ account. Nalanda was still in existence, but was a mer ghost of its past glory. Once it had seven temples and 14 big and 84 small monasteries. Dharmasvamin tells us that they were damaged by the Muslims and there was none to look after them or to make offerings. Only two Viharas called Dha-na-ba and Ghu-na-ba were in a serviceable condition. The surrounding wall of the establishment still existed with its eastern and western gates. Thousands of monks belonging to the establishments had fled away, but the chief abbot Rahula-sri-Bhadra continued to reside and had declined to flee. He was an old man of more than 90. At the time of Dharmasvamin’s visit there were 70 monk scholars reading under him, being supported by king Buddhasena of Bodh-Gaya and a rich lay Brahmana disciple named Jayadeva living at Odantapuri or Bihar Sharif. This incident must have served only as a temporary deterrent, as Dharmasvamin’s own account of what happened during his stay will show.The partial survival of Nalanda was probably due to the following causes: 1. The establishment had not many stone structures, which could supply stone for the erection of mosques. 2. It was too big to be thoroughly destroyed in one effort. 3. Nalanda was not, like Vikramsila, on the high way leading from Delhi to Bengal, and so the work of completing its destruction required a special expedition. 4. Of its numerous temples and monasteries, two monasteries were in a serviceable condition in 1235 A.D. So when the first avalanche of Muslim invasion was over, a few monks, about a hundred in number, returned with their head about to stay at the establishment, hoping that they would now be left undisturbed. Practically the whole province had been over-run by the Muslims and the constant danger of their harassment was everywhere. Why then not stay in a place, which could at least afford some good accommodation for a limited number. In the summer of 1235 A.D. Nalanda suffered further from Muslim depredations. A military force had been stationed at Odantapuri (Bihar Sharif) and its commanding officer suddenly put into prison Brahmana Jaydeva, a lay disciple of the town. Jaydeva however learnt in his captivity that a fresh attack was contemplated on Nalanda and managed to smuggle out a message from his jail to the Abbot Rahula-sri-Bhadra, advising him to flee. On the receipt of this message all the seventy disciples fled away leaving the old Guru and his Tibetan disciple. Eventually both decided to quit, the pupil carrying his Guru on his shoulders, along with the rice, sugar and some books. They however only shifted to the temple of Jnananatha in whose miraculous powers to save his devotees the Guru had an implicit faith. This temple was to the south-west of Nalanda establishment. While they were staying there, suddenly some 300 million Muslim soldiers appeared, armed and ready to fight. ‘Though they were sure to kill them, they did not find them and went back’. This party might have wrought further devastation of Nalanda, though Dharmasvamin is silent upon the point. Dharamaswamin does not refer to the libraries at Nalanda, nor did he get any MSS copied there. The library buildings seem to have been destroyed earlier than 1235 A.D. The monks who were staying at nalanda had however a few MSS with them. (Text published by Jayswal Research Institute, Patna) Communalizing History: Shivaji And Afzal Khan Ram Puniyani Recently (September 3, 2009) tension developed in Miraj, Sangli and neighboring areas during Ganesh festival. trouble began with the erection of an arch on the route of Ganesh Visarjan, WHICH depicted the slaying of Afzal Khan by Shivaji. Anticipating trouble due to the communal polarization around Shivaji and Afzal Khan, to maintain peace, the police removed the arch. Protesting against thE removal some Ganesh Mandals decided not to immerse the Ganpati idols till the arch was restored. This led to Communal violence in due course, in which one person died and five got injured. BJP leadership condemned the Governments’ step of removing the arch. Shiv Sena asserted that they will put posters of Shivaji slaying Afzal Khan all over the state. Few years ago during the previous Parliamentary elections, the same parties had tried to demolish the tomb of Afzal Khan. Fortunately at that time it was brought to people’s notice that this tomb was built by Shivaji himself and the matters came to a rest, but not before it created lot of bad blood. Shivaji is popular amongst people, not because he was anti Muslim or worshipper of cows and Brahmins, but because he reduced tax on the poor peasants. Shivaji adopted humane policy in of his administration, which did not base itself on religion. In the recruitment of soldiers and officers for army and navy. More than one third of his army consisted of Muslims. The supreme command of his navy was with Siddi Sambal, and Muslim Siddis were in navy in large numbers. Interestingly his major battles were fought against the Rajput army lead by Raja Jaisingh, who was with of Aurangzeb. When Shivaji was detained at Agra forte, of the two men on whom he relied for his eventual escape, one was a Muslim called Madari Mehtar. His confidential secretary was Maulana Haider Ali and the chief of his cannon division was Ibrahim Gardi. Rustom-e-Jamaan was his bodyguard. He respected the holy sants like ‘Hazarat Baba Yaqut bahut Thorwale’, whom he gave the life pension and also he helped Father Ambrose, whose church was under attack in Gujarat. At his capital Raigad, he erected a special mosque for Muslim devotees in front of his palace. During his military campaigns Shivaji had issued strict instructions to his men and officers that Muslim women and children should not be subjected to maltreatment. Mosques and Dargah’s were given due protection. He also ordered that whenever a copy of the Koran came into the hands of his men, they should show proper respect to the book and hand it over to a Muslim. The story of his bowing to the daughter-in-law of Bassein’s Nawab is well known to all. When she was brought as a part of the booty and offered to him, he respectfully begged her pardon and asked his soldiers to reach her back from the place from where she was forcibly brought in. All this goes on to show the values of communal harmony which Shivaji pursued, and that his primary goal was to establish his own kingdom over maximum possible area. To project him as anti-Muslim and anti-Islam is travesty of truth. Neither was Afzal Khan anti Hindu. When Shivaji killed Afzal Khan, Afzal Khan’s secretary Krishnaji Bhasker Kulkarni attacked Shivaji with a sword. Today communal forces are out to ‘use’ Shivaji issue, to communalize it for their political goals. In Maharashtra, Shivaji Afzal Khan have been projected as Hindu and Muslim. From amongst all the possible pictures of Shivaji, why is the one related to Afzal Khan is chosen? One can also show the pictures of his Pratapgadh fort with Afzal Khans tomb. One can show Shivaji paying respect to the Mazar of Madari Mehtar, a Muslim prince, who helped him to escape from Agra? The very selection of this picture is to divide the communities along religious lines. Communal interpretation of history, has been the major tool in the arsenal of communal forces. We are witnessing this pattern of history being used to communalize the society & to create sectarian divides. What is needed is to overcome these communal angles, to build the Indian nation. We need to look at historical icons, as kings ruling for power, rather then the representatives of a particular religion. ( Milli Gazitte, 16-31 October, 2009) PARTITION Congress-League Breakdown in 1937 on UP- Real Forerunner of Pakistan Partition was not Jinnah’s Idea; Congress Left him with No Options A.G. NOORANI, Eminent Analyst In U.P. the Congress refused to enter into a coalition in 1937, after the first general election held under the Government of India Act, 1935. Lionel Carter is former Librarian, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge. He has produced five volumes comprising the Punjab Governors’ reports from 1936 to 1947, besides a volume containing Mountbatten’s report on his Viceroyalty March 22-August 12, 1947. Governor Harry Haig’s reports to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow provide an authoritative and disinterested account of the Congress’ arrogant folly in 1937. It is all the more damning for the fact that his own comments were sparse. The reports were not for publication. Linlithgow disliked Haig because he was not anti-Congress unlike the Viceroy. Haig’s pen portrait of Nehru written on October 29, 1936, is a cameo: "The return of Jawaharlal Nehru, however, and the holding of the Congress session at Lucknow last April started a new phase. The Congress had found a leader with a name and personality that appealed to the masses, and possessing unusual initiative, determination and authority. The first reactions of his presidential speech were to alarm seriously all the vested interests, not only landlords, but businessmen and professional men, and to intensify the resolution on the part of these powerful interests to oppose the Congress. But gradually his doctrines, by rather milder repetition, seemed to lose their first alarming quality and to pass into the category of political phrases, which by long practice can be consumed innocuously on the largest scale. Meantime the Congress tried to concentrate attention more on their traditional appeal representing the national revolt against foreign domination. While economic doctrines are still being preached, which are as repugnant to a large section of Congress as they are to the more conservative elements in the country, this does not seem to prevent the bourgeois Congressmen from working with enthusiasm for the Congress cause. There are the most profound differences amongst Congressmen as to future policy…." They emerged after Independence. Haig realistically noted who its opponents were. "The main non-Congress of [or?] conservative force in this Province is bound to be the great body of landlords... a privileged class which has always been in the closest and most friendly relations with the government and which regards its existence as dependent on the support of the government. It was evident that in the new constitution the struggle would be between the Congress and the landlords. At the same time their organisation hardly extended beyond the paper it was written on, and they had none of the characteristics of a life [live?] and vigorous political party. Many of the landlords frankly disbelieved in the necessity of organisation. Their view was that they could by their personal influence control the votes of their tenants and that the ordinary methods of propaganda were superfluous, while their political horizon was limited to their own personal success at the election." Mark what he had to say of the Muslim League which Mohammed Ali Jinnah invigorated after his return from London: "The All India Muslim League was merely to be the means whereby Mr. Jinnah was to utilise the Muslim vote for the purpose of his own advanced nationalist policy" (emphasis added, throughout). JINNAH THE MEDIATOR He had only a few years earlier broken with the Aga Khan. Jinnah did not attend the conference that the Aga Khan convened in Delhi after the Congress’ intransigence on the Nehru Report. The League was split. Jinnah’s nationalism alienated him from the reactionary Muslims while his espousal of safeguards for Muslims alienated him from the communal elements in the Congress. A true nationalist Muslim, Jinnah was a mediator between Indian nationalism and, to put it crudely, Muslim separatism. He needed for his success support from the secular elements in the Congress, especially its prime secularist – the greatest of all time Jawaharlal Nehru. But the nationalism Nehru then espoused had no room for any such nuances. It was simplistic and proved destructive. A cruel irony it was – the breach between two modern-minded secularists. In a speech in the Central Assembly on February 7, 1936, Jinnah asserted: "Religion should not be allowed to come into politics… religion is merely a matter between men and God." But the safeguards were not a religious issue. "This is a question of minorities and it is a political issue." Whatever drove him to advocate the two-nation theory only four years later and demand the partition of India? It is little realised that in fact Nehru differed fundamentally from the approach of the Congress leaders to the communal question in the decades since the issue cropped up. Men such as Motilal Nehru, M.A. Ansari and Tej Bahadur Sapru differed over the terms of Jinnah’s 14 points. Nehru objected to the very idea of a Congress-League pact on safeguards for the minorities. He wrote to Gandhi on September 27, 1931: "I wonder if any purgatory would be more dreadful for me than to carry on in this way. If I had to listen to my dear friend Mohammed Ali Jinnah talking the most unmitigated nonsense about his 14 points for any length of time, I would consider the desirability of retiring to the South Sea Islands where there would be some hope of meeting with some people who were intelligent enough or ignorant enough not to talk of the 14 points" Jinnah was then an acclaimed nationalist. The two shared a common platform as late as on August 12, 1936, at the All India Students Conference in Allahabad over which Jinnah presided and introduced Nehru in warm words which Nehru reciprocated. The next year in 1937, their paths diverged, tragically. As President of the Congress, Nehru gave free, uninhibited expression to his subjective views on the communal question in terms which not only questioned the locus standi of the Muslim League but diverged fundamentally from the very basis of the Congress-League discourse since 1916. He had no use for the pacts of old, such as the Lucknow Pact of 1916. His was a secularism which refused to accept a religious community as a political group. But it was secularism. For, he was astute to discern and just to denounce communalism of the majority when it masqueraded as nationalism. On this he never faltered. It is another matter that his concept of secularism in excelsis rendered a Congress-League Pact impossible and played into the hands of communalists within the Congress. CLASS & RELIGION To Nehru the socialist, the fundamental divide was economic, not religious. Or, if you like, a class division. During the First World War many socialists thought that the working class would unite to oppose the war. The working classes proved to be as chauvinistic as any other. So it was in the 1930s. The working class was no less conscious of its identity as a religious group. That reality had to be faced. Nehru did not. His pronouncements during this crucial phase reveal the inarticulate major premise which shaped his politics. He said at Ambala on January 16, 1937: "All those people who talk in terms of Hindu rights and Muslim interests are job hunters, pure and simple, and fight for the loaves and fishes of office. How long are you going to tolerate this nonsense, this absurdity? ... India’s problem is linked up with the problem of the world and the election business is important inasmuch as it helps us to grasp this problem. But I warn you to beware of minor issues.…"There are only two forces in the country, the Congress and the government. Those who are standing midway shall have to choose between the two." Gandhi fully agreed: "If a fight is to be avoided, Governors must recognise the Congress as the one national organisation that is bound one day or the other to replace the British Government" (Harijan, August 6, 1938;. It was this claim to monopoly on power that wrecked India’s unity. In a statement to the press on January 10, 1937, Nehru said: "Religion is both a personal matter and a bond of faith, but to stress religion in matters political and economic is obscurantism and leads to the avoidance of real issues. In what way are the interests of the Muslim peasant different from those of the Hindu peasant?" At the Congress Working Committee meeting in Wardha on February 27-28, 1937, Nehru took the initiative to discuss a plan of Muslim mass contacts and a strategy of political mobilisation in India on an unprecedented scale. On March 31, 1937, he urged the provincial Congress Committee to "make a special effort to enrol Muslim Congress members, so that our struggle for freedom may become even more broad-based than it is, and the Muslim masses should take the prominent part in it which is their due" (ibid., page 123). The failure of this programme has been ably analysed by Lt. Col. James E. Dillard ("The Failure of Nehru’s Mass Contacts Campaign and the Rise of Muslim Separation", Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies; Volume XXXI, No. 2, Winter 2008. He added: "Those who talk of the Congress entering into a pact or alliance with Muslims or others, fail to understand the Congress or the new forces that are moving our people. We have already made a great pact among our people, a great pact among ourselves, among all who desire national and economic freedom, to work together to this common end. The Muslims are in this pact just as the Hindus and Sikhs and so many Christians" (ibid., page 143). This implied one national organisation representing all. Differences could be sorted out within it. Pacts with others were ruled out. The League’s leader Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman was told off sharply in a letter on July 1, 1937: "Is the League a democratic organisation or is it not just a close preserve of certain individuals? Why should I accept it as the representation of the Muslim of India when I know it represents the handful of Muslims at the top who deliberately seek refuge in the name of religion to avoid discussing mass problem? I have a certain measure of intelligence and I have studied political, economic and allied problems. Am I to insult my intelligence by talking baby-talk of an age gone by?" Given the state of the Congress itself Nehru’s recipe was unrealistic. By denying from a secular standpoint the need for a pact on safeguards for Muslims, he played into the hands of communalists who denied that Muslims were a political minority. Nehru himself, uniquely, was even-handed. He noted in his Autobiography (1936): "Many a Congressman was a communalist under his national cloak" (Oxford University Press, page 136). The Hindu Mahasabha’s communalism "masquerades under a nationalistic cloak" (ibid., page 467) – as does the BJP’s "nationalism". AFTER THE ELECTIONS The Congress won 133 seats in the 1937 election. The League won 28, the National Agriculturist Party 25, the Independents 41 and the Liberals 1. Initially, the reactionary elements formed a minority government. "Liaquat Ali Khan made a strong speech in the meeting today against it," the Governor reported on April 1, 1937. The League wanted the Congress to form a Ministry, but share power with it. It condemned its member, the Nawab of Salempur, for joining the minority government. The Congress and the League had fought the elections on a nationalistic plank and the expectation, if not, indeed, a tacit understanding, was that a coalition would be formed. The Governor reported on April 5, 1937: "The Muslim League are at present buoyed up with the hope that the Congress will take office and with the assurance that, if so, it will make an alliance with them. It is interesting to observe that up to the time when [Govind Ballabh] Pant first saw me, i.e., the period when the Congress themselves seemed to contemplate office, they appeared to be taking a very stiff attitude towards the Muslim League and refused to make any kind of agreement with them. Immediately after Pant’s first interview with me, when he must have known that office acceptance was out of the question, the Congress made overtures to the Muslim League and practically offered them two posts in the cabinet. These negotiations have, I understand, since been continued and the assurances reiterated. It is possible to suppose that the Congress are pursuing a deliberately dishonest policy, and having no intention to take office, are holding out hopes to the Muslim League in order to prevent them joining the alternative government." Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman was close to the Congress. On April 10 the Governor reported: "Khaliq, who is at the moment President of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, has begun almost openly to identify himself with the Congress. He had an interview with Jawaharlal Nehru with a view to settling the terms on which the Muslims could join the Congress, and as Chairman of the Municipal Board, Lucknow, he invited Govind Ballabh Pant to perform with due ceremonial the hoisting of the Congress flag over the Municipal office. These activities, combined with the avowed policy of the Congress to capture the Muslim masses, have seriously alarmed the non-Congress Muslims. Jinnah has made clear his strong opposition to the Muslim joining the Congress." He wanted a coalition. The Congress demanded merger. Jinnah met Khaliquzzaman on May 7. "It was made quite plain that the League would not stand for any policy of merging the Muslims in the Congress or allowing the Muslim League to become a mere appendage of the Congress. They decided also that the Muslim League would not as a party attend the meeting of M.L.As, convened by the Congress." Contrary to later versions, Maulana Azad did not disagree with Nehru. He said on July 14: "If any party wanted to join the Congress, it must give up its separate identity and identify itself with the Congress." The next day Azad and Pant, the Premier-in-waiting "met Khaliquzzaman in a Lucknow hotel when Azad handed him a two-page document". Its very first paragraph read: "The Muslim League group in the United Provinces shall cease to function as a separate group." Its members would join the Congress "as full members", Azad added in a note of his own. (The Pioneer of July 30, 1937, published the full text. Vide R. Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India; Vol. 2, p. 111). Nehru’s letter to Rajendra Prasad on July 21, 1937, rightly denied an electoral pact but admitted that "a kind of convention developed". He endorsed Azad’s line. Time ran in favour of the League. Its electoral debacle in 1937 was a passing phase as the Governor reported only a few months later on March 23, 1938, ending with a prophecy that came true: "As I have mentioned more than once, a position in which practically the whole of the important minority community of Muslims is ranged in the legislature in opposition to the Government is bound to lead to serious communal friction. The minority cannot get their own way in the legislature, and as a permanent communal minority have no prospect of ever getting it, and they are tempted inevitably to redress the weakness of their parliamentary position by rousing religious feelings and emphasising the importance of the community outside the legislature, even at the risk of communal outbreaks. This is the Muslim contribution to the trouble. But the Muslims are not solely responsible for all the ill-feeling. There is also a reverse side to the picture. The Hindus have been undoubtedly elated by the establishment of what is in effect a Hindu Government. There is a good deal of popular feeling that this is Hindu raj, and several officers have told me that they think the Hindu attitude towards communal questions has been aggressive lately." In July 1938, partition was proposed by the Nawab of Chhatari who had an ambiguous relationship with the League. On March 23, 1940, the League passed its famous Resolution demanding partition of India. While the Congress was set on a pact with the British, bypassing the League, the League dreaded transfer of power to the Congress alone. The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s assessment on April 4, 1940, is noteworthy. "I feel, I must make this debate the occasion for pouring much cold water on the Muslim idea of partition formally advocated in the Lahore Resolution, though not necessarily at this stage conclusively rejecting it. I should emphasise that this would be a counsel of despair and wholly at variance with the policy of a united India which British rule has achieved and which it is our aim to perpetuate after British rule ceases…. There is much that could be said in criticism of Jinnah’s partition ideas and we clearly could not accept or endorse them. But quite apart from the fact that we have left the whole scheme and policy of the Act open for discussion after the war, and that Jinnah’s scheme itself has, I suspect, largely been provoked by the unreasonable demands of Congress, any condemnation of Jinnah’s scheme will at once irritate Muslim feeling and will be seized on by Congress." The volume has important documents on doubts about the impact of the Pakistan resolution on the Muslims outside the Pakistan areas. The Haroon Report, commissioned by the League, why repudiated Jinnah with disastrous consequences. On relations between the two parts of India, the Report said that "the subjects to be assigned to this central machinery shall be (a) External relation, (b) Defence, (c) Communications, (d) Customs, (e) Safeguards for minorities and voluntary intermigration etc., subject to the following provision in respect of defence and intermigration." This is what the Cabinet Mission’s Plan envisaged in 1946. Jinnah had another formidable sceptic to deal with. The Nawab of Chhatari wrote to Jinnah on October 16, 1940, that "even the Lahore Resolution will not solve the problem because the Muslims in the minority provinces will suffer in any case". Jinnah assured him on October 22 that "the resolution made it quite clear that we cannot leave the Muslims in the Hindu provinces to their fate" and asked him to come out "with a definite scheme of his own". Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman was also restive despite his support to the Lahore Resolution. Jinnah smothered doubt and dissent. He thought that he would pull off a loose union without conceding anything in advance before the negotiations. When he reached the nego-tiating table in 1946, the Congress rejected such a federation and left him with the partition he had dreaded all along. (Source: Frontline, September 25, 2009) Making Sense of Jinnah Today Editorial, Economic & Political Weekly, Auhust 22, 2009 In this book, Jaswant Singh appears to have argued that the intransigence of Congress leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel practically forced Jinnah to demand Partition of Britishruled India and the creation of a sovereign Pakistan. Singh terms him the leader of Muslims in undivided India and apparently argues that Jinnah was merely trying to protect his constituency from a Hindu majoritarian democracy. Apart from the extraordinary irony of such a statement coming from a senior leader of the very party which has aggressively pushed the Hindu majoritarian agenda, such a position also goes against a widespread national consensus over the historical assessment of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his role in the creation of Pakistan. Whatever the other political and academic differences among the entire spectrum from the far left to the far right, Jinnah has been the universal villain of Partition in independent India’s historiography. While there may be substantial differences of opinion over the role of the Congress as a party and of individual Congress leaders in contributing to the Partition of the country, there has been unanimity over the destructive political role of Jinnah, especially in the last decade of British rule. Therefore, it is quite surprising and unexpected that the revision of this position has come, not once but twice in quick historical time, from political figures placed firmly in the far right of the Indian spectrum. In 2005, L K Advani had taken initial steps towards a similar reassessment of Jinnah. Advani calling Jinnah secular was merely a reflection of V D Savarkar’s Hindutva ideology, which claimed that once Hindus captured state power, they would treat the minorities with generosity. Jinnah, once he had acquired his Muslim state, was merely doing that by speaking of minority rights. It is instructive that these remained mere words in Pakistan and suggest that there was no contradiction in Advani applauding Jinnah, since he wanted India to be a similar polity. At most, Advani could be accused of making a tactical mistake but did not renounce any foundational idea of Hindutva. This was perhaps the reason why Advani got off with a mere rap on the knuckles. Jaswant Singh, it appears, forwards an argument which is a break from the Hindutva position. He suggests that Muslims were right to fear domination and discrimination in a Hindu majority India with universal suffrage and to demand special protections or rights. Further, he accuses Congress leaders, including Sardar Patel, of being complicit in the Partition. Therefore, it should have come as no surprise to anyone, least of all to a Hindutva veteran like Jaswant Singh that his party reacted with the fury it did. Jaswant Singh’s arguments are not novel. It is a well argued, and equally well contested, position in Indian historiography that, by the 1940s, Jinnah had emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims and that it was Nehru and Patel’s "intransigence" over devolution of powers from the union to the federating units, as well as their inability to accept checks on the absolute power of the centre which pushed Jinnah to ask for a sovereign Pakistan. In Pakistan Jinnah’s legacy is the biggest political asset for the liberal and left political forces to fight the fundamentalists. The very words promising political rights to the minorities, which form part of Jinnah’s speech to Pakistan’s constituent assembly in August 1947 and which were quoted by Advani and Jaswant Singh in his praise, are used by those in present day Pakistan who want to push back the fundamentalist forces and work for a democratic state and tolerant society there. It is not Jinnah’s earlier record of working for Hindu-Muslim unity but rather, his post independence avatar which is the preferred political asset for secularism and liberal democracy in Pakistan today. The same person’s legacy serves diametrically opposite political purposes in the two successor states of British India. In India he is a symbol of right reaction, while in Pakistan he is the bulwark for the present day Left. What does this dissonance imply? The easy answer is that political conditions are so starkly different in India and Pakistan that a stable constitutional majoritarian democracy would be an advance in Pakistan while it would be a political regression in India. But there is something more troubling that this dissonance points to. Even 62 years after the traumatic events of Partition the two successor states of British India have not been able to encourage a historiography and national memory which does not demonise and vilify the founding fathers of the other. This surely does not help either of the two countries to move on and build more secure relations; rather it helps entrench the deep distrust that the national publics of the two countries have for each other. While there cannot be any denial of Jinnah’s crucial role in asking for division, it surely should be possible to move beyond the monochromatic visions of Partition seen largely along lines of religious affiliation with clear villains. Jinnah, Nehru, Patel or even Gandhi, were not merely representing religious or national interests. Rather, as any social scientist would aver, class, caste and a variety of other interests played an equally crucial role. Not only academic rigour but the pressing political needs of building peace in the subcontinent call for a renewed public debate on Partition. Gandhi and Jinnah In Present Context M J Akbar, Eminent Journalist Six decades after 1947 a debate on Jinnah can pack halls in Delhi but a discussion on Gandhi might not fill a front row. Is this because Jinnah offers the drama of a court trial, the speakers being advocates for defense or prosecution, and the audience a silent, but ultimately decisive, jury?. Has Gandhi become, in our subconscious, an irritating nuisance, a mirror before our guilty conscience? Who wants to be measured by the yardstick of a saint who was so disconcertingly honest that he turned his autobiography into a confessional? Jinnah, on the other hand, was so private, and even secretive in life that, in death, he is vulnerable to endless post-mortem dissection. Gandhi has become as ephemeral as an ideal. We can disturb the memory of Jinnah. Gandhi’s memory disturbs us. It seems that our innumerable guardians of secularism need familiar villains for their rage. Faceless violence is not attractive enough. Gandhi placed the facts of violence above the politics of conflict. He would have been an inconvenient presence for those who profess to live by his creed today. As for the heroes of modern India : they would not recognize him. There is no way to reinvent Gandhi as a happy symbol of a rising sensex, checking out the value of investment portfolio. It makes sense on every side to convert Gandhi into a token portrait on the wall of a government office. Jinnah’s problem, conversely, has been that he has been appropriated, or misappropriated, by a range of vested interests, each determined to resurrect him in its own image, to serve its agenda. Pakistan ’s political elite, forced to compromise with the culture of theocracy, has converted the natty, lean, handsome owner of 200-odd London-tailored suits into a shalwar-and-cap chameleon. Most Pakistanis would be shocked today to discover that Jinnah did not know Urdu, never fasted during Ramzan, had little interest in the rituals of religion, and that his concept of spiritual sustenance was very worldly indeed. Indian politicians have restructured Jinnah more subtly. Contemporary Congressmen needed a cardboard Jinnah as the all-purpose villain who could soak up all the guilt of Partition. An obstinate, communal hate figure was planted into Indian schoolbook history. This was then morphed into something more insidious. When Jinnah’s utility as the father of Pakistan receded, he was transformed, surreptitiously, into the symbol of the guilt of Indian Muslims, who became the whipping boys of Indian nationalism as practiced on all sides of the spectrum. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, forerunner of the BJP, latched on to this projection with great glee, since it perpetuated the politics of isolation and accusation. Indian Muslims, in this construct, were genetically unpatriotic and therefore, deservedly condemned to the status of second-class citizens. When Jaswant Singh challenged this single-dimension mythology by lifting the record from the private domain of academic archives and flinging it into public discourse, he had to be expelled. He had spread the guilt to others, who were Hindus, and disturbed the equanimity of a half-truth. The secular parties, whose expertise in the dynamics of electoral behavior has always been more astute, quickly understood that fear is the easiest route to the Indian Muslim vote. Fear of the past, Partition, was compounded by fear of its future consequences. Muslims had to choose between the communal cage and the secular trap. One offered a diet of gruel, and the other a scrap of cheese. After six decades, Indian Muslims are beginning to bang on the door of both the cage and the trap. Gandhi would have heard the clamor. (Source: The Times of India, 11 October, 2009) OBITUARY Ikhlaq Hussain Qasmi (1920-2009) Renowned Theologian, Eloquent Speaker and of Inimitable Writer Syed Shahabuddin Born in 1920.The Past representative of the Waliullah school of thought, Maulana Ikhlaq Hussain Qasmi passed away in Delhi at the age of 89 on 13 October 2009, Leaving behind his wife 7 sons & 4 daughters & was buried in Mehlian. His family came from Peshawar and settled in Delhi. His father ran a Karkhana. Though originating from a non-academic family, in his thought, writings and speeches he achieved the highest pinnacle of theological learning among his contemporaries. Known nationally and internationally. Accessible to all seeker of knowledge, he lived simply in his modest residence which reflected his essential humility. He received his education in Madarsa Alia Fatehpuri and completed it in Darul Uloom, Deoband. Subsequently, but a brief entry in public life, he spent his entire life in teaching and writing. He was long associated as Imam & teacher with Madarsa Husain Bakhsh and then with Jamia Rahimia, both in Delhi, and latter served as its Mohtamim At the time of Partition, as a youth he threw himself in relief work and service to the Muslims of Delhi and constantly assisted leaders like Mulana Hifzur Rahman, Mufli Kifayatullah, Maulana Ahmed Sayeed, Maulna Mohammad Mian and Mufti Atiqur Rahman Subsequently he served the Jamiatul Ulema Hind as the state president for Delhi.in 1946 and subsequentlyas as Nazim for the central Jamiat in 1950. Once and only once he contested an election for the Municipal Council on the Congress ticket but after that bitter experience he gave up politics for good to devote himself only to academic & theological pursuits. But in his political views he remained committed to Hindu-Muslim unity , national integration and secularism and though not in politics he always extended moral support to honest & selfless politics . Out of his ground contact came his sociological study of the Muslim Baradarin’ which is rated as a source book. He was a master of Urdu, as spoken in Delhi & had the gift of translating ideas and thought, even on theological question simply and briefly. Maulana was influenced in his religious thought by Shah Waliullah & Maulana Abu Kalam Azad. He published a commentary on Tarjumanun Quran under the title Maulana Azad ki Qurani Baseerat. He wrote extensively on Tafseer and secret. But his ‘Magnum Opus’ is editing the first 200 year old translation of the Holy Quran in Urdu by Shah Abdul Qadir Dehlvi under the title ‘Mauzehatal Quran’ after comparing all available edition, then a commentary thereon under the title ‘Mahasin-e- Muzehatal Quran’. This book alone is enough to immortalize him as it includes a digest of many Tafseers in Arabic, Persian & Urdu. He also penned dozens of books and merely 200 articles on various aspect of the Quran, the Seerat & Fiq’h. Maulana was an eloquent speaker in Urdu and his weekly Friday addresses in Madarsa Hussian Bakhsh attracted listeners form all over Delhi and even from outside. Maulana absolutely eschewed extremism both on theological and political issues. Following Shah Wallilullah and Maulana Azad, he was firmly of the view that Allah had also sent prophets to guide the people of the subcontinent but their teachings were distorted over a period of time. He respected the religious leaders of the Hindu community as well as the religiosity of the common Hindus. In his books on Seerat he emphasized the moderation in the personal and political conduct of the Holy Prophet towards others. He tried to imbibe his piety and humility. in his own life & conduct. As a scholar of comparative religion, though a firm exponent of the Hanafi School, he never showed any prejudice in his writings or presentations towards other sunni & non sunni sects. Through his Idara Rahmat-e- Alam the Maulana published about 200 brochures & more than 25 books for the common man in his charactereristic style, to clarify theological & historic points. Indeed, towards the end of his life he become the point of reference for elucidation of any difficulty the lay Muslims experienced in understanding the Quran and the Seerat No living Islamic scholar in Delhi can fill the void left by the Maulana in the foreseeable future or match his brilliance, intelligence and articulation or his capacity to express his views in simple style and in fewest possible words. Maulana Qasmi recived the President’s Award as an Arabic Scholar. For his writing in Urdu he was recognized by Delhi Urdu Academy. IQBAL AHMAD ANSARI (1935-2009) Eminent Academician and Ceaseless Crusader for Human Rights Syed Shahabuddin Born on 25 February, 1935, Prof. Iqbal Ahmad Ansari obtained MA in English from the AMU and a Post-Graduate Diploma in English Studies from Cardiff (UK). Subsequently, he served the AMU as a teacher of English language and literature (1962 - 1995. On retirement, he served the Jamia Hamdard and Jamia Millia Islamia as Visiting Professor. Earlier, he had a teaching assignment (1979-80) at the King Abdul Aziz University, Madina campus. While serving in the AMU he was actively associated with curriculum and course designing and material production and organization of workshops for teachers of English. He served as the Director of the AMU Centre for Promotion of Educational and Cultural Advancement of Muslims and organized several conferences and workshops on Indian Muslims, some in cooperation with the Department of Education. As a member of the General Body of the Institute of Objective Studies (IOS), Delhi he was long associated with many projects and committees. He organized seminars and edited the monumental "Reading on Minorities", in four volumes. Also, on behalf of the Institute he edited the quarterly journal ‘Human Rights Today’. He compiled Seminar papers on The Muslim Situation in India (1989). He was the founder Secretary General of the Minorities Council of India, under whose banner, he organized two seminars on Problems of Minorities in India and Hindu-Muslim Relation. Under the auspices of Citizens for Democracy, he organized a National Seminar on Communal Riots and the Rule of Law Enforcement Agencies in India, at Bombay in January, 1994. As Vice Chairman of the Coordination Committee on Kashmir, which was chaired by late Justice V M Tarkunde, he investigated and brought out five reports on human rights situation and organized a National Seminar on Kashmir: Problem and Prospects in Delhi in 1991. He served the National Commission on Minorities as a Consultant and prepared a Report on Prevention and Control of Communal Violence. On the question of recognition of Muslims as a Backward Class under article 15(4) of the Constitution he vigorously successfully interacted with the Venkatachalliah Commission. He participated in National conference on Reservation in 1994 & in convention on Representation in Legislatures organized by AIMMM in 1994 & 1998. He wrote extensively in Urdu and English in well known national and international newspapers and journals on a variety of subjects like Democracy in India, Modernization and Islam, Social Violence, Human Rights, Reservation for Muslims, Muslim Personal Law and Minority Rights. Among the journals to which he regularly contributed were the Radical Humanist, Seminar, and Economic and Political Weekly. He investigated various communal riots including Jabalpur (1961), Ahmedabad (1969), Aligarh (1978), Meerut (1987) etc. In the case of Meerut he played an important role in bringing the Hashimpura Massacre to trial and in shifting its venue from Ghaziabad to Delhi as well as in securing enhanced compensation for the next-of-kin. He also wrote several books and booklets on reservation, communal violence, police and judicial reform. He contributed chapters to Minorities and State at the Indian Law, edited by Dr. Tahir Mahmood, Sir Syed’s Reappraisal, edited by Prof. Atique Siddiqi, two chapters on the New Emerging Nations and Human Rights Education in India and Pressing Issues Facing the Nation, edited by Dr. Tahir Mahmood and a chapter in Violation of Democratic Rights in India, edited by Mr. A.R.Desai. His magnum opus publication includes Political Representation of Muslims in India: 1952-2004. Prof. Ansari participated in many national and several international conferences, like the International Seminar on Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim States organized by the Islamic Council of Europe in London in 1978, the World Congress on Human Rights sponsored by Human Service Centre, Geneva, in New Delhi in Dec. 1990, the second Parliament of World Religions in Barcelona. He was a life member of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, New Delhi and a member of the National Executive of Citizens for Democracy. Of late he was involved in Citizens Initiatives for Peace under whose banner he was planning a Round Table of eminent jurists to formulate a national consensus on reservation for minorities, a revised law against social violence and judicial and police reforms. Iqbal Ansari received a Citation of Excellence in 2008 by the JNU. He was also recognized by his alma mater. With his inexhaustible energy and total immersion Prof. Ansari produced an unceasing torrent of ideas in all areas of his commitment. As an eminent figure in his chosen field he not only expressed himself in lectures and articles but also kept in touch with leading figures including eminent jurists, retire Chief Justices and public figures. Essentially a teacher, for 20 year, he remained a teacher to his last breath and continued to educate the nation, and the Muslims in particular, on the Constitution, Human Rights and Minority Rights and National Integration and Rule of Law in order to build a violence free and humane India. Prof. Ansari passed away suddenly on 13 October, 09, survived by his wife, three sons and two daughters, surrounded us ever by many unfinished projects. A national loss, his demise removes from the scene a tireless worker and an articulate activist who combined knowledge, commitment and capacity to translate his concepts and ideas into countless speeches and articles and several books. His death creates a void which is unlikely to be filled in the foreseeable future. A Tribute to Habib Tanvir, September 1,1923–June 8, 2009 SHANTA GOKHALE, Theatre Critic Habib Tanvir identified so completely with a theatre that used Chhattisgarhi actors, dialect and narrative material that it is difficult to believe he chose to train at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, London. Halfway through the course he saw how irrelevant the training was to his idea of theatre. He quit and returned to India after writing and singing his way across Europe . When Tanvir returned to India, with a dream he had nurtured all through his travels in Europe. He was obsessed with doing Shudraka’s Mrichchakatikam. Its modernism and free-flowing form challenged him. In Delhi, Begum Qudsia Zaidi’s Hindustani Theatre was willing to back him. Begum Zaidi even translated the play into Hindi for him. Born in Raipur, Tanvir had grown up with local folk theatre forms like Nacha and Pandavani. On a visit home he watched an all-night Nacha performance and his mind was blown by the superb acting skills of the five actors before him. On an impulse, he asked them if they would go to Delhi to act in Mitti Ki Gadi. They happily agreed. Begum Zaidi laid the foundation of Naya Theatre, Tanvir’s karmabhoomi (workplace). The five became the backbones of Naya Theatre along with Tanvir’s wife and professional partner, Moneeka Misra. Together they tried, failed, tried again to meld the skills, spontaneous energy and instinctive feeling for movement and song of the Chhattisgarhi actors with Tanvir’s sense of narrative flow and overall structure. "It took me years to discover the simple thing that I should give my artistes autonomy; that I should give them their mother tongue," Tanvir once said in an interview. "I knew the sweetness of the dialect but I was totally unaware of its communicability to non-Chhattisgarhi people. after three years of failure, I made the breakthrough with Gaon Ka Naam Sasural, Mor Naam Damaad and then Charandas Chor." The trick was to use the Chhattisgarhi dialect, allow the actors to improvise and when their movements matched his ideas, freeze them. The 1974 play, Charandas Chor, became a hit in India and abroad. The earlier 1954 hit, Agra Bazaar, had revealed the possibility of bringing urban actors and rural non-actors together successfully on the same stage, Charandas Chor established a way of bringing together the sophistication of modern urban theatre with the vitality of folk artistes. Doing plays with Chhattisgarhi actors was not part of the "back to the village" movement . Tanvir was not chasing folk forms to use as decorative elements,. He was chasing folk actors for the specific vitality, acting and singing skills only they could bring to his plays. He wanted to be part of their great cultural traditions and in the process help those traditions and the actors to survive. The actors were well paid and stayed with Naya Theatre till they retired or died because it allowed them to live off their art with dignity. In the village, they were the lowest of the low. On the Naya Theatre stage they were kings and queens. Habib Tanvir did not believe government schemes could help folk arts. If folk theatre was to survive, it needed hard work from within, not "uplift" from outside, he asserted. Tanvir combined a passion for theatre with an uncompromising belief in secular-liberal values and a lifelong engagement with social problems. His most overtly political play, Hirma Ki Amar Kahani, appeared to some critics to be an argument in favour of feudalism against democracy. But Tanvir pointed out that democracy was not all white. It could be used for a fascistic agenda as had happened in Gujarat. Similarly, feudalism was not all black. It had encouraged the arts. Hirma, only provoked people to see both sides of the story. Standing up for your convictions, countering lies, fighting parochialism, meant running personal risks. His play, Ponga Pandit, was attacked by the Hindu Right for being supposedly anti-Hindu. But he stood his ground. Habib Tanvir was theatre in every sense of the word. His death orphans the art. (This article was published in The Hindu on June 14, 2009.) Tyeb Mehta – A Tribute Tyeb Mehta, one of India’s most tal-ented and celebrated artists, passed away in Mumbai on July 2. Born in Kapadwanj, Gujarat, the 83-year-old artist lived in Mumbai for most of his life apart from brief but crucial spells in London, New York and Santiniketan. Tyeb Mehta was an artist of quiet humility but was vocal and public in his stand against communal violence and in his support of human rights and the freedom of expression. His work was notable for its commitment to the ideals of equality and freedom. When he was 22, India was partitioned and his street was also divided, reflecting the reality of a ravaged subcontinent. He was unable to travel the relatively short distance to his workplace. In the bloodbath that followed, he was witness to a horrifying incident in which a young man was lynched. This was an image that would stay with him for the rest of his life. "The crowd beat him to death and smashed his head with stones," he said in an interview with art critic Nancy Adajania. "I was sick with fever for days afterwards and the image still haunts me today. I am paralysed by the sight of blood, violence of any kind, even shouting…" Sixteen years ago he drew by hand the huge backdrop for SAHMAT’s Artists Against Communalism cultural sit-in at the Shivaji Park in Mumbai in 1992. Against this backdrop, Sitara Devi and Astad Deboo danced and Hariprasad Chaurasia played the flute. Despite his increasing physical frailty in recent years, he came out to join the protest at Mumbai’s Jehangir Art Gallery in May 2007 after the BJP attacked the student review in the art department of the MS University in Vadodara. For us at Sabrang, Tyeb Mehta & his family have been staunch supporters of our work and he was generous in donating his work to support our efforts against communal forces. We join the wider art fraternity in paying tribute to a fine artist who spoke out during dark times. – Editor, Communal Cmbat MONUMENTS Monumental Asset & Heritage Site Focus on Tourism Potential Editorial, Thimes of India, 13 October, 2009 The Union culture ministry has admitted that as many as 249 heritage sites in the country are being encroached upon. The violated sites include Sher Shah Suri’s tomb in Sasaram, Bihar, and Maratha king Shivaji’s three historic forts at Sindhudurg, Solapur and Raigad. In July 2009, a spokesperson of the ministry said that out of the 3,675 centrally protected monuments or sites, as many as 35 have simply vanished, because of "urbanisation, commercialisation and routine development work". World heritage sites in India are not being given the benefit of that status. Illegal occupation by squatters or commercial establishments is common within the circumscribed ‘no-trespass’ zone radius of the monument. Monuments continue to be defaced by irresponsible visitors and locals. The world over, monuments are prime tourist attractions and the sites are sustained with revenue from visitor footfalls and merchandising. The local economy thrives on the activity generated by travellers who make the trip not just to gaze at a monument but to also experience whatever else the place has to offer. Should we miss out on all the benefits that can accrue to a heritage site and the region for lack of imagination and initiative? The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) has its hands full, as it were, with documentation, research and plans of conservation. It lacks the imagination and resources to develop heritage sites into much more than ruined remnants of a dead past. The answer is to outsource work relating to maintenance and beautification, security and promotion. The ASI should consider converting as many heritage sites as possible into living monuments, housing visitor centres, libraries and museums, bringing the past alive and making daily maintenance a routine. Event managers and corporate sponsors can help promote and maintain ancient monuments with more imagination, arrange for merchandising souvenirs and boost the local economy by marketing the works of local artisans and craftspersons. A few heritage attractions like Khajuraho and Chidambaram have been able to sustain cultural festivals on their sites, drawing tourists and sponsors; there is no reason why this cannot be replicated in similar destinations across the country. Ten per cent of employment in the country is generated by tourism that contributes more than 6 per cent of GDP. Tourism can boost the hospitality industry and its subsidiary feeder industries. All this can be promoted by maintaining our heritage. INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS Minorities in India and Pakistan Nehru-Liaquat Agreement on Minorities, 8 April,1950 (Extracts) A.The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure to the Minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honor, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country’s civil and armed forces. Both Governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to enforce them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention to the fact that these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its Constitution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar provision exists in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights shall be assured to all their nationals without distinction. Both Governments wish to emphasize that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and that it is to the Government of their own State that they should look for the redress of their grievances. B. In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between the two Governments : (i) That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal effects and household goods as a migrant may wish to take with him. Moveable property shall include personal jewellery. (ii) That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash as he does not wish to take with him with a Bank. (iii) That there shall be no harassment by the Customs authorities. (iv) Rights of ownership in or occupancy of the immoveable property of a migrant shall not be disturbed. If, during his absence, such property is occupied by another person, it shall be returned to him, provided that he comes back by the 31st December 1950. Where restoration of immoveable property to the migrant who returns within the specified period is found not possible the Government concerned shall take steps to rehabilitate him. (v) That in the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all his immoveable property shall continue to vest in him and he shall have unrestricted right dispose of it by sale, by exchange with an evacuee in the other country, or otherwise. A Committee consisting of three representatives of the minority and presided over by a representative of Government shall act as trustees of the owner. The Committee shall be empowered to recover rent for such immoveable property according to law. The Govt of East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura shall enact the necessary legislation to set up these Committees. C. As regards the Province of East Bengal and each of the States of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura respectively, the two Governments further agree: (1) Continue their efforts to restore normal conditions and shall take suitable measures to prevent recurrence of disorder. (2) Punish all those who are found guilty of offences against persons and property and other criminal offences. In view of their deterrent effect, collective fines shall be imposed, where necessary. Special courts will, where necessary, be appointed to ensure that wrong-doers are promptly punished. (3) Make every possible effort to recover looted property. (4) Set up immediately an agency, with which representatives of the minority shall be associated, to assist in the recovery of abducted women. (5) Not recognize forced conversions. Any conversion effected during a period of communal disturbance shall be deemed to be a forced conversion. Those found guilty of converting people forcibly shall be punished. (6) Set up a Commission of Enquiry at once to enquire into and report on the causes and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendations with a view to preventing recrudescence of similar trouble in future. The personnel of the Commission, which shall be presided over by a Judge of the High Court, shall be such as to inspire confidence among the minority. D. Sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of C of the Agreement are of general scope and applicable, according to exigency, to any part of India or Pakistan. E. In order to help restore confidence, so that refugees may return to their homes the two Governments have decided: (i) to depute two Ministers, one from each Government to remain in the affected areas for such period as may be necessary; (ii) to include in the Cabinets of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam a representative of the minority community. F. In order to assist in the implementation of this agreement, the two Governments have decided, apart from the deputation of their Ministers referred to in E, to set up Minority Commissions, one for East Bengal, one for West Bengal and one for Assam. The function of the minority commission shall be: (i) To observe and to report on the implementation of this Agreement and, for this purpose, to take cognizance of breaches or neglect ; (ii)To advise on action to be taken on their recommendations (iii) Each Commission shall submit reports, as and when necessary, to the Provincial and State Governments concerned. Copies of such reports will be submitted simultaneously to the two Central Ministers during the period referred to in E. G. Except where modified by this Agreement, the Inter-Dominion Agreement of December 1948 shall remain in force. MUSLIM MINORITIES Towards a Fiqh for Muslim Minorities Al Alwani’s Book Reviewed by Yoginder Sikand, Eminent Scholar Almost half the world’s Muslim population today lives as minorities. In some countries, such as India and China, Muslim minorities number in the tens of millions. In addition to these traditional Muslim minorities that have been in existence for centuries, recent decades have witnessed the emergence of thriving Muslim communities in countries that previously have had no significant Muslim presence, such as is the case of several West European states. Some of the world’s leading Islamic scholars today are members of Muslim minority communities, and many of them are playing an important role in developing new Islamic perspectives on a range of issues that modernity has forced Muslims to engage with, such as religious pluralism, inter-religious relations, gender justice and politics. However, despite the growing salience of Muslim minorities in shaping global Islamic discourse, the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) has not seriously taken the Muslim minority condition into account. Consequently, leading Islamic scholars, for the most part members of Muslim minority groups themselves, are now calling for new fiqh perspectives that reflect the particular socio-political contexts as well as concerns of Muslim minorities. One such scholar is the US-based Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani. Author of numerous books on Islamic law, al-Alwani is a graduate of the renowned al-Azhar University, Cairo. He has served as the President of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, USA, and is currently the president of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences and the Fiqh Council of North America. In his recently published book Towards A Fiqh For Minorities: Some Basic Reflections, al-Alwani develops a theoretical framework for an Islamic jurisprudence attuned specifically to the contemporary Muslim minority context. Al-Alwani sees this as an urgent necessity, given that the corpus of classical Muslim fiqh is based on the assumption of Muslims being in a majority, and hence ignores the Muslim minority condition or else provides prescriptions that are hardly practicable today. Al-Alwani writes that the medieval fuqaha typically regarded the Muslim minority condition as ‘casual’ and ‘transient’, and hence it did not merit their attention. Accordingly, the rules that they formulated for Muslim minorities through their fatwas were ‘restricted’ and ‘isolated’, and were regarded simply as the fiqh of ‘crises’ or ‘emergency’, temporary at best. Al-Alwani sees the attacks of 11 September, 2001, as constituting a crucial defining moment for Muslim minorities, particularly those living in the West, and as necessitating new fiqh formulations for these communities. Al-Alwani refers to Western writers who refer to classical works of fiqh, randomly selecting passages in order to deliberately create the impression of Islam being synonymous with terror, hatred of adherents of other faiths, oppression of women and so on. In short, these writers seem to suggest that Muslim minorities can never be loyal citizens of their countries. To add to this growing crisis facing contemporary Muslim minorities from rapidly escalating Islamophobia is the almost complete absence of appropriate guidance for such communities in the existing works of fiqh. Hence, al-Alwani argues, the need for developing a new fiqh for Muslim minority communities (fiqh al-aqaliyya) has probably never been as urgent as it is today. Al-Alwani defines ‘fiqh for minorities’ as ‘a specific discipline which takes into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the conditions of the community and the location where it exists’. In this sense, ‘fiqh for minorities’ consists of a contextual application of the rules and principles of the primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence that is rooted in a recognition and appreciation of the particular conditions facing Muslims living as minorities. In developing this project al-Alwani opposes taqlid or the blind imitation of jurisprudential precedent on the grounds that the formulations of the classical fuqaha were a response to vastly different socio-political conditions, and hence are of little or no relevance as far as contemporary Muslim minorities are concerned. The corpus of medieval fiqh, he says, ‘was associated with the historic circumstances in which it was developed’. Being a product of its own time, it can hardly be applied in the vastly different social context of today. New perspectives on a range of old as well as new issues are urgently required, he says, for which ijtihad is indispensable. This does not mean that the entire corpus of medieval fiqh is, from today’s point of view, wholly irrelevant. Al-Alwani suggests that while it can no longer be blindly followed, it must be closely studied in order to discern the principles on which it is based, which, in turn, could provide contemporary Islamic jurists the necessary skills to respond to issues of present-day importance. A sensitive appreciation of the social context, al-Alwani writes, is indispensable in order to develop new fiqh responses to issues relating to Muslim minorities. Fuqaha providing Islamically appropriate answers to specific questions related to Muslim minorities in the form of fatwas must carefully examine the wider social context in which these questions emerge, as well as the social implications of implementing these fatwas. Furthermore, al-Alwani says, the fatwas should be guided not by a literalist reading of the sources of law, but, instead, should be shaped by the broader aims of the shari‘ah (maqasid al-shari‘ah), Islam’s missionary imperative as well as by the recognition of the fact that the shari‘ah ‘permits all that is clean and wholesome and forbids what is harmful’, and hence is ‘aimed at making life easier and more convenient’. The jurist must constantly remember that ‘the fulfillment of religious obligations is concomitant upon human ability’, and that everything is permissible unless specifically and categorically forbidden in the Qur’an and the authentic Prophetic traditions. The ‘fiqh for minorities’ project that al-Alwani seeks to develop is also aimed at reviving the dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence. Al-Alwani makes a clear distinction between the divine shari‘ah, on the one hand, and fiqh, on the other, which he recognizes as a human product. He marshals historical evidence to back his plea for fiqh formulations for Muslim minorities that might depart from the classical model. He writes that many classical jurists were themselves flexible in matters of several issues, changing them according to changing situations and conditions. Several jurists also differed with their teachers on certain matters on the grounds that the social conditions had changed. He even quotes the Prophet to legitimize his call for jurisprudential dynamism. The Prophet likewise, some of his companions, and their successors, are said to have changed their opinions on a range of issues of legal import in the face of new conditions. Although al-Alwani does not spell this out explicitly, this discussion suggests that he quite possibly considers the fact of Muslims being in a minority in a particular country as requiring that the rules of fiqh be modified to suit their particular context, and to be different in certain key respects from laws that ought to be enforced in a Muslim-majority state. Guided by these general principles, al-Alwani argues, new fiqh formulations suited to the conditions of Muslim minorities can emerge and develop that provide meaningful responses to the particular challenges that these communities find themselves faced with. As he sees it, this project would also help recover Islam’s vision of universality, which he regards as having been somewhat overlooked by the classical jurists owing to ‘a certain degree of introversion’, and ‘excessive preoccupation with parochial factors of geography and society’. It would help revive the ‘higher values, principles and objectives’ of Islamic law, which al-Alwani regards as having been ‘obscured’ by medieval fiqh that reinforced, as he puts it, a ‘partial, fractional and personalised’ image of Islamic jurisprudence. It would also enable contemporary Muslims in their task of missionary work, facilitating better relations between Muslims and people of other faiths, and in this way helping to realize some of the fundamental objectives of Islam. Furthermore, al-Alwani writes, it would displace the ‘fiqh of conflict’ that the classical fuqaha developed at a time when the world consisted of mutually hostile groups with little communication between each other, replacing it with a ‘fiqh of coexistence’ that is better suited to the world of today. As Al-Alwani sees it, the enormous complexity of today’s world and the explosion of human knowledge necessitate a new form of ijtihad in order to provide solutions, in the form of appropriate fatwas, to the problems that Muslim minorities are faced with. He pleads for collective, as opposed to individual ijtihad, calling for the traditional fuqaha to jointly work with experts in social and natural sciences on an equal basis in order to develop new fiqh formulations. These experts would examine issues from various different angles in order to provide contextually grounded and relevant fiqh prescriptions. Al-Alwani argues that collective ijtihad can help open up new possibilities for the progressive development of fiqh, albeit remaining within the boundaries set by the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. As to the authority of these two sources, he insists on the Qur’an’s primacy, while also recognizing the possibility of multiple interpretations of particular Qur’anic verses. Central to al-Alwani’s discussion are two crucial issues: the political loyalties of Muslim minorities, and their relations with their non-Muslim fellow citizens. Distancing himself from extremists who see non-Muslim states as necessarily ‘anti-Islamic’, al-Alwani argues that Muslim minorities must remain loyal citizens of their states as long as they are allowed full freedom of religion and are not deliberately victimized. This points to the possibility for Muslim minorities to live fully ‘Islamic’ lives even in the absence of an ‘Islamic’ state. Interestingly, al-Alwani critiques the classical notion of the ‘abode of Islam’ (dar ul-Islam) as limited to areas ruled according to Islamic law. He goes so far as to assert that, because Islam knows no geographical boundaries, ‘dar ul-Islam is anywhere a Muslim can live in peace and security, even if he lives among a non-Muslim majority’. Conversely, he says, the ‘abode of infidelity’ (dar ul-kufr) exists ‘wherever Muslims live under threat’, and this also includes several countries with Muslim majorities. al-Alwani approvingly quotes a medieval Islamic scholar as saying that ‘it is preferable for a Muslim to reside in a country where he can practice his religion openly’, than to live in dar ul-Islam, because in he can communicate the message of Islam to non-Muslims. Al-Alwani prefers to refer to contemporary non-Muslim countries that guarantee their Muslim citizens the freedom of religion as dar ul-da‘wah or ‘the land for the propagation of Islam’, regarding it perfectly legitimate for Muslims to be loyal citizens of such states. Yet, this does not mean that Muslim minorities must blindly obey the dictates of their states if the states promote tyranny and injustice. In such an event, al-Alwani writes, Muslim minorities resident therein must actively work to promote justice and counter oppression and must not willingly collude in any form of injustice. Furthermore, he argues that for the sake of promoting justice and for protecting or promoting their interests, it is acceptable for Muslim minorities to participate in electoral politics. On the question of relations with non-Muslim majorities, al-Alwani refers to the Qur’an as mandating ‘tolerance and justice’ and as exhorting Muslims to ‘be kind and equitable’ with those non-Muslims who do not fight them on account of their faith. Al-Alwani regards this as the basic principle that should guide Muslims in their relations with others. ‘All developments and new situations’, he says, ‘must be judged according to this principle’. Linked to this is the Qur’anic injunction that describes committed Muslims as the ‘best nation ever raised for mankind’. This suggests, al-Alwani writes, that Muslims have the responsibility of conveying God’s message to all of humanity, and to work for justice for all, and for this, naturally, good relations between Muslims and non-belligerent non-Muslims need to be promoted. Many of the points that al-Alwani raises have already been discussed in considerable detail by numerous Islamic scholars in the past. Yet, his is probably the first book that sets out to formulate a methodology for developing a fiqh specifically attuned to the particular context of Muslim minorities. The need for the revival of the dynamism of early Islamic jurisprudence, sensitive to local contexts and responding to situational demands in a constructive manner, appears to be growing. And in this ambitious project scholars speaking from a context of Muslim minority-ness seem to be playing a leading role, an interesting reversal of the classical model. (Source: Sikand’s book Muslims In India) INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE Islamic- Christian Dialogue Risks & Pitfalls to be Avoided for Success-I Dr. Ezzddin Ibrahim, Eminent Islamic Scholar, Abu Dhabi The dialogue of Islam with Christianity goes back to the early days of Islam. The Qur’an is full of verse directed towards the followers of Christianity, at times confirming the truths shared between the two religions, sometime indication the clearly attested differences of belidf, and area calling for a meeting on "common terms" between them. The Prophet (God’s Blessing and peace be upon him) held discussions with the priests and monks of Najran for three days I Makinah when they stayed as his guests in the mosque. He also wrote to the Coptic Patriarch in Egypt, to the Negus, Kind of Abyssinia, to Hercalirs,, the ruler of the Byzantines, to Jabala bin al-Ayham, a Ghassanid king, ot Bishop Daghaatir of Constantinople and to Abu Harith b. ‘ Alaqama,, bishop of Najran Muslims have continued this dialogue both orally and in writing almost without cease, except in the periods of the sad clashes between followers of the two religions, and then during the Crusades and the period of Western colonialism.1 Although dialogue between the followers of the two religions has but always been palatable, even there has been at times harshness in disputes because of htezeal with which each side has held its beliefs, never less this teachings of Islam remains true to three important qualities: debate with the People of the Book should be "in a way that is better"; Muslims should remember that Christians are "nearest in affection"; and that relations with those who do not take part in attacks upon Muslims should follows the way kindness and justice. For God Almighly has said " And argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in a way that is better"; ( Surah 29:46), and "Thou wilt find the bearest of them in affection to those who believe to be those who say: Lo! We are Christians. That is because there are among them priests and monks, and because they are not proud" ( Sura 5,8:2) and " Allah forbiddeth you not those who warred not INSTITUTIONALIZATION THE INTER-FAITH DIALOGUES From these Inter-faith dialogues, we should expect no miracles except those that result from open hearts, the willingness to see the other side’s viewpoint, and a great deal of patience. To institutionalize these Dialogues, my country has proposed setting up an "Interfaith council" in the United Nations system, not just a "focal point" in the office of the Secretary General or in the Economic and Social Council to coordinate and monitor these dialogues. If creating a new council is overly difficult –as some legalists have warned –then, perhaps, we could write an interfaith mandate in the mission order of the Trusteeship Council, which has any way run out of trust territories to supervise. I ask King Abdullah, King Carlos, and all of us in the Madrid Dialogue to lead a movement to create this "Interfaith council" in the U.N. WE MUST LEARNTTO CREATE SPACE FOR OTHER FAITHS Ultimately as President Bill Clinton has said the twenty first century will be defined by a simple choice the nations must make whether to emphasize their ethnic, ideological, and religious differences or their common humanity. But nations can never make the right choice, for as long as their peoples insist that "our faith must reign supreme" since this claim can be affirmed only by the negation of all other faiths. So we must reinterpret our traditions to embrace pluralism in culture and in society. We must learn to create space for alternative faiths. After all, every great religion arose from the same wellspring of faith accepting, for its central belief, God’s direct and decisive intervention in human history by revealing Himself to humankind. GLOBAL ETHIC The German Theologian Hans Kung has spent a life time studying the great religions, in an effort to understand their ethical messages to our conflict-ridden world. And the vision of how he has derived from his studies, he sums up in four propositions: 1. No peace among the nations without pea3e among the religions. 2. No peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions. 3. No dialogue between the religions without global ethical standards; and 4. No survival of our world without a global ethic. This suggests how crucial and how urgent we must regad our search for moral values and ethical standards that all the faiths and belief systems could share above and beyond their surface differences in dogma, symbols, and rituals. We must accept that every community every society whether big or small needs a basic consensus on ethics, if it is not to succumb either to anarchy or to the domination of the strong. Without a global ethic, world order would never be sustainable. The ore of this global ethic – Hans Kung suggests humankind can discover in the simple but profound principle: "Treat other as you would like to be treated." This "Golden Rule" might indeed be the common ethical denominator in all the religious – and even non belief system on Earth. As Hans Kungs emphasizes, the Global Ethic is no substitute for the Great Books of the Faiths – the Torah, the Sermon on ht eMount, the Qur’an, the Bhagvadgita, the Discourses of the Budha, the analects of Confucious. Neither is it a global ideology. The Global Ethic is nothing but the necessary minimum of binding values, irrevocable standards, and moral attitudes which all religions can affirm, and which even non-believers can support. The Universal Peace Federation has put forward its first principle: that we are all God’s children, belonging to "one human family under God." In sum- As the mother of thics of the whole of humankind, the Golden Rule could become the core of initial agreement around which Interfaith Dialogue in our time could build a thousand years of peace as a community of sharing: the peace of "every man living under his vine and his fig tree." Against you on account of religion and drove you not from your homes, that you should show them kindness and deal justly with them. LO! Allah loveth the just dealers" (Sura 60:8). At the present time, and for forty years to be exact. Islamic-Christian dialogue has been given new vigour, and regular meetings and gatherings have been organized for it in Broumana, Riyadh, the Vatican, Tripoli in Libya, Geneva, Paris, Salzburg, Cairo, Beirut, Lagos, Tunis, Hong Kong, Caordova and else where. The resut has been declarations, recommendations clarifications as well as research papers and many books.2 The Initiative for contemporary with faith dialogue was taken by Pope Paul VI, who promulgated the encyclical Ecclesiam Suam which called for dialogue, on 6 August 1964. This was shortly after the Secnd Vatican ouncal which mentioned with approval, and called fro past conflicts to be forgotten. The Pope established the Secretariat for Non-Christian Affairs in the Vatican, established the World Council of Churches in Geneva the Sub-Unit for Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies. In the Islamic world no equivalent institution has appeared, except the initiatives by the Muslim Would League Makkah Da’wa al Islamia in Tripoli. Undoubtedly, dialogue meetings have produced an atmosphere of optimism and positive understanding between the Islamic and Christian worlds, and have helped to remove mistake perceptions about each other. They have encourage commendable cooperation in the struggle against attitudes and tendencies which the two ‘religions reject, in the intellectual, behavior, social and political spheres. They have helped develop friendship between intellectuals and educted followers of the two religions, fostering potential growth in understanding and cooperation, friendship and peace in the world. However, there are many weak points and shortcomings in this process. Which should be confronted frankly and faithfully if we wish the currnet of dialogue to flow successfully. This is particularly pertinent when the call to dialogue has been renewed in recent years at the highest level at both international and Arab conferences. May be the first weak point in these dialogue meetings is the lack of clear final statement of intention agreed upon by all sides. It is not enough for such a statement to be a vague spiritual call to mutual understanding and love without establishing the basic principles and putting aside the hidden intentions that may surround it. Since the initiative in the contemporary dialogue has come from the Christian would, the document on this subject (its direction, aims and related intention) are necessary Christian. If the Islamic would had ever been in a position to produce documents on this subject, then the two sides could have been in the same unfortunate position of regarding dialogue as a veiled means of evangelisms. Christian documents are: 1 The encyclical Eccclesiam Suam of Pope Paul VI. Published in 1964: 2 The publication, Reflections and Orientations on Dialogue and mission issued by the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Christian Affairs in 1984 in connection with the twentieth commemoration of the contemporary dialogue: 3 The report of the consultative seminar organized by the would Council of churches in Zurich in May 1970. For the sake of brevity I will content myself with these three documents. I should also mention the detailed study published by Dr Hallencreutz, a Notwegian theologian, in which he states that, dialogue is the second phase in the movement of Christian evangelisation, the first being that from evangelism to witness, and the second from witness to dialogue; three phases deferent in degree but with one purpose with regard to their substance whtich is evangelization, Christians believe in Christian evangelization as part of their creed. I myself as a Muslim stand for mission,k and I recognize this concern both in myself and in my companions engaged in mission for our own religion. Rather, I want the purpose of dialogue to be perfectly clear bo both the sides. If the aim is evangelisation then so be it, let us be frank and give it a definition which is free from the intention to evagelise. To end , the in Tripoli in February 1976, under the presidency of Cardinal Pignedoli and Dr. Mahmud al- Sharif, agreed to adopt the following definition: "The aim of dialogue is for participants form the two religion to exchange information, thinking, and factual knowledge, which increases the understanding on each side of the others religion, history, culture and other concerns, in order religion, history, culture and other concerns, u birder it clarify matters of convergence and divergence between them in sincerely and objectively, while allowing each side to maintain its beliefs, obligations and commitments, in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual esteem." This definition can be described as precautionary rather than comprehensive, because it guards against the inclusion of evangelisation as a component of dialogue but does not set out the available possibilities for dialogue except in general terms. But the good it did was sufficient, because excising the harmful is more urgent than promoting the beneficial. One of the weak points which must be avoided is to confuse dialogue with syncretism, whether explicitly or implicitly. Explicit syncretism is for example, when a participant in a dialogue proposes agreement on a declaration of faith composed of seven points which he has selected from the teachings of Islam and Christianity. While these seven points may be acceptable to Muslims and Christian when taken separately, their presentation as a seven- part formula can be mistaken as a replacement for the existing Islamic declaration of faith with its two parts. So even though the proposal might arise from pure motives, it turns out, for this reason, to be explicit syncretism. An example of implicit syncretism occurred in the dialogue in Beirut when participates attended two services, in a mosque and in churches and in another session meetings were opened with prayers make up from passages of the Holy Qur’an, the psalms and the New Testament. This was abandoned, and everyone agreed to a straightforward reading from the New Testament alone. If participants made concessions to syncretism dialogue would be changed into something resembling the search for the middle formula which politicians try to arrive at in their compromise. But there is a difference between revealed religious injunctions and devised political views. MUSLIM MINOTITIES-CHINA Grandmother whom Beijing Fears Reshma Patil China has accused a 58-year-old exiled grandmother, mother of 11 children and a former millionaire of plotting the nation’s deadliest riots in decades that killed 156 and injured over 1,000 on Sunday. Over a decade ago, Rebiya Kadeer was part of China’s political elite and nominated to a top government advisory panel and business forums. She was on the list of China’s rich and famous as the wealthiest Uighur businesswoman in northwest Xinjiang with an estimated 25-million-dollar empire. The remote oil-rich province of Xinjiang - it also borders parts of India, Pakistan and Afghanistan -simmers with a deep-rooted divide between ethnic Uighur Muslims and migrant Han Chinese. On Sunday, the tension erupted in riots that armed police struggled to control in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi. China quickly blamed Kadeer who heads the separatist World Uighur Congress, for instigating rioters through the Internet and telephone - charges she denied. The official evidence handed to State-run media included a recent call to her brother in Urumqi, when she reportedly said: We know a lot of things have happened." A section of the Uighurs are affiliated to groups seeking an independent Turkestan state and protection of their unique cultural and religious rights allegedly stifled under Chinese control. Rights groups claim that the controls include prohibiting Uighur students and government staff from fasting during Ramadan. (Source: The Hindustan Times, 9 July, 2009) .Uighur Discontent Chandra Muzaffar It would be a mistake for the Chinese government to rely mainly upon massive arrests, bans upon demonstrations and curbs on the media to contain Uighur discontent in the Xinjiang province of Western China. The Chinese government should address the root causes of the discontent. Poverty, widespread unemployment, low paying jobs and alleged discrimination in the work-place, have created a deep sense of alienation within the Uighur population. There is also considerable unhappiness about the Han influx into Xinjiang which has altered the province’s demography. Today, about 50 percent of the province’s population is Han; five decades ago it was less than 5 percent. The Uighurs who are 10 million strong and make up the other 50 percent, feel overwhelmed in their own homeland especially since most of the powerful and influential positions are held by the Han. It is the Hans, the Uighurs allege, who enjoy the lion’s share of rapid economic growth in a province that is well endowed with oil and gas reserves. Add to all this, allegations of severe curbs upon Uighur culture and language, and one can understand why Uighurs have from time to time revolted against Beijing. This is why improving the economic well-being of the Uighurs is a major challenge facing the Chinese government. Special efforts should be made to channel development assistance to the Uighurs. The civil and social rights of the Uighurs and their distinctive cultural identity should also be accorded the respect they deserve. Most of all, empowering the Uighur minority should be part of a larger transformation that leads to the devolution of authority from the Centre to the provinces and the streng-thening of individual human rights and collective ethnic autonomies within the larger framework of the Chinese nation. This is a process that will take time but one hopes that the Chinese authorities will begin to move in that direction. The Uighurs for their part should continue their quest for justice in a peaceful manner, without resorting to acts of violence. The violent reaction of a small segment of the community to the killing of a couple of Uighur workers by Han Chinese in a toy factory in Guangdong province on 26 June 2009 has been exploited by the Chinese media to tarnish the image of the Uighur people both domestically and internationally. The Uighurs should also guard against the infiltration of extremist interpretations of Islam which have begun to take root among a small fraction of their youths. If Uighurs remain on the middle path, it is quite conceivable that more of the Han Chinese intelligentsia will begin to understand and support their struggle for justice. | |
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